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I. INTRODUCTION
Analysts of legal doctrine need to put aside their telescopes. Too many
scholars are devoting too many pages to the scrutiny of pinpoint problems in
the law, grinding and regrinding their analytical lenses. In the process,
inevitably, they have lost track of matters farther from home, matters of the
conceptual juxtaposition of different fields of law and even of separate doctrines
within individual fields. What scholars perceive when they squint at the
exquisite details of legal rules is often a source of wonder.1 What they would
discern if they peered out at the wider span of the legal heavens, however,
might well alarm them.
In his satire of Socratic teachings, The Clouds, Socrates's contemporary,
Aristophanes, provided an apt commentary on the modem legal cosmos:
"Whirl is king, and has ousted Zeus." 2 Many legal doctrines today appear
jarringly, carelessly, almost randomly out of harmony with one another. The
chaos has gone largely undetected and hence has continued to swirl unimpeded.
But it is there to be seen, if only we care to look. To observe the chaos, one
has simply to forsake all instruments of magnification and scan the skies with
the naked eye.
In this Article, I take up the problem of structural consistency of law. By
this I mean the symmetry or asymmetry of doctrinal treatment between
structurally analogous (or "parallel") legal issues. Oddly, it is a concern that
has provoked little curiosity within the realm of jurisprudence. The theoretical
antithesis of the problem of structural inconsistency, the so-called fallacy of the
transplanted category, whereby structurally different legal issues are sometimes
treated alike because of superficial coincidences of nomenclature, has aroused a
bit of interest over the years.3 The more widespread phenomenon of courts and
1 Having devoted a daunting 833 pages to the subject of the Rule Against Perpetuities,
John Chipman Gray crowed that his subject was "concatenated with almost mathematical
precision." JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 869, at 757 (Roland Gray
ed., 4th ed. 1942) (1886). See also J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought,
39 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1986). Which is not, of course, to say that there is no such thing as
microscopic muddle. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757,757-58 (1994).
2 ARSTOPHANES, THE CLoUDS 307 (WJ.M. Starkie trans., MacMillan & Co. 1911)
(423 B.C.).
3 On this phenomenon, see WALTER W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF
THE CONFLICr OF LAWS 154-93 (1942); Moffatt Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted
Category, 37 CANADIAN B. REV. 535 (1959). Noting its occurrence in connection with the
transplantation of fiduciary law, for instance, see Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL.
L. REV. 795, 804-08 (1983); John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990
Sup. CT. Ray. 207, 209-13.
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legislatures treating similar legal issues unalike due to the absence of semantic
overlap or other cues or recognition of theoretical affinities, has garnered far,
far less.
In the pages following, I will attempt to demonstrate the extent of structural
inconsistency within a single category of law: namely, the law of wills and
inheritance of property. It is an ancient comer of the legal universe, one that
has had centuries to settle into logically coherent patterns and orbits. Yet it is
an area that continues to display-noticeably, one might even say remarkably-
a nebulous, unguided quality.4 Even recent efforts to codify the field of
inheritance law have failed to reduce the area to better structural order. One
might have expected the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws to intercede as a deus ex machina to fashion order out of chaos. It
produced a Uniform Probate Code, whose substantive articles have been newly
revised from top to bottom, with the ostensible purpose of "simplify[ing] and
clarify[ing] the law concerning the affairs of decedents." 5 Alas, the Conference
(im both of its incarnations) has left much of the chaotic doctrine intact. In a
few instances the Conference has even proven a diablo ex machina,
aggravating the law's disharmony. 6
This study may be read as a free-standing, and free-wheeling, critique of
the state of inheritance law in America today. It is intended, however, to be
both more and less than that. The aspects of inheritance law addressed here are
selective, comprising an assortment of doctrines that, when compared, turn out
to display sharp contrasts. But in order to place those comparisons in some
context, we will have to develop an analytic framework for mapping the
41 am not the first commentator to render such a judgment. Some twenty years ago,
Professor Gaubatz complained that "the lack of relationship between the technical rules of
law and the goals sought to be achieved by those rules" was a problem "particularly
prevalent" in inheritance law. Gaubatz proposed that its rules be loosened to permit greater
recourse to equity. See John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modem Wills Act, 31 U.
MIAML. RE v. 497,498-500 (1977).
5 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b)(1) (1993). This guiding principle appeared in the
original version of the Uniform Probate Code, promulgated in 1969. It was incorporated
into the revised version of the Code, completed in 1990, which makes no amendments to
the "general provisions" of the Code, found in Part 1 of Article 1, or to other, procedural
articles of the Code. See also id. art. 2 prefatory note (discussing the general aims of the
drafters of the revised Uniform Probate Code in 1990). A precursor was the Model Probate
Code, developed an academic generation earlier by Professors Simes and Bayse under the
sponsorship of the American Bar Association. See generally LEwis M. SIMEs & PAUL E.
BAYSE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW, INCLUDING A MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946)
(hereinafter MODEL PROBATE CODE].
6 But see infra note 39 for one notable effort by the Commissioners to bring structural
symmetry to inheritance law.
1996] 1059
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
problems of inheritance law that may be of some use in its own right. And the
comparisons thus drawn double as a case-study of the jurisprudential
phenomenon of structural inconsistency in law, which remains the larger object
of my inquiries.
The analysis will progress in stages. Part HI examines doctrines connected
with the formalization of wills. Part m" turns to doctrines involving the
construction of wills. Having told the tale, we shall proceed in Part IV to dwell
upon its morals: herein we treat the problem of structural inconsistency of law
in the abstract, as an attribute of the legal system that wants sufficient
theoretical attention and whose very existence has not even been fully
appreciated by lawmakers.
If. TEnTAMENTARY FORMALIZATION
A. Theoretical Prologue
Inheritance law stands on ceremony. In order effectively to create a will in
the United States, the testator must not only express her substantive intentions
but also observe a number of procedural niceties for due execution. It was not
ever thus. In colonial times, settlers were content to give effect to nuncupative
(oral) wills or even to depositions by friends or family concerning the
decedent's dispositive preferences as expressed to them casually. The court
then ordered distribution "according to the minde of the deceased. " 7
Nowadays, by contrast, every state has enacted a Statute of Wills requiring that
testamentary instruments be in writing,8 signed by the testator,9 witnessed by at
7 George L. Haskins, The Beginnings of Parfible Inheritance in the American Colonies,
51 YALE L. 1280, 1286-88 (1942) (quoting contemporary document, without citation, at
1288). In Great Britain, nuncupative wills disposing of real property were valid until 1677
and those disposing of personal property until 1837; Britain's American colonies began
enacting comparable provisions in the eighteenth century. See infra note 44. For a recent
survey of the historical development of testamentary formalities in England, citing to the
principal studies, see C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and
Legislative Reform: An Exmnination of the New Uniform Probate Code "Hamless Error"
Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism (pts. 1 & 2), 43 FLA. L. RL V. 167, 187-204,
599 (1991). See also Brenda Danet & Bryna Bogoch, From Oral Ceremony to Written
Document: The Transitional Language of Anglo-Saxon Wills, 12 LANGUAGE & CoMM. 95
(1992). Despite the relative informality of early English and American wills, rituals have
played a prominent part in western legal culture since classical times when they were, if
anything, even more pervasive than they are today. See Peter M. Tiersma, Rites of
Passage: Legal Ritual in Roman Law and Anthropological Analogues, 9 J. LEGAL HIST. 3
(1988).
8 In a few jurisdictions, nuncupative wills are still permitted under very limited
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least two subscribing witnesses (who in some jurisdictions must be present
simultaneously) and, in a few lingering jurisdictions, "published," that is,
acknowledged in an oral address as the testator's last will. 10 By tradition, these
formalities have been strictly enforced.II
What purposes are served by obliging the testator to follow these
procedures? In part, they function to provide the probate court with clear
evidence of the authenticity and substance of the estate plan submitted to it as
the testator's. Given that the testator herself is unavailable to verify those
facts, 12 the probate court has need of a reliable alternative; 13 a witnessed,
signed writing meets that end.' 4
circumstaices. See WILLIAM M. MCGOvERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
§ 4.5, at 177-78 (1988). A provision validating nuncupative wills in special cases appeared
in the Model Probate Code and was also included in an early draft of the Uniform Probate
Code, but it was omitted from the version finally adopted by the Commissioners. See
MODEL PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 49; UNiF. PROBATE CODE § 6 (First Tentative
Draft, Aug. 2-7, 1965); cf UNii. PRBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-502; id. app. VII, § 2-
502 (pre-1990 art. 2).
9 Some states further require that the signature appear at the end of the testamentary
instrument.
10 For references to state law, see infra note 35.
11 As one opinion put the matter a mite indelicately, "[in the case of execution the
courts do not consider the intent of the testator, but that of the Legislature." Twilley v.
Durkee, 211 P. 668, 674 (Colo. 1922). On the requirement of strict compliance (upon
which there has always been some difference of opinion), see 2 WLLIAM H. PAGE, ON THE
LAW OPWILLS § 19.4, at 67-68 (William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker eds., rev. ed. 1960
& Supp. 1996).
12 Perhaps unavailable is the wrong word to use, for the testator's testimony is also
inadmissible whilst she lives: Ante-mortem probate of wills is barred in the vast majority of
American jurisdictions-a policy Professor Langbein has condemned as a "worst evidence
rule." John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.. 2039, 2044 (1994) (book review).
For a recent discussion, see Aloysius A. Leopold & Gerry W. Beyer, Ante-Mortem
Probate: A Viable Alternative, 43 ARK. L. REV. 131 (1990). One may go a step further and
remark that were ante-mortem probate permitted, the formalities of will execution could be
dispensed with entirely!
13 The testimony of survivors is not a reliable alternative. E.g., Estate of Utterback,
521 A.2d 1184, 1188 (Me. 1987) ("Testimony concerning statements of intent made by a
testator... is almost always self-serving and rarely objective.").
14 E.g., Lorraine v. Grover, 467 So. 2d 315, 318 n.6 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1985)
("[TIhe avowed purpose of the Statute of Wills [is] to guard against fraud, but also ... [to
close] the door to 'the fabled triplets of conjecture, speculation and surmise.'"). The original
British statute requiring that wills be written, signed, and witnessed likewise expressed as its
purpose the "prevention of many fraudulent Practices which are commonly endeavored to
be upheld by Peury... ." An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes, 29 Car. 2 c. 3
(1677) (Eng.) (preamble). For academic discussions, see Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J.
1996] 1061
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
This aspect of will execution is fairly obvious, but the process also serves a
more subtle, though no less important, end: namely, to clarify what exactly the
testator meant to do when she composed the words that are alleged to comprise
her will. As modem linguistic theory recognizes, human language can function
to effect several different purposes. People use language to communicate-
indeed, that is its ordinary, day-to-day function-but they also use language, on
rarer occasion, to do things-that is, to accomplish, simply by virtue of the
recitation, some change of their worldly state. The words "I promise"-or, "I
do"-are examples of statements that have been turned to this purpose. Once
the individual speaks them, her life will never be the same again. And the
execution of a will also involves (as the linguists say) this performative use of
words. 15 Once a will is deemed effective, a court will enforce its terms; the
legal status of the beneficiaries adjusts accordingly. But because lay persons
more frequently use words for communicative than for performative purposes,
it falls upon authorities carefully to differentiate those instances in which
persons intend their words to carry legal consequences from those in which
they do not.
Now, how can the legal system distinguish between the two? One way is
by altering the form of the words themselves. The stylized, often redundant,
linguistic formulae found within testamentary instruments, 16 like those reserved
for other legally significant occasions, serve to set them apart from everyday
Tilson, Classificadon of Grantous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 6-9 (1941); John H.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 489, 492-93
(1975). A related function of will execution is to protect the testator from duress or undue
influence, thereby ensuring that the evidence presented in the testamentary dossier
accurately reflects what the testator wished to say. In this regard, the witnesses assume a
role that would otherwise be played by officers of the court, were the testator able
personally to testify. For discussions, see Gulliver & Tilson, supra, at 9-13; Langbein,
supra, at 496-97. For an early recognition, see HENRY SUGDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF
WILLS 178-79 app. (London 1837).
15 For the seminal theoretical discussion of this use of language, see J.L. AUSTIN, How
To Do THmNGs wrrH WORDS (F.O. Urmson & Marina SbisA eds., 2d ed. 1975) (based on the
William James Lectures, 1955). Austin distinguished performative words from constative
words (the latter term referring to mere communication). Id. at 4-7. Austin's most
renowned student, John Searle, prefers to term performative words as speech acts. See
JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH AcTs (1969); see also JOHN R. SEARLE, ExPRESSION AND
MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH Acrs (1979) [hereinafter EXPRESSION AND
MEANING]; John R. Searle, How Performatives Work, 12 LINGUITICS & PHIL. 535 (1989).
16 Among the conventional pleonasms: I make my "last will and testament." I "give,
devise, and bequeath ... " including "all the rest, residue, and remainder of my
estate ... ."And so on.
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speech. 17 (Indeed, the very setting apart of such speech is recognized by
popular terminological distinctions-hence, we exchange not wedding words,
but wedding vows.18) Such formulae, though, have drawn criticism, at least in
the context of legal discourse. Norman Dacey, in his best-selling do-it-yourself
estate planning manual, How to Avoid Probate!, railed against the "ponderous
phrases and legalistic mumbo jumbo" that continues to pepper modem wills. 19
(He nonetheless retained some of the traditional verbiage in his own model
wills, as he explained sarcastically, so that the reader "won't feel cheated." 20)
Other, heavier scholars have weighed in with similar criticisms. Fred Rodell,
in a classic indictment of the legal profession, dismissed legal language as
"solemn hocus-pocus," "reading as though [it] had been translated from the
German by someone with a rather meager knowledge of English." 21 I would
submit that Rodell and other exponents of the "Plain English" movement in
legal language have missed the point.22 It is useful for legally performative
statements to employ a distinctive vernacular precisely because this discourse,
unlike ordinary discourse, does accomplish "hocus-pocus." 2 3 The switch to a
17 Judge Posner has made the point in passing. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw AND
LnTRATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 272 (1988). For an early recognition, see JOHN
PRoFFATr, THE CURiosrrms AND LAW OF WiLis 51 (photo. reprint William S. Hein & Co.
1989) (San Francisco 1877) ("As if to appropriately mark the solemnity of the act, and to
declare a consciousness of it, it was the usual way to commence a will ... with 'In the
name of God, Amen' .... "). For a theoretical discussion, see AUSTIN, supra note 15, at
56-93.
18 Alternatively, the word word in lay discourse can be rendered performative (or at
least express an intent to be performative) with a slight embellishment, viz., "You have my
word!" or, in a more stylized version, "My word is my bond!"
19 NORMAN F. DACEY, HoWTO AVOID PROBATE-UPDATED! 555 (1980).
20 Id. Dacey's sarcasm held more truth than he knew: having grown accustomed to a
dichotomy between technical legal language and non-technical communicative language,
some lay persons believe that a document cannot be legally performative unless it contains
technical words. See Lawrence X. Cusack, The Blue-Pencilled Will: What's Wrong with a
Wdl in Plain English?, 118 TR. & EST., Aug. 1979, at 33, 34.
21 FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS! 185 (1939). See also id. at 7-20, 183-
202.
22 For the gospel of Plain English, see DAVID IELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE
LAW (1963); Robert W. Benson, The End of Legalese: 7he Game Is Over, 13 N.Y.U. Rv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 519 (1984-85), and with respect to wills, see, by the aptly named,
Thomas S. Word, Jr., A Brie.ffor Plain English Wdls and Trusts, 14 U. RIcH. L. REv. 471
(1980). The crusade is an old one: early champions in America (where the move converged
with the post-revolutionary campaign to new-model the entire English language) included
John Adams and Thomas Iefferson; and in England Jeremy Bentham and, as early as the
sixteenth century, Sir Thomas More. See MELLINKOFF, supra, at 202-03,238-56, 261-66.
23 Rodell goes astray when he continues: "Now it is generally conceded that the
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foreign-sounding grammar underscores to the lay person that when she uses
legal words she is playing with fire. Were plain English adopted instead, this
fact might be less clear; like an observer at an auction with a nervous twitch,
the lay person might appear to be doing legally significant things when she
does not mean to.24
Though the words of a will typically follow certain traditions of form,
these are not required by law.25 What lawmakers do insist on is that the testator
formalize her words, be they plain-spoken or lawyerly, within an execution
ceremony that involves a writing, signature, witnesses, and so forth. And here
too, the same policy can be perceived.26 The arcane minuet of the will-
execution ceremony, like the marriage ceremony, serves to impress upon the
testator that on this occasion her words will count, that this is no time for idle
banter.27 Whence have scholars referred to the "ritual function" of the Statute
purpose of language, whether written, spoken, or gestured, is to convey ideas from one
person to another." RODELL, supra note 21, at 185.
24 As a matter of law, a will is effective only if the testator envisions it to constitute an
instrument of testation; its words are not performative in and of themselves, but only
because the testator intends them to be so. In practice, however, courts often have no
evidence other than the will itself and so must infer (or not) the presence of this intent. See
infra note 27. For a related linguistic discussion, see AUSTIN, supra note 15, at 12-24.
25 E.g., Hebden v. Keim, 75 A.2d 126, 128 (Md. 1950) ("In some legal instruments
the use of technical words and phrases is required by the long usage of the law to
accomplish particular effect. But the law does not require a testator to use technical words
or any particular form of words in his will to convey his intention."); Dingess v. Drake, 64
S.E.2d 601, 604 (W.Va. 1951). For an early discussion, see HENRY SWNURNE, A BRIME
TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLES 190a-91 (Photo. reprint 1978) (London 1590).
26 In an English opinion dating to 1798, the Lord Chancellor called for "the
interference of the legislature to prevent.., the disposing of all a man's fortune [at death
by] the most slight and trivial act, attended with much less of form, solemnity, and
precision, than any act he could do with regard to any part of his property during his life."
Mathews v. Warner, 31 Eng. Rep. 96, 106 (Ch. 1798) (Loughborough, C.); see also 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *376 (London 1765-69)
(referring to the "solemnity" of will execution introduced by the act of 1677 requiring that
wills be written, signed and witnessed). For an early American recognition in a related
context, see Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. 239, 245 (N.IY. Sup. Ct. 1810) (Kent, C.) (noting
that the policy underlying seals "consists in giving ceremony and solemnity to the execution
of important instruments, by means of which the attention of the parties is more certainly
and effectually fixed and frauds less likely to be practiced upon the unwary").
2 7 Sometimes, even a ceremony is not enough: some executed wills have been
contested on the ground that they were not intended to be legally effective. In such cases,
courts have divided over whether to admit extrinsic evidence to help determine whether a
formalized document was intended to be performative as a will. See MCGOvERN FT AL.,
supra note 8, § 7.1; 1 PAGE, supra note 11, § 5.10; Ian E. Rein-Francovich, An Ounce of
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banter.27 Whence have scholars referred to the "ritual function" of the Statute
of Wils.28
So much is accepted wisdom and, moreover, wise: many persons are given
to speak and write off the cuff, many persons commit to words tentative drafts
of their wills and then have second thoughts when the time for inking draws
near. To admit into probate informal expressions of a testator's estate plan
could often thwart the true intent of the testator. To be sure, a formality
requirement also carries in its train some risk of error, in that the will excluded
for want of formality could nonetheless accurately reflect intent.2 9 But the very
2 7 Sometimes, even a ceremony is not enough: some executed wills have been
contested on the ground that they were not intended to be legally effective. In such cases,
courts have divided over whether to admit extrinsic evidence to help determine whether a
formalized document was intended to be performative as a will. See MCGOVERN ET AL.,
supra note 8, § 7.1; 1 PAGE, supra note 11, § 5.10; Jan E. Rein-Francovich, An Ounce of
Prevention. Grounds for Upsetting Wdls and Will Substitutes, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(1984-85).
28 Gulliver and Tilson coined the phrase. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 14, at 5-6;
Langbein, supra note 14, at 494-96. See also, e.g., Estate of Utterback, 521 A.2d 1184,
1188 (Me. 1987) (.. . to provide a reliable source of the testator's intent expressed under
circumstances where the testator fully understands the significance and permanence of the
statements he has reduced to written form"). A related function of ritual is to give the actor
a breathing space, so to say, to deliberate before acting, lest she subsequently regret a
decision made on the impulse of the moment. This rationale, which Lon Fuller called the
"cautionary function" of legal formalities, has been offered to justify the unenforceability of
unritualized donative promises. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L.
REV. 799, 800, 814-15 (1941); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U.
CI. L. REv. 1, 5, 13 (1979). For an early discussion, see 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECrURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE 907 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. London, John Murray 1885) (1861).
This rationale has less application to testamentary transfers, which are ambulatory; the
testator will have time to deliberate after the will is executed and can always modify her
estate plan by codicil, assuming she remains physically and mentally able. On the other
hand, knowledge that a will must be elaborately formalized may serve ex ante to discourage
procrastination resulting in "deathbed wills," common before formalities were required in
England, and notoriously poorly planned. This aim was recited in SUGDEN, supra note 14,
at 235 app.; see also Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 14, at 10-11 & n.32 (on the frequency
of the problem). Asserting that will formalities also serve psychological purposes, see Gerry
W. Beyer, The Will Execui'on Ceremony-History, Significance, and Strategies, 29 S. TEx.
L. REv. 413,419-20 (1987).
29 See Windham v. Chetwynd, 97 Eng. Rep. 377, 381 (K.B. 1757) (Mansfield, I.)
(opining that "many more fair wills have been overturned for want of the form, than
fraudulent have been prevented by introducing it."); 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, ON CONTRACTS
§ 575, at 380 (rev. ed. 1960 & Supp. 1994) (asserting, by analogy, that contract formalities
"may have done more harm than good ... attempt[ing] to determine justice and truth by a
mechanistic device ... evidencing a distrust of the capacity of courts and juries to weigh
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fact that the law demands formalities should function ex ante to encourage
proper execution and hence yield, in more instances, better evidence both of
the substance of the estate plan and of the testator's resolve to put it into legal
effect.30 As a fringe benefit, a formalities requirement also eases administrative
processes. It renders more efficient the proof of wills within probate
proceedings31 and generally should discourage litigation over the validity of
human credibility"). But see infra note 120 (asserting the contrary in the context of
scriveners' errors).
30 See Wright v. Bloom, 635 N.E.2d 31, 38 (Ohio 1994) (discussing the fbrmalities
associated with joint bank accounts). Apart from its ex ante effect on the reliability of
evidence in probate, a formalities requirement could reflect another, tacit policy: namely, a
preference for the distributive scheme mandated by the intestacy statute, absent clear
evidence of intent to the contrary. A formalities requirement effectively places upon
testators who do wish to deviate from the intestacy scheme the onus of evincing
unequivocally their intention to do so. Thus, the drafters of the New York Revised Statutes
of 1830 reported in a related context: "We may safely lean in favor of intestacy; since it
rarely happens that the dispositions of a disputed will are as just and equitable as those
which, in the event of its being set aside, the law provides." Report of Revisers of N.Y.
Statutes of 1827-28, quoted in W.W. Ferrier, Jr., Revival of a Revoked Will, 28 CAL. L.
REV. 265, 267 (1940); see also, e.g., In re Walker's Estate, 42 P. 815, 818 (Cal. 1895)
(requiring strict compliance with the Statute of Wills because "[ifn the absence of any will,
the law makes a wise, liberal, and beneficial distribution of the dead man's estate"),
modfled, 42 P. 1082 (Cal. 1896) (per curiam); Reed v. Roberts, 26 Ga. 294, 300-01
(1858) (requiring strict compliance with the Statute of Wills because "[o]rdinarily, our
statute of [intestate] distribution makes the fairest disposition of a dead man's property.").
Likewise in Great Britain, "it is true that the proposed regulation [requiring will formalities]
may sometimes produce an intestacy, where by the present law a... disposition might be
upheld: but the distribution ... in case of intestacy, is a just and fair distribution amongst
those who ... have the strongest claim to participate in the property of the deceased."
SUGDEN, supra note 14, at 235 app. But see Bosley v. Wyatt, 55 U.S. 390, 397 (1852)
(Taney, CJ.) (given that in America "[tihe property devised is, perhaps, in the greater
number of cases, the fruits of the testator's own industry ... the policy and institutions of
the country are adverse to the feudal policy of favoring the heir at the expense of the
devisee"). Cf. THOMAS E. ATINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 62, at 293 (2d
ed. 1953) (questioning the existence of this policy as an explanation for the requirement of
strict compliance with will formalities); Langbein, supra note 14, at 499-501 (same).
31 Fuller called this the "channelling function" of legal formalities; as he pointed out,
the procedural efficiency of formalities is useful for courts as well as for individual actors
who seek low-cost means of ensuring the legal effectiveness of their transactions. See
Fuller, supra note 28, at 801-03. See also Lawrence Friedman, The Law of the Living, the
Law of the Dead. Property, Succesion, and Society, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 340, 370-72; L.
Vold, The Application of the Statute of Frauds under the Udfonn Sales Act, 15 MNN. L.
REv. 391, 392-95 (1931) (anticipating the point in the context of contracts). For a judicial
discussion in the context of joint bank accounts, see Wright, 635 N.E.2d at 37. A related
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wills by again reducing the uncertainty of the evidence.32
This having been said, questions remain about what manner of form
suffices to corroborate testamentary intent. Certainly, the trend of recent days
has been to chip away at formal requirements, a trend also reflected in the
evolution of the model codes. With some fanfare (but as yet, few adoptions),
the revised Uniform Probate Code ends the obligation to comply strictly with
the statutory formalities. Courts can excuse formal requirements, hence giving
effect to improperly formalized wills, where extrinsic evidence establishes
testamentary intent. 33 More quietly, the model codes have pruned back several
point is that formalities tend to funnel the substance of estate plans into standardized,
efficiently interpreted lines of expression, owing to the intervention of attorneys whose
participation, though not mandatory, is encouraged simply by the requirement that testators
fulfill the technical formalities. See Friedman, supra, at 368; Langbein, supra note 14, at
493-94, 496-97; see also infra note 71. But see Sir Edward Sugden, Speech to the House
of Commons (Dec. 4, 1837), in THE LAW OF WILLS BILL 16-18 (London 1838) (criticizing
the practical need to consult an attorney under the British Wills Act as a "clog upon the
transmission of property"); infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing contrary
public policies).
32 For an early recognition, see SUGDEN, supra note 14, at 236 app. Economic
analysis suggests that litigation (as opposed to out-of-court settlement) is most likely to ensue
when the parties have differing expectations of the probability of victory. See RIcHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5 (4th ed. 1992); Bruce L. Hay, Effort,
Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1995); Steven Shavell, Suit,
Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation
of Legal Casts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 63-69 (1982). But cf Russell Korobkin & Chris
Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement. An Experimental Approach, 93
MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994) (discussing additional psychological factors that can affect
propensities to litigation). The more certain the evidence is, arguendo, the less variance
there can be in expectations of the outcome of suit. Therefore, encouraging the production
of better evidence ex ante should reduce propensities to relatively costly litigation expost.
33 This is known as the "dispensing power." UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-
503 & cmt.; see also RESTATEMEN (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIV TRANSFmS § 33.1
cmt. g (1992); cf Burns v. Adamson, 854 S.W.2d 723 (Ark. 1993) (purporting to follow a
rule of substantial compliance, but limiting its application); Successions of Eddy, 664 So. 2d
853 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (same). Professor Langbein had earlier advocated variations of this
approach in a brace of articles. See Langbein, supra note 14; John H. Langbein, Excusing
Hamless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in
Probate Law, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 1 (1987). Professor Gaubatz had also proposed this idea.
See Gaubatz, supra note 4, at 560-61. Many courts, in fact, were already moving in this
direction, usually by evasion, rarely by frank admission. See In re Will of Ranney, 589
A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991) (discussing prior case law); McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 4.1,
at 158; Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 1033, 1038-41 (1994). For some recent examples of evasion, see Gardner v.
Balboni, 588 A.2d 634 (Conn. 1991); Phillips v. Najar, 901 S.W.2d 561 (rex. Ct. App.
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of the formalities themselves, a suggestion followed in quite a few states.3 4
Gone in many jurisdictions today is the requirement of publication by oral
address; gone too, or at least going, is the old rule requiring simultaneous
presence of the witnesses.35 By streamlining the protocols of will execution,
lawmakers reduce the danger that testators will fail by accident to abide by a
procedural technicality, thereby voiding an estate plan intended to be legally
performative.3 6 But at the same time, by making it simpler to execute a will,
1995); In re Estate of Price, 871 P.2d 1079 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). The Uniform Probate
Code's dispensing power thus "restores a measure of candor to the process." Mann, supra,
at 1040. Still, one can at least raise the question whether a rule of strict compliance coupled
with tacit evasion better serves public policy than does creation of an explicit dispensing
power. The ex ante consequence of candor could be greater laxity in fulfilling formal
requirements that do serve useful purposes. For a jurisprudential discussion, see Larry
Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191,
1197-98 (1994) ("Under appropriate conditions, a rule works best if it lies."). See also
GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUrEs 172-77 (making the same
point in a related context). See generally Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial
Candor, 73 TEX. L. Rnv. 1307 (1995). But cf Langbein, supra note 14, at 524-26 (arguing
that the dispensing power will not encourage lax execution of will formalities); Langbein,
supra, at 51-52 (same). See also Miller, supra note 7, at 704-12. Analogous powers to
excuse insubstantial errors of form exist under the laws governing other sorts of
transactions. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1994).
34 Within the model codes, this pruning has followed a clear progression: The Model
Probate Code did away with the requirement of publication but retained the requirement
that the witnesses be simultaneously present when they signed the will. MODEL PROBATE
CODE, supra note 5, § 47. The more recent Uniform Probate Code dropped the latter
requirement as well. UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, app. VII, § 2-502 (pre-1990 art.
2). And the still more recent revision of Article 2 of the Code permits the witnesses to add
their signatures merely within a "reasonable time" after they witness the testator's signing or
acknowledgment of the will (which standard of reasonability can even validate wills signed
by witnesses after the testator's death). Id. § 2-502 & cmt. (None of the model codes has
required the testator to sign at the end of the testamentary instrument, a stipulation still
found in a few jurisdictions. See infra note 35.)
35 Discussing the trend, see McGOvERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 4.1, at 158-60, and
discussing the various requirements, see id. §§ 4.2-.3. For a catalogue of the Statute of
Wills formalities prevailing in all fifty states, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY,
supra note 33, § 33.1 statutory note 1(a).
36 The Uniform Probate Code pursues this goal quite consciously, for the
Commissioners had been galvanized to take on the project by the appearance of Norman
Dacey's best seller, How to Avoid Probate!, which had loudly condemned the
cumbersomeness and expense of the system of inheritance law and probate administration
then prevailing in the United States. See WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF
SERvICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMmIoNERs ON
UNFORM STATE LAWS 99 (1991); 1. Pennington Straus, History and Origin of the Uniform
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lawmakers could place in greater jeopardy the evidence safeguarded by the
execution process, and the aura of solemnity hanging over the proceeding could
evaporate as well. When executing an estate plan becomes "just a formality,"
the danger that a testator will fail to distinguish performative execution from
matter-of-fact communication or (more likely) a mere drafting exercise begins
to loom larger.37
B. Creation of Wills
Exactly how solemn and elaborate a ceremony need be in order to secure
evidence and alert lay persons to the legal ramifications of their words is an
interesting question, but it is not ours.38 Our focus is consistency, so let us
Probate Code, in ACLEA National Conference on the Uniform Probate Code: Study
Materials 1, 9-11 (1972) (unpublished materials, on file with author). Dacey's specter
plainly hung over the drafters when they allowed that,
If the will is to be restored to its role as the major instrument for disposition of wealth at
death, its execution must be kept simple. The basic intent of these sections is to validate
the will whenever possible. To this end .... formalities for a written and attested will
are kept to a minimum.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, app. VII, art. 2, pt. 5, general cmt., § 2-502 cmt. (pre-
1990 art. 2). See also Richard V. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer
to Probate Avoidance, 44 IND. L. 191 (1969) (Chief Reporter of the Uniform Probate
Code responding to Dacey).
37 By analogy, the promise under seal lost its legal power to bind promisors in many
jurisdictions after the seal degenerated into a printed form, thereby attenuating its cautionary
effect and leaving unclear a promisor's recognition of its legal significance. See Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 659-60 (1982); Paul
R. Hays, Fonnal Contracts and Consideration: A Legislative Program, 41 COLum. L. REv.
849, 850-51 (1941). For a detailed treatment of the history of the seal and its present status,
see Eric M. Holmes, Stature and Status of a Promise Under Seal as a Legal Formality, 29
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 617 (1993). Were the promise under seal to be revived, as some
commentators have proposed (e.g., Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics
and Law, 6 1. LEGAL STUD. 411, 419-20 (1977); Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of
Altruisn and Defierred Gfts, 20 L LEGAL STUD. 401, 419-20 (1991)), lawmakers would
have also to restore its mystique, either by bringing back the molten wax, ribbons and signet
rings of yesteryears, or by instituting some new set of alternative formalities. One scholar
has proposed the use of a thumbprint for this purpose. See Holmes, supra, at 666-68.
3 8 The issue has been much debated over the years. E.g., Lydia A. Clougherty, Note,
An Analysis of the National Advisory Committee on Uniform State Laws' Recommendation to
Modfy the Wdls Act Foralities, 10 PROB. L.J. 283 (1991); Langbein, supra note 14, at
497-98; James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirementfor Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV.
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proceed to contrast the formalities required to execute a will with those
necessary to give effect to some closely related sorts of transactions.3 9
541 (1990) [hereinafter Lindgren, Attestation Requirement]; James Lindgren, The Fall of
Formalism, 55 ALB. L. Rev. 1009 (1992); J.K. Maxton, Execution of Wills: The
Fonnalities Considered, 1 CANTERBURY L. REV. 393 (1982); Philip Mechem, Why Not a
Modern Wills Act?, 33 IowA L. REv. 501, 502-08 (1948); Miller, supra note 7, at 289-
302; Charles L Nelson & Jeanne M. Starck, Formalities and Formalism. A Critical Look at
the Execution of Wills, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 331 (1979). For an early discussion, criticizing the
British Wills Act of 1837, see Sugden, supra note 31, at 10, 15-24.
39 One related sort of transaction that I will not address in this Article is the congeries
of "will substitutes"-revocable inter vivos trusts, pay-on-death designations, revocable life
insurance policies, and the like-that are functionally indistinguishable from wills, but which
serve the (sometimes) useful purpose of avoiding probate administration. Wil subsititutes
are notorious for their legal inconsistencies with wills-and with each other-respecting not
only their formal requirements, but also, inter alia, their vulnerability to the spousal elective
share, their liability to the claims of the decedent's creditors, and their subordination to the
various rules of testamentary construction, such as lapse and revocation by operation of law.
The tangle of disparate rules pertaining to will substitutes provides a quintessential example
of structural inconsistency in law. But this one, at least, has long been recognized and has
already been treated in a raft of essays that renders superfluous further elaboration here. For
discussions, see Donna R. Blaustein & Paul Ward, The Future of Revocable Intervivos
Trusts: Are the Lines Between Wills and Trusts Blurring, 9 PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct.
1995, at 46; Olin L. Browder, Giving orLeaving-What Is a Wdl?, 75 MIcff. L. REv. 845
(1977); Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 14, at 23-39; Stanley M. Johanson, Revocable Trusts
and Community Propeny: The Substantive Problems, 47 TEX. L. REV. 537 (1969); Jerry F.
Jones, The Effects of Divorce on Life Insurance, 2 PROB. & PROp., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 37;
Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Revocable Trusts: Creditors' Rights After Settlor-Debtor's Death, 7
PROB. & PRop., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 40; Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., & Stanley C. Kent,
Creditors' Rights in Probate Avoidance Trusts-A Model Statute, 9 PROB. & PRoP., Jan.-
Feb. 1995, at 61; Sidney Kwestel & Rena C. Seplowitz, Testamentary Substitutes-A Tune
for Statutory Carification, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 467 (1988); John H. Langbein,
The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1108 (1984); Robert J. Lynn, Wdl Substitutes, Divorce, and Statutory Assistance for the
Unthinking Donor, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1987); Wflliam M. McGovern, Jr., The Payable
on Death Account and Other Wdl Substitutes, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 7 (1972) [hereinafter
McGovern, Payable on Death Account]; Mechem, supra note 38, at 518-20; John Ritchie,
What Ls a Will?, 49 VA. L. REv. 759 (1963); Richard V. Wellman, Transfer-on-Death
Securities Registration: A New itle Form, 21 GA. L. REv. 789 (1987). Noting an
inconsistency between different Will substitutes, see John F. Kuether, Signficant Probate
and Trust Decisions, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 263, 322-24 (1994).
The Uniform Probate Code goes a good way toward unifying the law of wills and will
substitutes-this being one of its explicit objectives-but it does not quite go the distance. A
fair number of discrepancies between the treatment of wills and will substitutes, and
between different will substitutes, remain in the revised Articles 2 & 6. See Grayson M.P.
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In fact, to discover such inconsistencies, our gaze need not stray even to
cognate problems; we need seek no further than the Statute of Wills itself. In
some twenty-nine jurisdictions today, the testator can make a holographic
will-that is, a will entirely handwritten and signed-as an alternative to one
that is formally executed. In some jurisdictions, holographic wills are
authorized by separate, associated statutory provision; in others, they appear as
an exception within the very statute mandating formal execution of wills. 40
Thus, in something over half the states, the Statute of Wills has taken on a
schizophrenic quality: either a will must be thoroughly formalized by virtue of
witnesses and so on, or it must be thoroughly informalized by virtue of a
statement wholly in handwriting. A will that is neither formal nor informal, but
rather semi-formal-such as an estate plan typed and signed (but not witnessed)
on a pre-printed will form-be it even an official statutory will form published
with the state's imprimatur41-is of no legal effect whatsoever. The Uniform
Probate Code endorses this structural dichotomy. 42
McCouch, Will Substitutes Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 58 BROOK. L. Rnv.
1123 (1993); William M. McGovern, Jr., Nonprobate Transfers Under the Revised Uniform
Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1329 (1992) [hereinafter McGovern, Nonprobate
Transfers]. Noting the aim of unification, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, art. 2
prefatory note, § 2-503 cmt., § 2 pt. 7 general cmt.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY, supra note 33, § 33.1 cmt. g, § 34.2 & cmt. g, § 34.6 & cmt. b; RESTATEMENT
(rmRD) OFPROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 & cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, Mar.
28, 1995). Several critics of the Code have been so bold as to propose thoroughgoing
union, though in different ways. C. McGovern, Nonprobate Transfers, supra, at 1350-53;
Miller, supra note 7, at 717-21.
40 The states are tallied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 33,
§ 33.1 statutory note 1(. For a doctrinal survey, see Kevin R. Natale, Note, A Survey,
Analysis, and Evaluation of Holographic Will Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 159 (1988).
41 On statutory wills, see Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Fill-in Will Forms-The First
Decade: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Findings, 72 OR. L. REv. 769 (1993).
42 UNip. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-502(b); id. app. VII, § 2-503 (pre-1990 art.
2). See also MODEL PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 48. (It is possible, however, that an
unexecuted typed will would be held valid under the Uniform Probate Code's dispensing
power. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.) Several early drafts of the Uniform
Probate Code made the provision validating holographs optional. See UNiF. PROBATE CODE
§ 237A (First Reporter's Draft, Aug. 1966); id. at § 2-502A & cmt. (Third Working Draft,
Nov. 1967); id. at § 2-502A & cmt. (Summer Draft, July 14, 1967). The Fourth Working
Draft eliminated holographic wills completely "in the interests of uniformity and
simplicity... hav[ing] occasioned frequent litigation in those states which permit such
wills," but they were reinstated in the following draft. See id. at § 2-502 cmt. (Fourth
Working Draft, Second Tentative Draft, July 22-Aug. 1, 1968); id. at § 2-503 (Fifth
Working Draft, n.d., c. 1969). The structural inconsistency between execution requirements
and holographic wills has not gone unnoticed. See Langbein, supra note 14, at 498;
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How came to pass this state of affairs? The holographic will is a legal
implant, a native not of common, but of civil law. 43 It was first received into
the statute book of colonial Virginia as early as 1748, despite its repugnance to
the British Statute of Frauds, 44 and (propelled by Virginia's influence?) spread
further among southern states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
Lindgren, Attestation Requireent, supra note 38, at 558-60; Bruce H. Mann, Sef-Proving
Affidavits and Fomialism in Wills Adjudication, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 49-50 (1985);
Mann, supra note 33, at 1042. But cf. Sugden, supra note 31, at 19 (suggesting that the
inconsistency is justified by public policy); Miller, supra note 7, at 629-31 (same).
43 Executed wills of the common law sort are unknown under civil law, though the
civil code does offer ritualistic alternatives to the holograph. See CODE NAPOLEON; THE
FRENCH CIVIL CODE §§ 967-80 (Claitor's Book Store, photo. reprint 1960) (1804). The
historical origins of the holographic will in the United States have not been explored by
scholars. On its European roots, see Reginald Parker, History of the Holograph Testament
in the Ovi/ Law, 3 JURIST 1 (1943). In Great Britain, holographic wills sufficed to pass both
realty and personalty until the Statute of Frauds of 1677 and thereafter to pass personalty
until the Wills Act of 1837. On holographs in English legal history, see R.H. Helmholz, The
Or'gin of Holographic Wills in English Law, 15 . LEGAL HIST. 97 (1994).
44 An Act Directing the Manner of Granting Probat[e] of Wills, and Administration of
Intestates Estates (1748), in 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECrION OF ALL THE
LAws OF VIRGINIA 454, 456 § 7 (William W. Hening ed. 1819) ("[A]H devises and bequests
of any lands, or tenements ... shall be attested ... by two or more credible witnesses, or
shall be wholly writ by the said devisor['Is own hand, or else they shall be void and of no
effect.") Cf. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 5 (1677)
(Eng.) ("[A] Devises and Bequests of any Lands or Tenements ... shall be attested
... by three or fower credible Witnesses or else they shall be utterly void and of none
effect."). The Privy Council ratified the Virginia statute despite its repugnance, even as the
Council disallowed a companion statute on intestacy. Proclamation Repealing Certain Acts
of Assembly Passed at the Revisal of 1748, in 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, supra, at 567-
68. (No comparable exception appeared in the Statute of Frauds in colonial Massachusetts,
dating to 1692. See An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, in MASSACHUSETTS
PROvINCIAL LAws, 1692-1699, at 23 (John D. Cushing ed. 1978).) Professor Bird
erroneously traces the first appearance of the holographic will in America to a Louisiana
statute of 1808 modeled after the Napoleonic Code of 1804. See Gail B. Bird, Sleight of
Handwriting: The Holographic MI in California, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 605, 606-07 (1981).
Long predating the Napoleonic Code, the Virginia statute may have drawn its inspiration
from civil customary law, for Great Britain prior to the Statute of Frauds had never excused
a witnessing requirement in the case of holographs; it had simply imposed no witnessing
requirement whatever. See The Act of Wills, Wards, and Primer Seisins, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1,
§ 1 (1540) (Eng.). But the legislative history of the Virginia statute (which formed part of a
general revision of the colony's laws in 1748-49) has never been investigated. Generally on
the legislative revision, see Gwenda Morgan, "The Privilege of Making Laws':" The Board
of Trade, The Virginia Assembly and Legislative Review, 1748-54, 10 . AM. STUD. 1
(1976).
1072 [V7ol. 57:1057
INHERiTANCE AND INCONSISTENCY
centuries, 45 a time of broad American interest in civil codes. 46 Rather than
supplanting common law execution, the holographic will took root beside it,
and the two alternative forms have subsisted ever since, appearing side by side
in the Uniform Probate Code.
Plainly, the holographic will cannot be justified within the framework of
traditional will execution theory. Though the handwriting requirement serves to
warrant the authenticity of the document (marginally) more conclusively than
would a signature alone, and hence helps (slightly) to substitute in that regard
for the testimony of witnesses,47 a handwritten testamentary instrument
contains no aspects of ceremony.48 Inevitably, courts must contend with
nettlesome questions concerning the intent of authors to render legally effective
holographic documents that are offered for probate as wills. 4 9 (Those nettles
are most prickly when a holograph mixes testamentary declarations with
45 See Wills and Testaments, ch. 157, § 4, REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF
ARKANSAS ADOPTED AT THE OCroBER SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF SAID STATE,
A.D. 1837, at 765 (William McK. Ball & Samual C. Roane eds., 1838); An Act to Reduce
into One, the Several Acts Concerning Wills, § 1, ACTS PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF
THE FirH GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 162 (1797); An
Act to Explain, Amend and Supply the Deficiencies of an Act Passed Last Assembly at
Hllsborough, ch. 10, § 5, ACTS OF ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 22, 23
(1784); TENN. CONST. OF 1796, art. X, § 2 (receiving into Tennessee all laws previously in
force in the stale as a territory of North Carolina); CODE OF TENNESSEE ENACrED BY THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1857-58, § 2163 (1858).
46 See Peter Stein, The Attraction of the Cvil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52
VA. L. REV. 403 (1966). See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1993). By
contrast, the commission that dmfed Britain's act of Parliament setting will formalities in
1837 considered but rejected giving effect to holographic wills as an exception to the
witnessing requirement. See SUGDEN, supra note 14, at 181 app.; Sugden, supra note 31, at
19 (regretting the decision); An Act for the Amendment of the Laws with respect to Wills, 7
Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, § 9 (1837) (Eng.).
4 7 Commentators have disagreed over whether the handwriting requirement suffices,
from an evidentiary standpoint, to make up for the lack of witnesses. Compare Bird, supra
note 44, at 610, 632 with Estate of Black, 641 P.2d 754, 756 (Cal. 1982) and Gunn v.
Phillips, 410 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tex. App. 1966). For an early discussion, see 2
BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *501-02.
48 Nor do the requirements of a holographic will suffice to protect the testator from
duress or to channel wills into easily proven or interpreted lines. "The exemption of
holographic wills from the usual statutory requirements seems almost exclusively justifiable
in terms of the evidentiary function." Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 14, at 13; see id. at 13-
14.
49 E.g., Bailey v. Kerns, 431 S.E.2d 312 (Va. 1993) (holographic document offered
for probate held intended to be legally effective); Jessup v. Jessup, 267 S.E.2d 115 (Va.
1980) (holographic document offered for probate held not intended to be legally effective).
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ordinary communication, as when the alleged will appears within a diary or a
letter to the alleged beneficiary.50) Holographic wills are best understood as
abandoning the ritual function of the Statute of Wills in order to accomplish
another purpose: namely, ensuring that a person's modest financial means do
not abridge her legal means of carrying out her estate plan.51 By providing
50 "People are prone to write things in letters they never dreamed would be regarded
as a will .... Such statements are often made casually or to record a passing thought or a
purpose to be accomplished later on." Boggess v. McGaughey, 207 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Ky.
1948). For an (in)famous example, see In re Kimmel's Estate, 123 A. 405 (Pa. 1924). For
some recent cases (which divide over the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to clarify
whether a writing submitted as a holograph evinces testamentary intent, cf supra note 27),
see Mallory v. Mallory, 862 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1993) (barring extrinsic evidence); Wolfe v.
Wolfe, 448 S.E.2d 408 (Va. 1994) (same); In re Estate of Ramirez, 869 P.2d 263 (Mont.
1994) (admitting extrinsic evidence); Ayala v. Martinez, 883 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994) (same); see also UNuF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-502(c) (same). For
discussions of the case-law of holographs where testamentary intent is unclear, see
ATmNsON, supra note 30, § 47; McGovERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 4.5, at 175-76; 1
PAGE, supra note 11, § 6.21.
51 See In re Estate of Erickson, 806 P.2d 1186, 1188 (Utah 1991); In re Estate of
Teubert, 298 S.E.2d 456, 460 (W. Va. 1982). Likewise, the Commissioners:
[t]he decision [to provide for holographic wills] is consistent with the determination
... to relax purely formal restrictions regarding wills to the end that persons may have
an increased opportunity to execute valid wills without professional
assistance.... [Fior persons of modest means ... and for persons who are unable to
secure professional assistance, the holographic will may be valuable.
UNE'. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (Fifth Working Draft, n.d., c. 1969) (abbreviated in
UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, app. VII, art. 2, pt. 5, general cmt., § 2-503 cmt. (pre-
1990 art. 2)). Professor Wellman, Chief Reporter of the original Uniform Probate Code,
elaborates:
mhe public plainly insists on being permitted to use a 'do-it-yourself approach to will
malking, as is permitted in virtually every other enterprise .... If holographic wills
prove to be a source of trouble and litigation, it will become obvious to the consuming
public that lawyers have valuable training and experience to offer prospective testators.
Richard V. Wellman, Arkansas and the Unifonn Probate Code: Some Iwues and Answers, 2
U. ARK. LrrLERocKLJ. 1, 15 (1979); see also Sugden, supra note 31, at 16-19 (offering
an early, similar policy analysis); Mary L. Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA
L. REV. 611, 614-15 (1988) (noting that the general trend toward reducing the statutory
requirements for will execution promotes equal estate planning under law, without
discussing holographs); supra note 36. But see Bird, supra note 44, at 631-33 (suggesting
pointedly that because holographs result in such poor estate planning and so much costly
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citizens a simple and straightforward vehicle for estate planning without the
assistance of professional counsel, 52 holographic wills make dying testate far
easier and hence promote the principle of "equal estate planning under law"-a
principle which, even if imperceptible within the emanations of the penumbra
of the Fourteenth Amendment, can nonetheless be judged a goal worth striving
for.53 In pursuit of that goal, jurisdictions that give effect to holographic wills
are prepared to conduct problematic inquiries into, and endure costly litigation
over,54 the performative intent of the testator, when they can at least rest
assured that the document submitted for probate is genuine.
Such an approach has its virtues, to be sure. It resolves the tension between
the need to confirm performative intent and the desire to make testation easier
by plumping emphatically for ease. Whether that approach better serves public
policy is another matter-one that has been debated off and on for centuries. 55
Yet, by warranting holographic wills and witnessed wills in the alternative,
holographic will jurisdictions have not settled the issue so much as they have
encapsulated it. It appears almost as if lawmakers are of two minds on the
question, each promulgating its own, contradictory approach to the problem at
hand.
A decision systematically to resolve the tension calls for a singular rule of
will execution. If that resolution favors discarding testamentary formality for
the sake of faciity, then the singular rule should be one giving effect to any
signed will, whether handwritten or typed. The current ban on typewritten or
printed substantive provisions in an unwitnessed holograph is perverse from the
standpoint of the ritual function: it would seem that typing or printing indicates,
if anything, greater finality than does handwriting. If unwitnessed handwritten
documents are to be given effect in order to achieve equal estate planning under
post-mortem litigation, the statutes authorizing them in truth constitute "a species of
consumer fraud."). A secondary, related purpose of holographs may be to enable testators
who fall ill suddenly to execute an estate plan before death overtakes them. But see supra
note 28 (discussing the countervailing policy against "deathbed wills").
52 Some testators have executed holographs expressly in order to avoid involving an
attorney in their affairs. See Harry Hibschman, iWdmsies of Will-Makers, 66 U.S. L. Rev.
362, 365-66 (1932); See also Gilman v. MeArdle, 2 N.E. 464, 464 (N.Y. 1885)
(expressing a similar sentiment for avoiding probate). On the other hand, counselors can
sometimes be found making holographic wills for themselves. For one prepared by a
practicing attorney and inscribed onto a greeting card, see Trim v. Daniels, 862 S.W.2d 8
(rex. Ct. App. 1992).
53 The general principle is framed and defended in Fellows, supra note 51, at 613.
54 The authors of the Fourth Working Draft of the Uniform Probate Code proposed to
disallow holographic wills so that courts could avoid the clutter of this litigation. See supra
note 42.
55 See supra notes 31, 38.
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law, then afortiori typed or typed and printed unwitnessed documents should
be as well, so long as they are signed and hence can be authenticated.56
Alternatively, lawmakers could craft a singular rule that attempts to resolve
the policy tension by way of compromise. Lawmakers could, for example,
jettison the witnessing requirement, but mandate that every will (including
wholly handwritten ones) contain some other tangible expression of formality,
such as a testamentary heading on the document.57 Such an approach would
render will execution simpler, but still require a modicum of intrinsic evidence
showing that the document was intended to be legally performative. Or, as a
more general safeguard, lawmakers might comprehensively abandon the
witnessing requirement but mandate that the proponents of a will prove
performative intent by clear and convincing evidence 58-the same standard that
currently applies (by comparison) to proof of lost wills in most
5 6 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111(c) (West 1991) (allowing holographic wills to set
forth a printed statement of testamentary intent when they are superimposed onto a printed
will form). See Langbein, supra note 14, at 520 (advocating giving effect to typed and/or
printed documents); Lindgren, Attestation Requirement, supra note 38, at 559-60 (same);
Mann, supra note 33, at 1044 (criticizing the Uniform Probate Code's requirement that
printed matter form no "material portions" of holographic wills). But see In re
Pulvermacher's Wifll, 116 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (App. Div. 1952) ("Where a will or codicil is
entirely in the handwriting of a testator, there is little room for doubt that he understood the
testamentary character of the instrument."), rev'd on other grounds, 305 N.Y. 378 (1953),
modified, 305 N.Y. 923 (1953); Miller, supra note 7, at 627-33 (criticizing Langbein's
analysis).
57 Present law does not require holographs to be captioned as "wills." See MCGOVERN
ET AL., § 4.5 at 175. C. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(a) (1995) (requiring that a holographic
instrument be found among the decedent's "valuable papers" or deposited with someone for
"safekeeping" in order to be legally effective (a provision in force since 1784!)); see also
An Act to Explain, Amend and Supply the Deficiencies of an Act Passed Last Assembly at
Hillsborough, ch. 10, § 5, AcTs OF ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NoRTH CAROLINA 22, 23
(1784); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-110 (1984 & Supp. 1995) (same, but only pertaining to
holographs disposing of realty and written before February, 1941). In some civil law
jurisdictions, a letter cannot be probated as a holograph, i.e., the holograph must be self-
contained in order to manifest performative intent. Professor Atkinson opined that "[t]here
is considerable justification for such provisions." ATKINSON, supra note 30, § 47, at 210.
58 Assuming that the authors of holographs are aware of it, a clear and convincing
evidence standard should serve ex ante to discourage unusually informal holographic wills
and hence to provide courts with better proof of testamentary intent. Alternatively, such a
standard of proof, like a formalities requirement, would prefer the intestacy scheme to
uncertain expressions of testamentary intent. See supra note 30; see generally Michael L.
Davis, The Value of Truth and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Legal Disputes, 10 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 343 (1994); John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfnding Process, 20
STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1072 (1968).
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jurisdictions59-where an act of witnessing would suffice to meet this
evidentiary standard. Under present law, by contrast, holographs need contain
no hint of formality, and in most states they can be proven by a mere
preponderance of the evidence.60
That no comprehensive resolution of the policy tension has been ventured
under state law-or under the Uniform Probate Code-is in itself suggestive.
Surely, lawmakers are not unaware of the tension and of the oddity of pairing
executed wills with holographic ones. Nonetheless, they have found this
solution easier to adopt. The threads of precedent that holographs bring to a
probate code, albeit threads alien to the common law, seemingly have made
them more alluring to legislators (and to Commissioners) than a better-tailored
59 See 3 PAGE, supra note 11, § 29.156. As when dealing with a holograph, courts
presented with a formalized-but-lost will face greater uncertainty than when probating a
formalized will that does survive. The analogy is not precise, however, in that a holograph
provides sound evidence of the substance of an estate plan while lacking a clear
manifestation of intent to be legally performative; e contra, a lost will provides clear
evidence of performative intent (having been formalized) but instead wants iron-clad
evidence as to its substance. See also UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-503, which
requires clear and convincing evidence to prove a defectively formalized will under the
Code's dispensing power, discussed supra note 33 and accompanying text. Here the analogy
appears more precise: if an improperly formalized will can be proved only by clear and
convincing evidence (if at all), why should a lesser standard of proof be applied to
unformalized holographs? Yet under the Code (without explanation), holographic wills need
only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Conpare UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra
note 5, § 2-502(b) & (c) & cmt. with id. § 2-503 & cmt. (drawing no comparison between
the two sections).
60 See 3 PAGE, supra note 11, at § 29.167. In a few jurisdictions, however, more
stringent standards of proof do apply to holographs. In Tennessee, for many years,
holographic wills disposing of realty had to be proved by at least three "credible" witnesses
to the authenticity of the handwriting. For holographs written after February, 1941, the
authenticity of the handwriting must be proved by two witnesses. See TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 32-1-105, 32-1-110 (1984 & Supp. 1995). In Arkansas for many years, all holographic
wills had to be proved by the "unimpeachable" evidence of at least three disinterested
witnesses to the authenticity of the handwriting. See Wills and Testaments, ch. 157, § 4,
REvISED STATurES OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS ADOPTED AT THE OCTOBER SESSION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF SAID STATE, A.D. 1837, at 765 (William McK. Ball & Samual C.
Roane eds., 1838). Current law still requires three "credible" witnesses proving the
handwriting "and such other facts and circumstances as would be sufficient to prove a
controverted issue in equity." ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-117(b) (Miechie 1987 & Supp.
1993). In North Carolina, three witnesses to the handwriting have always been, and still are,
required. See An Act to Explain, Amend and Supply the Deficiencies of an Act Passed Last
Assembly at Hllsborough, ch. 10, § 5, ACTS OF ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH
CAROLINA 22, 23 (1784); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-18.2 (1995).
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alternative woven from whole cloth. Historical provenance can be a potent
force-even sustaining the coexistence of clashing doctrines that might have
been reconciled.
C. Contracts and Wills
Moving beyond the Statute of Wills, let us inspect with a structurally-
comparative eye the formalities associated with another category of law-
namely, the law of contract. In order to become binding on its parties, a
commercial transaction need not comply with the same formalities that
surround gratuitous transactions. It need only comply with the modem Statute
of Frauds, which requires a writing (but no signature or witnesses) in some
cases but also warrants as effective a parol agreement in many other cases.
Thus, the high-formality associated with the will execution ceremony is by and
large absent from contract law.61
Again, there may well be good reasons for making this distinction. Lon
Fuller suggested that contracts, involving as they do exchanges, manifest a
"natural formality" that is wanting in the field of gratuitous transfers. In other
words, the very fact that they are doing business will serve to remind the
parties that when they speak, they had better mean business. 62 To distinguish
sharply in this respect a contract from a gratuitous transfer is problematic,
however. Since classical times, theorists have recognized that gifts also involve
implicit exchanges, generally in the form of social services, generating what
political economists nowadays call "social capital." 63 Persons often, if not
61 See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1991); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 & ch. 5
Statutory Note (1981). The current draft revision of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code would further enhance the dichotomy, in light of its proposal to repeal the Statute of
Frauds in its entirety. See U.C.C. § 2-201 & reporter's note (Dicussion Draft of revised
Article 2: Sales, July 29 - Aug. 5, 1994); Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2: Preliminary Report 50-58 (1990)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
62 See Fuller, supra note 28, at 814-17 (allowing, however, that the natural formality
involved in the making of an executory contract is relatively less than in the subsequent
acceptance of performance by one of the parties to the contract).
63 The earliest discussion of which I am aware appears in THE NoMaCHEaN ETmics
OF ARISTOTLE, bk. 8, chs. 15-16, at 276-80 (T.E.C. Weildon ed., 1912) (ins. c. 334-23
B.C.). For the most recent discussion, see ODED STARK, ALTRmUSM AND BEYOND (1995).
For further references, see Adam I. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of
the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 9-10 (1992); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankrptcy:
The Meaning of the "Fresh Start," 45 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 211-14 (1994) [hereinafter
Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy]; Adam J. Iirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy:
Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 21 n.70 (1995) [hereinafter
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always, give in anticipation and expectation of reciprocal benefits. 64 Apart
from their knowledge of the different ramifications of contractual and donative
utterances as a matter of positive law, persons will not clearly choose their
words with any greater circumspection in the one case than in the other. 65 But
to expand on Fuller a bit, perhaps the point is that in our society the elaborate
process of bargaining and dickering that usually precedes a contractual
agreement in itself comprises a ritual that will serve further to distinguish that
Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts]; Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 587, 630 (1989) [hereinafter Hirsch, Insolvent Heir]. On the concept of
social capital, see PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE (1964); JAMES S.
COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 300-21 (1990) (coining the phrase); George
C. Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange, 63 AM. J. Soc. 597 (1958). Some courts have
acknowledged the culture of reciprocity within which gifts are conferred, at least in the
presence of an informal understanding concerning the social services "owed in exchange"
for them. When the social services have not been forthcoming, courts have granted donors
restitution. See MCGOvERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 5.5, at 224. Vise versa, in some cases
the provision of social services has been deemed adequate consideration to render binding a
gift promise. See In re Estate of Bucci, 488 P.2d 216 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Harold C.
Havighurst, Services in the Home-A Study of Contract Concepts in Domestic Relations, 41
YALE L.J. 386 (1932); cf REsTATEmENT oFRE sTrrIoT § 57 & cmt. d (1937) (limiting the
principle to cases where an agreement was intended but was expressed in terms of
reciprocal gifts). Some scholars nonetheless continue sharply to distinguish contracts from
gifts. E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 643, 656; James D. Gordon III, Consideration and
the Conmrcial-Gft Dichotomy, 44 VAND. L. REV. 283 (1991).
64 Of course, to view gratuitous transfers singularly as contract-substitutes would be an
absurd oversimplification; rather, they are the financial vehicles of a more complex gray
economy, part of which is driven by gratuitous transferors' interdependent utilities with
their transferees, and part of which also functions to cement and maintain social relations.
But gratuitous transfers are no less significant economically to transferors on that account.
For discussions of these other aspects of the socioeconomics of gifts, see GARY S. BECKER,
A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 277-306 (rev. ed. 1991); DAvID CHEAL, THE GIFr ECONOMY
(1988); Posner, supra note 37, at 411-14.
6 5 Compare the related discussion in Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises,
211. LEGAL STUD. 39, 53-54 (1992). An associated argument offered by Fuller and others
is that gratuitous transfers hold less economic importance than contracts and hence do not
merit enforcement unless formalized in a manner that courts can verify at comparatively
lower legal process cost. Modem scholars have roundly condemned this view; Professor
Kull suggests that it "reflect[s] little more than mercantilist prejudice." Id. at 49. Compare
Fuller, supra note 28, at 815, and Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 3-5, with Jane B. Baron,
Ofts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 179-203 (1989), and Mary L. Fellows,
Donative Promises Redux, in PROPERTY LAw AND LEGAL EDUCATION 27, 28-29 (Peter Hay
& Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988), and Kull, supra, at 46-59; see also Posner, supra note
37, at 411-17 (asserting that gratuitous transfers are intrinsically as important as exchanges
but are justifiably treated differently for other reasons).
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event from ordinary discourse. 66 The more diffuse, implicit agreements
signaled by gratuitous transfers are not sealed in such a ritual by the traditions
of our culture67 and hence require an alternative one.68
Furthermore, the commercial parties who typically enter into contracts are
possessed of more legal savvy than the lay testator. They are likely to have
greater professional knowledge of when their words would be construed to
have performative effect. And from an evidentiary standpoint, parties to a
contract in general remain able to testify in personam. The transaction is
usually short-term; memories will be fresh. By contrast, testamentary
instruments are often executed long before death; memories may be dim, and
the chief witness will be eternally indisposed. Plainly, the benefits of
transcription are relatively greater in the case of wills than of contracts. And
beyond this lies the simple fact that commercial actors are busy persons; to
require them to execute a ritual whenever they make a deal would constitute a
significant burden, consuming time among those for whom it is of the essence.
Among lay persons who hold time less dear, and who make or update their
wills only rarely in any event, a legal requirement of ritual execution appears
far less of an imposition.69
6 6 On the ritual element of the bargaining process, see BROMLEY KNiVETON, THE
PSYCHOLOGY oFBARGAuINNG 47-57 (1989).67 Though sometimes they are! Birthdays and certain holidays, in particular, are
ceremonial occasions within which gift-giving occupies a prominent place. Arguendo, on
such occasions at least, gratuitous transfers could be permitted by mere words without
risking confusion over whether the donor intended those words to be performative. On the
other hand, there is no equivalent ceremonial occasion on which testamentary transfers are
traditionally made. These would obviously be out of place on birthdays or holidays and
hence would not fit naturally into the gift-giving ceremonies that accompany them.
68 In this context, the possibility of allowing a benefactor to substitute an utterance for
a ritual by framing an inter vivos gift (if not a testamentary transfer) as an exchange for
norminal consideration presents an interesting, marginal case. On the one hand, the form of
words here chosen differs from that used in the typical gratuitous transfer and hence helps to
distinguish the declaration from ordinary discourse. Justifying the doctrine of nominal
consideration on this basis, see Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 660-62; Fuller, supra note 28,
at 820; C.J. Hamson, The Reform of Consideration, 54 L.Q. REv. 233, 242-43 (1938); c.
supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text. On the other hand, in the context of a gratuitous
transfer, no ritual of dickering will typically have accompanied the words. Perhaps with this
thought in mind, the Restaters declined to endorse the enforcement of gratuitous promises
clothed with "a mere pretense of bargain." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra
note 61, § 71 cmt. b, illus. 5, § 87 cmt. b & c; see also 2 AUSTIN, supra note 28, at 907
(suggesting that nominal consideration is inadequate because deliberateness cannot be
inferred, absent the contemplation of advantage as a result of an exchange).
69 On the other hand, in one respect there is a relatively greater need for formalities in
the area of contracts than in the area of testamentary transfers. To the extent that parties
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All told, lawmakers may well have been right to uncouple the Statute of
Wills from the Statute of Frauds. But we are not quite done with our
inspection, for a number of hybrid entities, falling in between the contract and
the testamentary transfer, remain to be scrutinized. Consider the contract to
make a will.70 This compound is everywhere enforceable in equity, and the
question arises how it is to be categorized, and hence formalized. Arguendo,
the policies underlying the formalization of contracts to make wills more
closely resemble those applicable to a testamentary transfer, in that they
generally subsist outside a business environment, are entered into by lay
persons, and become payable or otherwise enforceable at one party's death,
often long after they were formulated. 71 In the vast majority of jurisdictions,
however, contracts to make wills fall into the contract category72 and hence can
be created by parol agreement (though many states now require at least an
may act without due deliberation, rituals give them useful time to think things over, thereby
reducing the risk that they will regret their transactional decisions upon reflection. For this
purpose, formalities can play a more important role in the area of contracts than in that of
wills, for whereas contracts are binding, wills are not; the testator ordinarily will have
plenty of time to deliberate over, and possibly to alter, her will after it is executed. See the
related discussion supra note 28; cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of
Contracts, 92 YALE LJ. 763, 786-97 (1983) (addressing cooling-off periods as a means of
ensuring due deliberation by contracting parties).
70 The most thorough (but dated) treatment is BmRTEL M. SPARKs, CoNTRAcrs TO
MAKE WHLLs (1956). For recent discussions, see Daniel S. Field, Note, Will Contracts for
Personal Se-vices and Real Property During the Lifetime of the Aging Devisor: Resolving
the Continuing Dilemuz, 11 PROB. LJ. 57 (1992); Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Contracts to
Devise or Gift Property in Exchange for Lifetime Home Care-Latent and Insidious Abuse of
Older Persons, 12 PROB. L.J 1 (1994).
71 C. Professor Fratcher:
Contracts affecting succession are rarely desirable as estate planning devices and
they are likely to cause much suffering if entered into without competent advice as
to their effects. Consequently, it seems desirable to impose [formal] requirements
upon the making of such contracts that are so difficult that they cannot be met
without the advice of counsel.
William F. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1037,
1081 (1966) (commenting on the First Reporter's Draft of the Uniform Probate Code,
discussed infra note 76). Indeed, it is true that contracts to make wills have been notorious
litigation breeders.
72 Florida and Texas are the exceptions, requiring that contracts to make wills be
formalized with a witnessed writing, as under the Statute of Wills. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 732.701 (West 1995); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A (West 1980). A working draft of the
Uniform Probate Code had also included such a provision. See infra note 76.
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unwitnessed writing). 73
Well, so be it, but consider then another hybrid category: the conditional
bequest. his entity comes under the category of wills and must be executed
accordingly. 74 The two hybrids are close relatives, yet their kinship has been
nowhere remarked and the legal formalities that pertain to them have remained
distinct. Consider the alternative scenarios:
Scenario # 1: Testator writes out an unexecuted document promising A
$10,000 under the testator's will if A stops smoking before the testator's death.
Assuming A stops smoking, this document is enforceable in equity against the
testator's estate as a contract to make a will (no matter what the executed will
ultimately provides).
Scenario # 2: Testator writes out a will bequeathing $10,000 to A if A has
stopped smoking by the time of the testator's death. It turns out that the will
was mis-executed under the state Statute of Wills. This document, though in
writing, is unenforceable as a conditional bequest (even if A stopped smoking,
as required).75
Note well that these two fact-patterns, though similar, are not identical. A
conditional bequest remains revocable, even if the beneficiary fulfills the
condition. But they are functionally pretty close and one may be hard pressed
to justify distinguishing them formalistically. Indeed, to the extent that they do
differ, the distinction in formalities only reinforces one's sense of the law's
arbitrariness, for it is the binding contract that requires less formality than the
nonbinding conditional bequest.
Without comment, the Uniform Probate Code codifies this traditional
formalistic dichotomy.76
73 In some twenty jurisdictions today, contracts to make wills can be formalized by
mere parol agreement, without any reference to the contract in a will or other writing. For a
recent example of a contract to make a will proved by parol evidence, see Black v.
Edwards, 445 S.E.2d 107 (Va. 1994). Even in those jurisdictions where a writing is
required, but where the parties merely reached a parol agreement, performance by one
party may still suffice to render the contract to make a will binding. See MCGOVERN ET AL.,
supra note 8, § 9.5, at 386-88.
7 4 On conditional bequests, see ATKNsoN, supra note 30, § 82; 5 PAGE, supra note
11, §§ 44.1-.33.
75 It is not inconceivable that, faced with this second set of facts, a court would reach
to find the conditional bequest a contract to make a will and (once again) enforce it in
equity-particularly if the testator had shown the will to the conditional beneficiary. A
search has revealed no cases on point. But the theory here is clear enough: performance of
a condition does nothing more than render a conditional bequest an absolute bequest. See 5
PAGE, supra note 11, § 44.11, at 418.
76 Under the Uniform Probate Code, a contract to make a will can be formalized by an
unwitnessed, signed writing; an oral statement can also prove the terms of a contract to
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D. Revision of Wills
As just noted, wills, by their nature, are ambulatory. One can revise a will
at will, and the interests it creates are mere expectancies, in no wise
encumbering the properties it bequeaths. When a testator decides to alter an
existing will, what formalities must she follow? In order initially to give effect
to an estate plan, the testator must execute (or, in jurisdictions permitting
holographs, hand-write) the testamentary instrument, for reasons we have
already explored. Those reasons are equally apropos to amendments of estate
plans, which also need to be recognized by the testator as legally performative
and carried out under verifiable circumstances. The law acknowledges this
symmetry. Subsequent wills and codicils must be executed with precisely the
same formalities as the original testamentary instruments they supersede.
Subsequent unexecuted documents cannot revise prior wills, even if the prior
will refers to them. 77
1. Acts and Formaity
Sometimes, however, an estate plan will depend not on subsequent words,
but rather on subsequent acts. For instance, a testator might bequeath to her
beneficiary "whatever automobile I own at my death." If effective, the corpus
of such a bequest becomes contingent upon the subsequent decisions of the
make a will if the executed will refers to the contract, whereas references in wills to oral
statements would be inadmissible to prove additional terms of the will itself-including
conditions attached to bequests--under the doctrine of incorporation by reference, which
permits references in wills only to extrinsic AWdngs. See UNW. PROBATE CODE, supra note
5, § 2-514; id. app. VII, § 2-701 (pre-1990 art. 2). For the provision on incorporation by
reference, see id. § 2-510; id. app. VII, § 2-510 (pre-1990 art. 2). Neither the old nor the
new comment draws any contrast to the treatment of conditional bequests or to
incorporation by reference. Intriguingly, a working draft of the Uniform Probate Code
would have required parties to formalize all contracts to make wills "in the manner
hereinafter prescribed for the execution of attested written wills," thereby achieving
structural consistency and (arguably) better policy. See supra note 71 and accompanying
text; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 234 (First Reporter's Draft, Aug. 1966). No subsequent
comments indicate why the provision was dropped. The provision ultimately adopted is
nonetheless described as intended "to tighten the methods by which contracts concerning
succession may be proved." UNri. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, app. VII, § 2-701 cmt.
(pre-1990 art. 2). (The Model Probate Code failed to deal at all with contracts to make
wills.)
77 See 2 PAGE, supra note 11, §§ 21.33, 22.3. See infra note 131 and accompanying
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testator, either to hang on to her present Volkswagen, sell it, or trade it in for a
Mercedes. Though they will have affected her estate plan, these decisions will
not have been formalized by any subsequent executed writing. In other words,
the testator will have altered her estate plan without complying with the Statute
of Wills.
How could lawmakers deal with such a case? One possibility would be to
treat subsequent (unexecuted) acts as equivalent to unexecuted words and on
that basis refuse to give effect to any change of estate plan premised upon
them. If the testator owned a Volkswagen at the time her will was executed,
that (or its monetary equivalent) is what her beneficiary would receive at her
death. Alternatively, lawmakers could deem acts effective to alter wills (thus
distinguishing acts from words). In that event, the terms of the bequest would
operate to give the beneficiary whatever automobile was actually discovered
among the decedent testator's personal effects.
In fact, the law of wills follows neither course: its move is altogether
stranger, more troublesome to apply, and from a policy perspective
affirmatively perverse. What the law of wills dictates is that acts of independent
significance-that is, acts performed in order to accomplish lifetime motives of
the testator-are effective to alter an estate plan. If the testator's purpose in
selling her car or in buying a new one is to alter her own standard of living,
then the act does operate to alter her will; whereas if the act has no significance
for the testator apart from its effect on the estate plan-that is, if the act is
performed solely in order to accomplish a change of estate plan-then such act
is ineffective to do so. Were a will to specify, for example, that A is to receive
the testator's automobile unless it is tagged with a black label, the act of
affixing the label, presumably carried out for no other reason than to extinguish
the bequest, will not be effective to alter the will. In other words, lawmakers
distinguish communicative from non-communicative acts. Those acts which the
testator conceives as the equivalent of words must be properly executed in
order to satisfy the Statute of Wills. Those acts which the testator does not so
conceive need not be so formalized. 78
We may notice preliminarily that to draw a distinction such as this is to
open a sizable can of worms, for the communicative significance of acts is
deeply ambiguous. Every act both affects and asserts. 79 Courts have wrestled
78 The doctrine of acts of independent significance has not been the subject of modem
policy analysis. For doctrinal discussions, see ATKINSON, supra note 30, § 81; MCGOVERN
LrAL., supra note 8, § 6.3, at 252; 2 PAGE, supra note 11, § 19.34.
79 Our vocabulary acknowledges the point by setting aside a special term for
communicative acts, which we call gestures. For a theoretical discussion, see PMRRE
FEYEREISEN & JACQUES-DOMINIQUE DE LANNOY, GESTURES AND SPEECH: PSYCHOLOGICAL
INVESTIGATIONS (1991). The principle is also understood deeply, if unsystematically, by
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with the same elusive distinction in several other arenas, including the
protection of acts under the First Amendment and the coverage of "non-verbal
conduct intended as an assertion" under the hearsay rule, with little clarity or
consistency.8 0 Determining whether a testator performed an act in order to
change her life or her will when the answer could very well be yes and yes is
often impossible and hence can lead to arbitrary results.8 1
Putting such difficulties to one side, the substantive effect of the doctrine of
acts of independent significance is no less troublesome. Notice the perversity of
what lawmakers are prescribing here. On the one hand, they are telling the
testator that if she seeks to alter her will by act she cannot do so. All efforts to
change an estate plan must comply with the requisite statutory formalities.82 On
the other hand, if the testator does not intend her act to alter her estate plan,
salespersons and advertisers, who may urge you (as the current pitch goes) to "say it with
flowers." We have already noticed that this same duality exists for words. See supra note 15
and accompanying text. For a further theoretical discussion (by comparison) of the
ambiguity between communicative and performative speech, see AUSTIN, supra note 15, at
94-147.
80 Discussing the First Amendment cases: "[A]ny particular course of conduct may be
hung almost randomly on the 'speech' peg or the 'conduct' peg as one sees fit... , so the
distinction between speech and conduct must be seen at best as announcing a conclusion of
the Court, rather than as summarizing in any way the analytic processes which led the
Court to that conclusion." LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMimcAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw § 12-7, at
827 (1978); see also, e.g., Stephanie M. Kaufman, Note, The SpeechlConduct Distinction
and First Amendment Protection of Begging in Subways, 79 GEO. L.J. 1803, 1821-22 &
n.128 (1991). Discussing the hearsay rule: "The difficulty inherent in determining whether
the actor intended to assert the matter his conduct is offered to prove is well illustrated by
the conflicting manner in which the [academic] writers have interpreted the same fact
situations." Ted Fmman, Inplied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Crticisms of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682, 687 n.16 (1962). The problem also arises within
contract law, where an act may or may not signal an offer and/or acceptance of a contract.
Agreements thus formed are known as contracts implied-in-fact. The ambiguity of acts has
been recognized in this context as well. See 1 CORBIN, supra note 29, § 18.
81 See, e.g., Smith v. Weitzel, 338 S.W.2d 628, 637 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960) (holding
that the act of placing stock certificates in envelopes bearing the names of intended
beneficiaries and then placing the envelopes in a lockbox had independent significance); cf.
Hastings v. Bridge, 166 A. 273, 273-74 (N.H. 1933) (dicta disputing this ruling in
analogous cases). Of course, what appears an arbitrary exercise to one observer may seem
an expedient space for judicial discretion to another. Professors Atkinson and Page both
appear to have been drawn to the latter view. See ATKINSON, supra note 30, § 81, at 397; 2
PAGE, supra note 11, § 19.34, at 119.
82 "If the will... contemplates a further dispositive act, the latter act should be in
writing and duly executed." Alvin E. Evans, Incorporation by Reference, Integration, and
Non-Testamentary Act, 25 CoLuM. L. REv. 879, 895 (1925).
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then she can do so. 83 Under the doctrine, then, a testator can alter her will by
act, so long as she does not do so on purpose. A curious outcome, to say the
least, when one bears in mind that lawmakers have exalted effectuation of
intent as the guiding principle of inheritance law. 84
But perhaps this analysis is a trifle too clever. If one can safely assume
under the doctrine that any act intended to alter an estate plan will be given
effect so long as it also has independent significance,85 then a possible rationale
for the rule's configuration begins to emerge. Consider again the functions of
the Statute of Wills. If an act has independent significance for the testator, is
there likely to be better evidence of the testator's intent? Not necessarily: acts
can have an impact on the testator's life whether they are performed in public
or in private. If an act has independent significance for the testator, is it likelier
that the testator sought to make a legally effective change in her estate plan?
Here we may be on to something, for acts which affect the testator's life cannot
be taken as cavalierly as acts which do not, hence they could indicate greater
evidence of her legal resolve. Consider again a bequest of "whatever
automobile I own at my death." If the testator does intend to disinherit her
beneficiary when she sells her car, the requirement that she go to the trouble of
altering her life-style in order to do so, absent a new executed writing, may
suffice to demonstrate the finality of her intent. By contrast, an act with no
independent significance-such as affixing a label-can be undertaken more
tentatively. At the same time, however, the doctrine has an underside: for when
an act has independent significance for the life of the testator, the risk is that
much greater that her sole motivation was to alter her own life-style and that
any change of estate plan that follows from the act-say, of selling her car-
was inadvertent. She may have wanted her beneficiary to receive a car at her
death and simply failed to anticipate that she might no longer own one at that
time. The danger of inadvertence recedes, by contrast, when the act in question
lacks independent significance, only to be replaced by questions of
83Since the event does not happen for the purpose of implementing the'will the policy
underlying the requirement of the Statute of Wills is not applicable. Even though the
future act is within the testator's control, it does not appear that such an act should be
denied effect if the testator did not thereby intend to supplement his will.
Alvin E. Evans, Nomestwentary Acts and Incorporation by Reference, 16 U. CI. L. REV.
635, 636 (1949).
84 See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.85 Professor Page makes this assumption, which certainly appears essential to explain
the outcomes of the extant cases, though the point is unclear as a matter of formal doctrine.
See 2 PAGE, supra note 11, § 19.34, at 119; cf. 1A AUSTiNW. Scorr, THE LAWoFTRUSTS
§ 54.3, at 32 (William F. Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (asserting that if the
independent significance is insubstantial it should fail to suffice).
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resoluteness. Compare the two scenarios: (1) "I bequeath to A whatever
automobile I own at my death." (2) "I bequeath to A my automobile, unless I
have attached to it a black label." The act of selling the car is (probably)
effective to eliminate the bequest under present law. The act of affixing a label
to the car (probably) is not. Is testamentary intent more likely to be effectuated
in the first case than in the second? Myself, I doubt it, but who knows?
Whether acts should be treated like words for purposes of testation is
ultimately difficult to say. Arguably, persons can be expected to act somewhat
less lightly than they speak; actions, as we say, speak louder than words. Lay
persons know that acts are performative. And even a purely symbolic act like
tagging a car is not routine, hence the testator is more likely to be impressed
with the legal effect of the act than when she is merely discussing the matter.86
On the other hand, evidence of acts may be no easier to come by than evidence
of words when performed out of the presence of witnesses.
At any rate, having established a rule to resolve this dilemma, be the
solution no less problematic than the problem itself, lawmakers have not even
applied their problematic solution in a consistent manner. Venture for a
moment from the realm of will execution to the realm of will revocation. These
two processes are in fact opposite sides of the same coin, for both operate to
alter a testator's estate plan. Yet, under the law of all fifty states, a testator can
revoke her will by subsequent executed writing-or by act! By canceling or
destroying the document with intent thereby to revoke it, the testator
accomplishes the revocation of her will. 87 Note well what is entailed here: the
act of defacing the will alters the testator's estate plan-yet that act has
absolutely no significance apart from its effect on the estate plan. Here, a
purely symbolic act, carried out for no other purpose than to accomplish a legal
result, is given effect despite the failure to comply with the Statute of Wills.
Viewed comparatively, the doctrine of revocation by act appears contrary to, or
constitutes an exception under, the doctrine of acts of independent significance.
86 Cf U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a) (1994) (permitting a security interest to be formalized
between debtor and secured creditor either by signed writing or by the act of transferring
possession of the collateral to the secured creditor). Symbolic gestures had a place in
western legal tradition and popular culture from the beginning. For a discussion, see
Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Motions: The Embodiment of Law in Gesture, 6 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 51 (1995).
87 See Mc GOVERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 5.2. In most, though not all, jurisdictions, a
testator can even revoke individual bequests within a will by act without revoking the entire
will. See id. § 5.2, at 211-13. On the historical origins of revocation by act, a practice
given effect in England apparently from the beginning and first codified under the Statute of
Frauds of 1677, see 2 PAGE, supra note 11, §§ 21.2-.3. For a sixteenth-century discussion,
recognizing the validity of revocation by act, see SWiNBURNE, supra note 25, at 270a-272.
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Possibly this exception can find justifications in public policy.88 Arguendo,
the ritual mandated for revocation by act is more unequivocally indicative of
intent to be perfbrmative than are other ritualistic acts. Here, the act required of
the testator in order for legal consequences to ensue is irreversible (at least by a
further act, unlike affixing a label to a car, which could be removed and then
reaffixed at the testator's whim), and that act also is performed upon the legally
significant document itself.89 But is the legal effect of this act truly more
manifest than when the testator sets out in an initial executed writing what
subsequent acts (e.g., labelling) are to be effective to alter her will and then
proceeds to perform them? Certainly, the risk of fraud or evidentiary
insufficiency is precisely the same in the two cases. Ultimately, the differences
here may strike the mind as less pronounced than the similarities.90
Whether convincing or no, the distinctions just drawn between revocation
by act and other acts comprise at best a post hoc rationalization. The fact
remains that commentators and lawmakers alike have never drawn any
comparison between these two bodies of legal doctrine and hence have failed
even to come upon, let alone come to grips with, the inconsistency between
88 One suggested reason for permitting revocation by act is the very fact that it is an
entrenched cultural practice. For an early discussion defending revocation by act (as well as
other aspects of inheritance law) on this basis, see Sugden, supra note 31, at 7, 19, 23, 32
("Run not counter to the habits of the People."). The argument has recently been reiterated
in LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 253 (1991). See also
McGovern, Payable on Death Account, supra note 39, at 13-14 (noting the argument in
connection with will substitutes); Mechem, supra note 38, at 503 (making the argument in
connection with will execution). There is merit to this reasoning: citizens follow social
norms, and enactment of conflicting legal norms is bound to cause error and confusion.
Still, where public policy suggests the expediency of a change in social norms, error and
confusion in the interim may-or may not-be deemed a price worth paying. Discussing
this dilemma in a different doctrinal context, see Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy, supra
note 63, at 192-93. See also infra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
89 Compare the requirement of an act of delivery to render an inter vivos gift
effective: here again, the act required to manifest performative intent involves the
transaction itself (namely the gift corpus), it is irreversible (at least without breach of the
peace), and it conforms with cultural norms. At the same time, the act of handing over
property to another party does have independent significance for the donor. Discussing the
policy underlying the delivery requirement, see Philip Mechem, The Requirement of
Delivery in Gifts of Ouzttels and of Cioses in Action Evidenced by Comiercial Innsunents
(pt. 1), 21 ILL. L. Rnv. 341,345-52 (1926).
90 Defending revocation by act in the sixteenth century, Henry Swinburne cast his
argument in general terms. "An other of the meanes whereby the testament which was good
at the beginning, is afterwards made voide, is the canceling or cutting of the testament,"
Swinburne observed, "for the will and meaning of a man is no lesse shewed by his deedes
then by his woords." SWNBURNE, supra note 25, at 270a.
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them. In separate sections, the Uniform Probate Code endorses the traditional
doctrines of acts of independent significance and of revocation by act. Only one
of these sections is accompanied by a comment, which makes no mention of or
reference to the other. 91
2. Acts and Substance
Given, at any rate, the undoubted legal authority of the testator to revoke
her will by act, questions can arise about the substantive effect on the estate
plan induced by that act. Of course, if a testator has a single testamentary
instrument, the consequence intended by revoking that instrument is
unequivocal: the testator seeks to become intestate. Where, however, a string
of executed documents exists and the testator intentionally incinerates only one
of them, the estate plan we are left with after the smoke clears is not self-
evident.
The problem emerges in two essential contexts: a testator may execute two
instruments sequentially and then revoke by act only thefirst one; or a testator
may execute two instruments sequentially and then revoke by act only the
second one. 92 What effect does she intend her act to have on the legal
operativeness of the other document? Curiously enough, depending on the
circumstances, the act can be interpreted either to deprive the other document
of legal force, or the opposite-to reinstate with legal force a document
previously deprived of it. Alternatively, the act could be considered to have no
legal effect whatsoever on any document other than the one directly acted upon.
And that, ultimately, is the rub: for once we permit an act to substitute for
executed words, both the testator's intent to render that act legally performative
and the substantive outcome she intended thereby may be impossible to infer.
Acts, alas, are ambiguous in more ways than one. 93
Consider first the problem arising when a testator revokes by act the first
of two sequential documents. Here, lawmakers have distinguished cases where
the two instruments are substantively connected (a will together with a codicil
91 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, §§ 2-507(a)(2), 2-512 (by negative
implication); id. app. VII, §§ 2-507(2), 2-512 (pre-1990 art. 2). The Model Probate Code
permitted revocation by act, but failed to deal with the doctrine of acts of independent
significance. See MODEL PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 51(b).
92 A third possibility is that the testator executes two or more duplicate instruments
simultaneously and then revokes by act only one of them. The uniform rule applied in such
a case is that the revocation by act of a single executed will conclusively revokes the
duplicate executed documents by implication. See ATKINSON, supra note 30, § 86, at 442-
43.
93 Which is not of course to say that words cannot also be ambiguous in their
substantive purport, a problem taken up in Part III of this Article.
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to that will) and those where they are substantively disconnected (a will
followed by another complete will). Where a testator executed one will and
replaced it with a second will (thereby revoking the first by virtue of its
temporal priority94), and the testator now destroys the initial, superseded will
by act, the law is crystal clear: the act of destroying an instrument which was
already revoked effectively is superfluous and has no effect on the second
testamentary instrument. Where, however, the testator executed a will followed
by a codicil to that will, and the testator now revokes the initial will by act, the
legal effect of that act on the second, substantively connected instrument has
been treated variously by the few courts that have faced the issue.95 Several
courts have given narrow effect to the statute authorizing revocation by act:
The statute provides that the document destroyed is the document revoked,
making no provision for revocation of an associated document by implication.
On that basis, the subsequent codicil, like a subsequent will, has been held
unaffected by the destruction of the prior document.96 In some other
jurisdictions, however, by additional statutory provision, the revocation of a
will by act conclusively revokes all codicils to that will.97 And in still other
jurisdictions which lack such explicit statutory provisions, courts have declined
to read narrowly general statutory authorizations for revocation by act; in these
states, the issue has turned on whether the codicil is substantively
"independent" of the will, 98 a property nowhere well defined, but one that can
be clarified in these states by extrinsic evidence of testamentary intent.99
94 This sort of revocation is known technically as revocation by subsequent executed
writing.
95 See ATKINSON, supra note 30, § 86, at 443; 2 PAGE, supra note 11, § 21.17;
Martha B. Allen, Note, Preswnpfive Revocation of Lost Will-Effect on Codicil, 16 U. CIN.
L. REV. 346 (1942); Roger W. Kapp, Comment, Wills-Revocat'on by Act to the
Document-Effect on Codicil, 60 MICH. L. REv. 82 (1961); R.L. Martyn, Annotation,
Revocation of Will as Affecing Codicil and ce Versa, 7 A.L.R.3d 1143, 1146-53 (1966).
96 The clearest statement to this effect appears in In re Sapery, 147 A.2d 777, 782
(NJ. 1959); see also In re Brown's Will, 160 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Surr. Ct. 1957) (lacking
explicit analysis). Advocating this position as a matter of statutory construction, see
ATKINsON, supra note 30, § 86, at 443; 2 PAGE, supra note 11, § 21.17, at 373-74; Allen,
supra note 95, at 348; Kapp, supra note 95, at 88-90, 93-95.
97 At present, four jurisdictions have statutes to this effect. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 732.509 (West 1995); N.Y. EST. PoWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-4.1 (McKinney 1981 &
Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 113 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIIED
LAWS ANN. § 29-3-9 (1994). In one additional jurisdiction, by statute, the presumption that
the revocation of a will revokes all of its codicils is rebuttable. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 11.12.080 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
98 Many of the cases are addressed in Kapp, supra note 95, at 90-93.
99 E.g., Smith's Estate, 2 Pa. C. 626, 627-28 (1887); Youse v. Forman, 68 Ky. (5
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The Uniform Probate Code fails to deal with this issue at all. It is a lacuna
in the Code.10
Regarding the reverse problem, where the testator revokes by act the
second of two instruments, even greater confusion, or more properly diffusion,
reigns. 10 1 Here, the question is whether the act of revoking a later testamentary
instrument revives the terms of the prior instrument (which the later instrument,
now gone, had previously superseded). A very few states, following the old
English common law, answer yes: the eventual revocation (by act) of a second
instrument that had earlier revoked by subsequent executed writing a prior
instrument conclusively reinstates the terms of the prior instrument.102 Other
states, following the British Wills Act of 1837, answer no: having been
revoked by subsequent executed writing, the prior will cannot be reinstated
Bush) 337, 347-49 (1869). See also supra note 97 (citing the Washington statute). Some
courts have failed to address the issue of extrinsic evidence. C. In re Halpern's Estate, 224
N.Y.S.2d 58, 59 (Surr. Ct. 1962); In re Emmons' Will, 96 N.Y.S. 506, 509 (App. Div.
1906) (which may be read to imply that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible). The English
courts, too, were in conflict on the whole question. See 2 PAGE, supra note 11, § 21.17, at
372-73.
100 This was true of the original Uniform Probate Code of 1969 and remains true of
the revised version of 1990. The Model Probate Code, by contrast, included a conclusive
presumption that the revocation by act of an initial will has no effect on any subsequent
"will, nor any part thereof." See MODEL PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 54 (by
implication). Thus the Model Probate Code, at least, treated the two scenarios
symmetrically.
101 "It is unfortunate that there should be so great a conflict of authority upon a
question which is frequently of such vital importance.... " 2 PAGE, upra note 11,
§ 21.54, at 442. See also W.F. Zacharias & G. Maschinot, Revocation and Revival of WIl~s
(pt. 3), 26 CIu.-KENT L. REv. 107, 146 (1948) ("...an almost kaleidoscope
pattern....").
102 This assumes that the original testamentary instrument was not (like the second
instrument) revoked independently by act. The few jurisdictions that take this view have
done so by case law. The common law rule is not codified in a single jurisdiction (but 11
states have no statute on point). See, e.g., Peck's Appeal from Probate, 50 Conn. 562
(1883). The notion of revival might find a basis in formal logic, where the double negative
yields a positive (though not the reverse: the double positive does not yield a negative, and
hence republication of a still-valid will does not result in revocation; but is this asymmetry
of formal logic logical? On the lighter side of this vexed question, see Taylor Branch, New
Frontiers in Aneican Philosophy, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 12, 46).
But in fact, this result under the common law had naught to do with formal logic (which had
yet to be invented), but stemmed rather from the notion that a revocation, like a devise,
took legal effect only upon death; if the testator revoked a subsequent will during her
lifetime, then the subsequent will never had a legal existence and the initial will remained
valid. See 2 PAGE, supra note 11, § 21.51.
10911996]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
except by formal re-execution; any acts taken with respect to the subsequent
executed writing are irrelevant. 10 3 And still other states, following the rule of
the old English ecclesiastical courts, admit extrinsic evidence to clarify the
testator's intent in this situation, either (as under the original rule) without any
presumption or (more commonly today) with a rebuttable presumption one way
or the other. 104 What is more, even within a given jurisdiction, the
determination of which of these several alternatives applies differs in some
states depending (once again) on whether the second, revoking instrument that
is itself revoked in turn was a will or a codicil. 105
Different outcomes premised on this last distinction also appear in the
revised version of the Uniform Probate Code. Under the original version of the
Code, symmetry was maintained: an original will, whether revoked completely
by a subsequent will or partially by a subsequent codicil, was presumed to
remain revoked despite the later revocation of the subsequent instrument unless
extrinsic evidence showed that the testator intended the contrary. 106 The
103 Seventeen jurisdictions currently follow this scheme by statute; the rule is
sometimes known as "anti-revival." It in fact appeared in the New York Revised Statutes of
1830 before it was adopted in Great Britain, although the impact of New York's legislation
on Parliament, and the comparative influence of the two statutes on other American states,
remains unclear. See Ferrier, supra note 30, at 266-70.
104 Rebuttable presumptions exist in all jurisdictions where the law has been codified,
but the old ecclesiastical court rule is established by precedent in a few jurisdictions lacking
statutes on point. See, e.g., In re Gould's Will, 47 A. 1082 (Vt. 1900). In still another
variation, a few states distinguish between subsequent wills which do or do not contain
express revocation clauses, holding such clauses to revoke prior wills conclusively,
irrespective of the subsequent will's revocation. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-73
(Michie 1995); Hawes v. Nicholas, 10 S.W. 558 (rex. 1889) (no statute on point). On the
public policy of this distinction, compare 2 PAGE, supra note 11, § 21.54, at 443
(applauding it) with Palmer L. Hall, Revival by Revocation of a Later Instrmenrt-Effect qf
a Revocatory Case, 28 KY. L.I. 227, 229 (1940) (criticizing it).
105 For statutes distinguishing the outcome of a revocation of a codicil from the
revocation of a subsequent will, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2509 (1995) (reverse
rebuttable presumptions); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.508(1), 732.508(2) (West 1995)
(reverse presumptions, one rebuttable and the other conclusive); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 755,
para. 5/4-7 (West 1992) (reverse conclusive presumptions); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-529
(1995) (reverse rebuttable presumptions); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-509 (Miechie 1994)
(same); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.12.080 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996) (same); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 853.11 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995) (same). In no jurisdiction does the
revocation of a codicil operate to revoke fully the prior will that it modified. See 2 PAGE,
supra note 11, § 21.18.
106 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, app. VII, § 2-509(a) (pre-1990 art. 2).
The Model Probate Code had also treated the revocation of subsequent wills and codicils
symmetrically, though in a different manner: following the British Wills Act of 1837, the
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revised Code treats subsequent wills and codicils differently. When a will is
entirely superseded by a subsequent will that the testator eventually revokes,
the Code continues to presume an intent not to revive the original will unless
extrinsic evidence shows otherwise. But when a will is partially superseded by
a subsequent codicil that the testator eventually revokes, the rebuttable
presumption flip-flops: now an intent to revive the original will is presumed,
unless contradicted by extrinsic evidence. 10 7
What rules ought to govern these two core problems? None, alas, can be
fool-proof: for the effect intended by a testator's act of revoking one document
when a second one exists is destined to vary from case to case. Even the
admission of extrinsic evidence on the question is double-edged, allowing for a
case-by-case determination of intent but also potentially opening the door to
fraud (as well as costly litigation). 08 Still, that door is just slightly ajar: here,
revocation of a subsequent will or codicil was deemed conclusively not to revive the prior
document (extrinsic evidence being barred). See MODEL PROBATE CODE, supra note 5,
§ 55. The drafters of the original Uniform Probate Code were of several minds on the
question of revival, and they tossed about a variety of, sometimes novel, schemes. See
UNiF. PROBATE CODE § 248 (First Reporter's Draft, Aug. 1966); id. § 2-508 & cmt.
(Summer Draft, July 14, 1967); id. § 2-508 & cmt. (Fourth Working Draft, Second
Tentative Draft, July 22-Aug. 1, 1968); id. § 2-509 & cmt. (Fifth Working Draft, n.d., c.
1969).
107 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-509(a) & (b). See generally Robert
Whitman, Revocation and Revival: An Analysis of the 1990 Revision of the Uniform Probate
Code and Suggestionsfor the Future, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1035 (1992). Under a strictly textual
reading of this section, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show only an intent not to revive
that portion of the will that the codicil superseded. Ex hypothesi, extrinsic evidence is
inadmissible to show that a testator sought by revoking a codicil to revoke the entire will
that it modified. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-509(b); see also Ud app. VII,
§ 2-509(a) (pre-1990 art. 2); supra note 105. Yet, if extrinsic evidence is credible for one
purpose, why not for the other?
108 "No rule can be worked out which will avoid the dangers of oral evidence on the
one hand and which will give effect to the actual intention of the testator in the particular
case, on the other." 2 PAGE, supra note 11, § 21.54, at 443. Some courts and
commentators have emphasized the dangers inherent in admitting extrinsic evidence on the
question of revival of wills. See, e.g., Bailey v. Kennedy, 425 P.2d 304, 306-07 (Colo.
1967); 2 PAGE, supra note 11, § 21.54, at 443; Report of Revisers of N.Y. Statutes of
1827-28, quoted in Ferrier, supra note 30, at 267; W.F. Zacharias & G. Maschinot,
Revocation and Revival of Wills (pt. 1), 25 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 185, 213-14 (1947); infra
note 111. But see Gail B. Bird, Revocation of a Revoking Codicil: The Renaissance of
Revival in California, 33 HASTMGS L. 357, 377 & n.122 (1981) (arguing that to bar
extrinsic evidence may invite fraud if a presumption against revival also applies, by
allowing heirs to offer unanswerable pejury as to the existence of a subsequent-but-missing
will for purposes of establishing the revocation of the surviving will); Mechem, supra note
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the only question before the court would be the intended effectiveness vel non
of documents executed once upon a time by the testator. 109
At any rate, not to admit extrinsic evidence in these two situations makes
for an odd comparison with the general application of revocation by act. Under
that doctrine, the rules for determining whether a single testamentary
instrument was destroyed with intent thereby to revoke it set out rebuttable, not
conclusive, presumptions; extrinsic evidence is universally admissible to
determine whether the testator possessed the requisite an nus.110 If extrinsic
evidence is admissible to show what effect the testator intended her act to have
on the particular document that was acted upon, ought not that same evidence
also be admissible to show what effect the act was intended simultaneously to
have on other documents? Extrinsic evidence seemingly is as reliable (or
unreliable) for the one purpose as for the other.'II Yet, many jurisdictions do
bar evidence on the latter issue, as we have observed. 112 What is more, the
38, at 511 (opining that extrinsic evidence "will probably be trustworthy more often than
not whereas any arbitrary rule, one way or the other, gives [the testator] no more than an
even break"). On the potential of extrinsic evidence to breed litigation, see supra note 32.
109 "Although such evidence may occasionally result in the probating of a will which,
since its original revocation, the testator never actually intended should be effective, it will
not permit of the establishment of a testamentary disposition which he never at any time
desired." Ferrier, supra note 30, at 273; Mechem, supra note 38, at 511.
110 See MCGoVERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 5.2, at 213-14.
111 This analogy was drawn by Professor Mechem (see Mechem, supra note 38, at
511) and a generation later by a cohort of the Reporters of the original Uniform Probate
Code, who sought to make extrinsic evidence admissible to resolve ambiguities concerning
the effect intended by acts; but other Reporters opposed the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence in this situation on the ground that its use "permits fraud in some cases." UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-508 cmt. (Summer Draft, July 14, 1967), repeated in id. § 2-508 cmt.
(Third Working Draft, Nov. 1967); cf id. § 2-508 cmt. (Fourth Working Draft, Second
Tentative Draft, July 22-Aug. 1, 1968) (debating the issue back and forth). This debate,
along with the useful analogy raised in the course of it, was banished from the Code as
ultimately adopted. With the above comments, compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note
5, app. VII, § 2-509 cmt. (pre-1990 art. 2). See also Ferrier, supra note 30, at 272
(pointing out that extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify latent ambiguities created by
words, as opposed to acts, by analogy).
112 See supra notes 96-97, 102-03 and accompanying text. Also troubling is the
comparison between strict revival or anti-revival rules and the common-law doctrine of
dependent relative revocation. Under the latter doctrine, if evidence shows that a testator
was mistaken about the legal effect of revoking a subsequent instrument, the court can deem
that act of revocation constructively to have been conditioned upon it having the effect the
testator anticipated; and if it does not, given the law of revival or anti-revival operating in
the jurisdiction, the court can invalidate the revocation of the subsequent instrument (the
fictional condition attached to that revocation, that it have the desired effect, not having
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issue has not even been treated with internal structural consistency. Some
jurisdictions that bar extrinsic evidence when the testator revoked by act the
first of two documents permit such evidence when she instead revoked the
second of two documents.1 13 And in some jurisdictions, the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence to show what effect the testator intended the revocation by
act of one document to have on the other document turns on whether they were
two separate wills or will and codicil. 114 Surely within these parameters,
been met), if the court finds that to do so would result in an estate plan closer to the
testator's intent. For example, if a testator revoked a subsequent will under the mistaken
belief that it would revive her original will, and the jurisdiction applies an anti-revival rule
presuming conclusively that the original will was intended not to be revived, the court could
invalidate the revocation of the subsequent will if it provided for an estate plan closer to the
will that the testator wished to revive than to the intestacy statute. Extrinsic evidence is
admissible to demonstrate such a mistake under the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation. E.g., In re Estate of Album, 118 N.W.2d 919 (Wis. 1963); see generally 2
PAGE, supra note 11, §§ 21.57-65. Notice, then, the anomaly: under the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation, courts are free in most jurisdictions to admit, and may
choose to rely on, extrinsic evidence to show that a testator intended, by virtue of her act of
revocation, to put into effect a particular estate plan-not to implement judicially that estate
plan, but to undo a revocation that, given the conclusive presumption concerning its effect
imposed by state law, moves her farther away from the estate plan she anticipated. Yet,
extrinsic evidence is equally reliable for, and might just as well be admitted for, the purpose
of effectuating the precise intent of the testator. Also drawing this analogy, see UNiF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-508 cmt. (Summer Draft, July 14, 1967), repeated in id. § 2-508 cmt.
(Third Working Draft, Nov. 1967).
113 When a will is followed by a subsequent will, all jurisdictions bar extrinsic
evidence to show what effect a testator intended revocation by act of the first will to have on
the effectiveness of the second will, whereas some twenty jurisdictions admit extrinsic
evidence to show what effect a testator intended revocation by act of the second will to have
on the effectiveness of the first will. When a will is followed by a codicil, at least one
jurisdiction has admitted extrinsic evidence to show what effect revocation of the will was
intended to have on the codicil but at the same time bars extrinsic evidence to show what
effect revocation of a codicil was intended to have on the will. Compare Youse v. Forman,
68 Ky. (5 Bush) 337, 347-49 (1869) (no statute on point) with KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 394.100 (Michie 1994). E contra, at least two other jurisdictions bar extrinsic evidence to
show what effect revocation of a will was intended to have on the codicil but admit extrinsic
evidence to show what effect revocation of a codicil was intended to have on the will.
Coipare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.509 (West 1995) with id. § 732.508(2); compare S.D.
CODNFED LAWS § 29-3-9 (Michie 1994) with id. §§ 29-2-1, 29-3-6.
114 Whereas all jurisdictions bar extrinsic evidence to show what effect revocation by
act of an initial will is intended to have on a subsequent will, at least three jurisdictions
admit extrinsic evidence to show what effect revocation by act of a will is intended to have
on a codicil. See supra note 99. Florida bars extrinsic evidence to show what effect
revocation by act of a subsequent will was intended to have on the initial will but admits
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extrinsic evidence in all instances is equally reliable or unreliable. The
distinctions some lawmakers have seen fit to draw in this regard appear as
thoughtless as they are arbitrary.
That is not necessarily true when it comes to setting the legal presumptions
(whether conclusive or rebuttable) that apply in these cases. To the extent
lawmakers distinguish the effect that the revocation of an initial document has
on a subsequent document from the effect that the revocation of a subsequent
document has on an initial document, or distinguish the effect of revoking one
of the two documents in a will-will sequence from the effect of revoking the
analogous document in a will-codicil sequence, these "asymmetries" stand the
test of reason if they correspond with distinctions that the typical testator would
herself draw: for the object of these presumptions is to infer and then to
implement the testator's probable intent, not to achieve some abstract ideal of
symmetry.
But have lawmakers succeeded in this endeavor? Absent empirical evidence
(which is expensive to come by) of what testators are most likely to intend by
acts of revocation under different circumstances, lawmakers must rely on their
intuitions when setting the operative presumptions. Just how canny those
intuitions have been is questionable. Consider the distinction chiseled into the
revised Uniform Probate Code between will-will and will-codicil sequences: If
the testator revokes a codicil by act, the will (to the extent that it had been
superseded) is presumptively revived; whereas, if the testator revokes a
subsequent will by act, the prior will (that was wholly superseded) is
presumptively not revived.I 15 Will the na've testator truly distinguish these two
situations?1 16 Certainly they can generate odd comparisons, in that a legal
extrinsic evidence to show what effect revocation by act of a codicil was intended to have
on a will. Comare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.508(1) (West 1995) with id. § 732.508(2).
115 See supra note 107.
116 Asserting that the distinction between wills and codicils in the context of revival is
"illogical," and "arbitrary," see Bird, supra note 108, at 376, 378. Asserting that most
ignorant testators probably intend to revive former documents when they revoke subsequent
ones (be they wills or codicils), see UNiF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508 cmt. (Summer Draft, July
14, 1967) (repeated in several of the drafts that followed); Perry Evans, Comments on the
Probate Code of Califorria, 19 CAL. L. REv. 602, 611-12 (1931); Ferrier, supra note 30,
at 273; see also id. at 271 (suggesting that this principle might be confined to those instances
where the testator preserves the earlier document among her important papers); Peck's
Appeal from Probate, 50 Conn. 562, 566-67 (1883) (inferring an intent to revive where the
first will had been "carefully preserv[ed]"). But see Harwell v. lively, 30 Ga. 315, 320-21
(1860) (suggesting that no inference is possible one way or the other); 2 PAGE, supra note
11, § 21.55, at 443 (suggesting that most testators do not expect a former will to be revived,
especially when the subsequent will contained an express revocation clause); Report of
Revisers of N.Y. Statutes of 1827-28, quoted in Ferrier, supra note 30, at 267, 272 & n.28
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abyss yawns at the point where a codicil becomes will-like. Put the case:
Scenario # 1: Testator executes an initial will naming A as sole beneficiary
and B as executor. Testator then executes a second instrument substituting C as
sole beneficiary (but relying on the initial will provision concerning the
executor). The second instrument constitutes a codicil; therefore, the testator's
subsequent act of revoking the codicil is presumed, absent extrinsic evidence to
the contrary, to reinstate the bequest of the entire estate to A.
Scenario # 2: Testator executes an initial will naming A as sole beneficiary
and B as executor. Testator then executes a second instrument substituting C as
sole beneficiary and D as executor. The second instrument constitutes a
complete will; therefore, the testator's subsequent act of revoking the second
will is presumed, absent extrinsic evidence to the contrary, not to reinstate the
bequest of the entire estate to A.
The two scenarios appear oh so very similar that they should at least raise
doubts about the wisdom of the rules as presently framed. The Commissioners'
decision to create this asymmetry surely was not thoughtless, but neither is it
corroborated by cogent reasoning, let alone a soupcon of supporting empirical
evidence.117
(suggesting that intestacy is the preferable inference, given uncertainty of intent). Noting an
inconsisteney between the anti-revival rule, where applied, and the doctrine permitting
interlineations within holographs, see Ferrier, supra note 30, at 274.
117 For an argument supporting greater use of empirical evidence in the drafting of
probate codes, including the Uniform Probate Code, see Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An
Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REv. 891,
915-18 (1992). In justifying the instant asymmetry, the Commissioners argued that "[a]s
revised, this section properly treats the two situations as distinguishable.... Wihere Will
# 2 wholly revoked Will # 1, the testator understood or should have understood that Will
# I had no continuing effect[,. . ." whereas, "where Will # 2 only partly revoked Will # 1,
Will # 2 is only a codicil to Will # 1, and the testator knows (or should know) that Will # 1
does have continuing effect." UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-509 cmt. (emphasis
added). The difficulty with this reasoning is that it can be wheeled out to defend any default
rule under the sun. Of course, a testator should know what effect the law will presume she
intended by her act, but that fact does not point lawmakers in the direction of any one
presumption as opposed to another. If they strive to effectuate intent, then the issue
lawmakers must address when setting default rules is what intent the typical testator who
doesn't know the law would expect her act to accomplish. That way, default rules are most
likely to carry out the wishes of both informed and uninformed testators. Though the
Commissioners employed no empirical evidence in the course of crafting § 2-509, they did
use such evidence to good effect in some other segments of the Code. See id. §§ 2-102
cmt., 2-302 cmt. Most unfortunately, however, the Uniform Law Commission provides no
funding for empirical research for its own drafting purposes. See Lawrence W. Waggoner,
The Umform Probate Code Extends Antilapse-Type Protection to Poorly Drafted Trusts, 94
MICH. L. Ray. 2309, 2337 (1996).
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E. Boundaries of Wills
Along with the temporal problem of will revision comes a "spatial"
problem of will execution: To wit, where does an estate plan end and material
extrinsic to a will begin? Assuming that a testator has validly formalized her
will, what substantive provisions are encompassed by that ritual? The simple
answer, simply stated, is that any material intended to form a part of the will
that is on hand when the will is executed becomes integrated into the will. The
prudent testator will see to it that all pages and provisions are present and
accounted for when the mass of documents setting out the estate plan come to
be signed and witnessed. Sometimes, however, they are not, at which point the
law must decide whether to give effect to provisions that the testator intended
to implement when she executed her will but which are nowhere to be found
within the executed writing.
Courts have grappled with this problem in two core settings. One is where
the testator fails by mistake to include provisions within a will that she believed
to be there. A section may be omitted due to a scrivener's error, for example,
and the testator may fail to spot the mistake when she reviews the documents
for signature. Can courts insinuate into a will provisions that the testator
presumed to be contained therein, but that in fact are not?
Notice what raw materials we have to work with here. On the one hand,
we know for a certainty that the testator sought to give performative effect to
some estate plan, for she did proceed with the will execution ceremony. The
difficulty concerns establishing the terms of that estate plan. In order to correct
mistakes of omission, courts would have to evaluate extrinsic assertions
concerning what words the testator believed she was executing, a problematic
exercise that could either restore the accuracy of the estate plan or expose it to
fraud. Cast into the traditional terminology of testamentary formality, giving
effect to mistakenly omitted material would run counter to the evidentiary
function, but not to the ritual function, of the statutory requirements for due
execution. 118 Can courts do so? The answer is no: errors of omission cannot be
118 "If extrinsic evidence is admitted to explain testamentary intent [omitted from an
estate plan]..., the risk of misinterpreting the testator's intent increases dramatically.
Furthermore, admitting extrinsic evidence heightens the tendency to manufacture false
evidence that cannot be rebutted due to the unavailability of the testator." Espinosa v.
Sparber, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Fla. 1993) (addressing the issue in connection with a
malpractice action against attorney-scrivener). An early English scholar viewed the issue in
similar terms, asserting that the admission of extrinsic evidence in cases of mistake would
be inconsistent with the law's insistence on proper execution:
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corrected, either at common law or by recourse to equity.' 9
Whatever the intrinsic merits of such a rule,120 it is, and has long been,
As the law requires wills ... to be in writing, it cannot, consistently with this doctrine,
permit parol evidence to be adduced, either to contradict, add to, or explain the contents
of such will; and the principle of this rule evidently demands an inflexible adherence to
it.... fbr it would have been of little avail to require that a will aborigine should be in
writing, or to fence a testator round with a guard of attesting witnesses, if ... its
deficiencies might be supplied, or its inaccuracies corrected, from extrinsic sources.
1 THOMAS JARMAN, A TREATISE ON WILLS 502 (Raymond Jennings & John C. Harper eds.,
8th ed. 1951) (1841-43). The two situations are not precisely analogous, however, in that a
testator's failure to execute a will at all leaves it deficient in both evidence and ritual;
whereas, a court confronted with an alleged clerical error faces a deficiency of evidence
only.
119 E.g., Knupp v. District of Columbia, 578 A.2d 702 (D.C. 1990); see also First
Interstate Bank of Oregon v. Young, 853 P.2d 1324 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to admit
extrinsic evidence to correct a mistaken omission where the scrivener could only offer notes
and recollections, not a copy of an earlier version of the will, but declining to decide
whether extrinsic evidence could ever be admitted to cure an omission). In a few cases,
courts have corrected omissions under the guise of construction, sometimes with the
assistance of equity. See, e.g., Greer v. Anderson, 259 S.W.2d 550 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953)
(equity); see also WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 88, at 565-66; Joseph W. deFuria, Jr.,
Misakes in dlls Reridting from Scriveners' Errors: The Argument for Reformation, 40
CATH. U. L. REv. 1, 7 n.26 (1990). But see In re Estate of Winslow, 147 N.W.2d 814,
818-19 (Iowa 1967) (expressly rejecting a finding of ambiguity to cure a scrivener's error);
First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 853 P.2d at 1327 (finding text of will unambiguous despite
alleged mistaken omission). Treating the doctrine of clerical errors in wills generally, see
ATKINSON, supra note 30, §§ 58, 60, at 274-77, 281-84; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 8,
§ 6.1, at 235-36; 1 PAGE, supra note 11, §§ 13.4-.5, 13.7-.8; 4 id. § 32.12; 4 GEORGE E.
PALNER, THE LAw oF REsTIUON § 20.1, at 156-58, 161-64 (1978 & Supp. 1996); 9
JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGIO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
§ 2421(1)(a) (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1994).
120 Obviously, the rule (like all other rules barring extrinsic evidence) is double-edged,
filtering out of judicial consideration both accurate and potentially fraudulent evidence.
Admission of extrinsic evidence also entails an administrative cost, in the form of added
litigation. See supra note 32. Some courts have asserted that the risks entailed in admitting
such evidence outweigh the benefits:
[It is against sound public policy to permit a pure mistake to defeat the duly solemnized
and completely competent testamentary act. It is more important that the probate of the
wills of dead people be effectively shielded from the attacks of a multitude of fictitious
mistakes than that it be purged of wills containing a few real ones.
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comparatively anomalous. Courts can correct clerical mistakes within written
contracts, whether or not subject to the Statute of Frauds.121 And even within
the law of wills itself, courts have not enforced the ban on reformation
consistently: for in the reverse situation, where material appears in a will that
allegedly was not intended to be there-an error of inclusion, rather than
omission-most modem courts will admit testimony disclosing that the testator
signed the document in error and will strike provisions that were included by
mistake. 122
Note well that in both of these instances, courts have before them precisely
In re Gluckman's Will, 101 A. 295, 296 (NJ. 1917);
[lf the writing is to be contradicted by parol evidence, the object of the law will be
defeated and all certainty destoyed. It is very common for scriveners to make
mistakes .... But, if these mistakes were to be corrected by the scrivener's
recollection of his conversation with the testator, it would open such a door for peijury
and confusion, as would render wills of very little use.
Iddings v. Iddings, 7 Serg. & Rawle 111, 112-13 (Pa. 1821). But C supra note 29. In
addition, the rule could conceivably be justified as an in terrorem provision, encouraging
greater care in reviewing testamentary documents e ante, and hence helping to provide
clearer evidence and more efficient proof of intent. See In re GlucAnm 's Will, 101 A. at
296 ("[A] testator may, by due care, avoid [scriveners' errors] in his lifetime."). C. supra
note 30 and accompanying text. The tide of modem opinion is against the rule, however.
See infra note 127.
121 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS, supra note 61, §§ 155-56. Within
contract law, this doctrine is of ancient lineage. But as Professor Wigmore points out, it
held greater importance in times past, when literacy rates were lower. See 9 WIGMoRE,
supra note 119, §§ 2405, 2417. Likewise, under the law of inter vivos gratuitous transfers,
including non-probate will substitutes, courts can correct clerical errors, both before and
after the transferor's death. See Loeser v. Talbot, 589 N.E.2d 301 (Mass. 1992); In re
Estate of Vadney, 634 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1994); Griffin v. Griffin, 832 P.2d 810 (Okla.
1992); 4 PALMR, supra note 119, §§ 18.5, 18.7, 18.9. Likewise, under the law of statutory
interpretation, courts have corrected clerical errors in legislation. See United States Nat'l
Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents, 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2186 (1993).
122 See supra note 119. Where the clerical error is a nisdescripfion-a combined
omission (of the proper description) and inclusion (of a false description)-courts once again
have only stricken, not corrected, the error. See supra note 119. But in some cases, again,
courts have avoided this result, often (though not always) by misdescribing the
misdescription as an ambiguity and correcting it under the rubric of construction. See
WAGoNER ET AL., supra note 88, at 572-73; deFuria, supra note 119, at 7 nn.25, 27. But
see McFarland v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 337 A.2d 1, 7 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973)
(explicitly rejecting this fiction), aff'd, 362 A.2d 834 (1975). By statute in Oklahoma, courts
can correct misdescriptions, but not omissions from wills generally. See OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 84, § 174 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
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the same evidentiary dilemma: given clear intent to render effective some
document, courts must decide whether to search beyond its bounds to discover
what it was, or what it was not, supposed to contain. In one case, courts do so;
in the other, they do not. This asymmetry would appear to follow not from any
shortness of sight, but rather from a rigidity of mind. Judges surely are not so
blind as to have missed the structural connection between these twin
scenarios. 123 But, they protest, the problem lies with the Statute of Wills,
which permits courts to subtract executed language from a will but which bars
them from adding any unexecuted language. They have simply made do with
the remedial apparatus at their disposal, acting opportunistically to tackle those
errors that are susceptible. 124 As a matter of substance, however, addition and
subtraction are equivalent operations, insofar as both produce a modification of
the estate plan as literally executed.x25 For courts to distinguish the two under
the Statute of Wills is to press thoughtless formalism toward the brink of
123 Still, their myopia ought not be underestimated. Regarding scriveners' errors
within other transactions, such as contracts, "[s]urprisingly.... few courts or
commentators have focused on them as analogies to support the argument favoring a
remedy for scriveners' mistakes in wills." deFuria, supra note 119, at 21. For one broadly
comparative analysis of the law of mistake in wills, see John H. Langbein & Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Refonwdon of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Ohange of Direction in
Amedcan Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982).
124 See Breckheimer v. Kraft, 273 N.E.2d 468, 471 (M)l. App. Ct. 1971) (observing as
a matter of law that "[a] mistake in description may be corrected by rejecting that which is
shown to be false, but no words may be inserted in place of those striken and no word or
words may be supplied."); see also Graves v. Rose, 92 N.E. 601, 603-04 (11. 1910). Prior
to the enactment of the modem, formalized Statute of Wills, ironically, this intellectual
hurdle was easily crossed. In 1590, Henry Swinburne had no difficulty asserting that "if the
writer [of a will] by error omit some wordes, whereby the sense is unperfect ... the error
of the writer ought not to prevaile against the truth of the testament: for the lawe presumeth
that more was spoken, though lesse was written." SWINBURNE, supra note 25, at 190a.
125 Subtraction of provisions from wills can have the effect of adding omitted terms,
when the words striken are words of limitation or qualification inserted by mistake. For
example, if a will bequeathed "40 of my shares in X Corp. to A," limiting the size of the
bequest by mistake, a court might strike the words "40 of" to restore the full bequest
intended. Still more artfully, if a will bequeathed "to my children, A and B," omitting C by
mistake, a court might strike "A and B" and thereby include C in the bequest. See
MCGOVERNEr AL., supra note 8, § 6.1, at 236; Roland Gray, Striking Words Out of a Will,
26 HARV. L. REV. 212, 230-36 (1913); see also Abigail Van Buren, Dear Abby: Don't
Leave Inheritance to Chance, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2, 1989, at E8 (when life imitated art).
The opportunity for such creative subtraction depends upon the precise language of each
testamentary instrument, hence rendering the correction of scriveners' errors even more
capricious.
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inanity. 126 For some time, commentators have marked this area of inheritance
law as ripe for reform, 127 and the Restatement (Second) of Property of 1990
calls for the rectification of drafting errors in wills, be they mistakes of
omission or inclusion.128 The Uniform Probate Code, on the other hand, fails
to address the issue.129
126 Misdescriptions provide the reductio: here, the very sane evidence that shows that
the will is wrong demonstrates how it should be righted, yet most courts will admit evidence
of error only to strike, not to correct, the error. See supra notes 119, 122. Yet, as a matter
of arid doctrine, extrinsic words may be added to testamentary instruments despite the
Statute of Wills under other circumstances, sometimes (though not exclusively) by resort to
equity. See infra notes 131, 148-50 and accompanying text. See also In re Fowles' Will,
118 N.E. 611, 613 (N.Y. 1918) (Cardozo, J.) (opining that "[s]ome reference to matters
extrinsic is inevitable" despite the "apparent generality" of the Statute of Wiflls; "[lt is a
question of degree"). But see MCGOVERN LT AL., supra note 8, § 6.1, at 235 (suggesting
that the phrasing of the Statute of Wills supports the mistaken omission/inclusion
distinction); Joseph Warren, Fraud, Undue Influence, and Mistake in Wlls, 41 HARv. L.
REV. 309, 333 (1928) (same).
127 For general criticisms of the law of mistake in wills (not limited to scriveners'
errors), see deFuria, supra note 119; James A. Henderson, Jr., Mistake and Fraud in Wills
(pts. 1 & 2), 47 B.U. L. REv. 303, 461 (1967); Clark Shores, Reforming the Doctrine ofNo
Refonnation, 26 GoNz. L. REV. 475 (1990/91); Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 123. Cf.
Warren, supra note 126, at 333-34 (asserting that while the "words of the Wills Acts"
supported the traditional distinction between striking mistakenly included words and adding
mistakenly omitted words, the "same policy" applied to both cases; but submitting that this
policy precludes judicial reformation of wills in either instance); see also 9 WIGMORE, supra
note 119, § 2421, at 71 (characterizing the treatment of mistaken omissions and inclusions
as "perhaps inconsistent[]").
128 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 33, § 34.7 & cmt. d &
illus. 11; see also RESTATEMENT (rflRD) OFPROPERTY, supra note 39, § 11.2(a) & (b)(2) &
cmt. n, § 12.1 & cmt. i. Likewise in Great Britain, the Administration of Justice Act of
1982 allows for the correction of clerical errors in wills. Administration of Justice Act, ch.
53, § 20(1)(a) (1982) (Eng.). Only a few American courts thus far have taken this approach.
See supra note 119.
129 Neither the original nor the revised Uniform Probate Code (nor its precursor, the
Model Probate Code) has addressed the consequences of mistakes of omission or inclusion;
nor did any proposed provision on the subject of mistake ever appear in one of the Code's
published drafts. See UNn'. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-601 cmt. (asserting that the
Code is not intended to preclude judicial adoption of a reformation doctrine for mistaken
omissions and inclusions). The failure of the revised Code affirmatively to admit extrinsic
evidence to cure a mistaken substantive omission could be deemed structurally inconsistent
with the Code's dispensing power (discussed supra note 33 and accompanying text), which
allows extrinsic evidence to cure procedural omissions of form in the process of will
execution. See id. § 2-503. See also infra note 227. That the Restators rather than the
Commissioners have set the pace in this area is the more intriguing because the two drafting
1102 [Vol. 57:1057
INHERITANCE AND INCONSISTENCY
In some cases, however, a testator's failure to integrate material into an
executed writing is quite deliberate. Whether heedlessly or witlessly, 130 the
testator may intend to give effect to substantive provisions that she expresses
somewhere other than in her will. Can a court implement such spatially
external provisions? The answer is no, but with exceptions-in other words,
sometimes.
If a will is accompanied by an unexecuted statement of supplementary
instructions, the court can implement those instructions in most jurisdictions if
they meet a number of requirements: the statement must be explicitly referred
to in the will, it must be in writing, and it must have been set down prior to the
time when the will was executed. Such a statement can then be incorporated by
reference under the law of most states, despite its failure to comply with the
formalities dictated by the Statute of Wills.' 3 '
What is going on here? In this scenario, the testator has again made a
mistake of sorts-not a mistake concerning what words were contained within
the document she executed, but rather a mistake concerning the law of due
execution.' 32 She failed (it would appear) to realize that words supplementing
committees overlapped substantially; the Reporter for the revised Article 2 of the Code,
Professor Lawrence Waggoner, also sat as advisor to the Restatement and has long
advocated reform of the law of mistake within wills. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note
123; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595, 603-04 (1995) (suggesting that the philosophies of
both law reform organizations are equivalent); id. at 618-19 (noting a difference in
procedure between the two organizations). Professor Waggoner explains the decision not to
include a reformation doctrine in the Code as having followed primarily from the fact that it
could not easily and briefly have been crafted into legislation and secondarily from concern
that the doctrine would have aroused political controversy and hence might have
endangered state adoptions of the revised Code as a whole. See Letter from Lawrence W.
Waggoner to Adam 1. Hirsch (January 21, 1996) (on file with author).
130 Possibly the testator seeks after privacy without sacrificing legal enforceability, or
possibly she simply will not be bothered to repeat information already set down or uttered
apart from the will, or possibly she has not yet completed her planning and will not be
bothered to delay execution of the will until her estate plan is complete, or to execute a
codicil thereafter.
131 The rule has been applied with some variations among the states. For doctrinal
analysis, see ATKINSON, supra note 30, § 80; McGovERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.3, at
249-52; 2 PAGE, supra note 11, §§ 19.17-.33. Under the common law, it was not enough
that the referenced document already existed when the will was executed; the will had
expressly to refer to the document as being in existence. The Uniform Probate Code does
away with this requirement. See UNUF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-510 & cmt.
132 "Incorporation by reference thus touches the lawyer's activities as a morbid
anatomist of wills rather than as a drtsman... ." Armistead M. Dobie, Testwnentary
Incorporation by Reference, 3 VA. L. REv. 583,584 (1916).
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an executed estate plan had also to be formalized under the Statute of Wills.
Lawmakers must now decide whether to give effect to her intent
notwithstanding her misconception. And so we face the question: Under what
circumstances, if any, are the policies underlying due execution satisfied
despite the testator's failure even to attempt to comply with the statutory
requirements? 133
By promulgating the doctrine of incorporation by reference, courts have
announced their answer. A writing helps to certify the quality of the evidence
of what was intended. And the requirement that the writing antedate the will,
and that the will refer to it expressly, also certifies its finality;13 4 were the
writing left unreferenced, or were it referenced prospectively, courts could not
easily determine whether the extrinsic document constituted a tentative or final
draft of what the testator intended legally to incorporate. 135
So, we can report with some assurance that, hedged in as it is, the doctrine
of incorporation by reference runs afoul of neither of the principal policies
underlying the Statute of Wills. 3 6 Still, we may fairly ask whether the law
133 Cf. the Uniform Probate Code's dispensing power, addressed supra note 33.
134 Again from an evidentiary standpoint, the reference requirement provides evidence
of which document was intended to be incorporated when more than one candidate is
offered for probate. Hence, the document must be referred to with sufficient specificity to
permit its identification. The reference requirement also reduces the vulnerability of the
estate plan to fraud, in that a would-be defrauder could not forge an appropriate document
unless the executed will happened to contain such a reference, and unless she had
knowledge of the details of the reference in the will. Thus, the reference requirement
substitutes for the fact that the document referred to need not be signed by the testator (nor
stored in a secure location).
135 . UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-511(a) (allowing a testator to bequeath
property to the trustee of a trust "executed before, concurrently with, or after the execution
of the testator's will") (emphasis added). This provision forms an exception to the
antecedent document requirement of incorporation by reference. Nonetheless, the exception
is thematic in that the execution of a trust is itself a formal act, in contradistinction to the
preparation of an informal writing.
136 See In re Rausch's W]ll, 179 N.E. 755, 756-77 (N.Y. 1932) (Cardozo, CJ.)
(discussing the doctrine). Nonetheless, courts have treated material incorporated by
reference into a will as apartfrom the will, but brought into effect by it, as opposed to
material integrated into a will, comprising the effective instnwnt itself. "The papers
incorporated by reference are used to construe and apply the will, and do not become part
of the will in the same sense as those integrated." In re Estate of Nielson, 105 Cal. App. 3d
796, 803 (1980) (citations omitted). This distinction is, to say the least, deeply metaphysical.
Ordinarily it makes no difference, because material outside a will that is incorporated and
material inside that is integrated are equally valid. But in one instance it does: under
holographic will doctrine, all material provisions of a will must be in the testator's
handwriting. That means no substantive provisions of the estate plan can be integrated into
1104 [V/ol. 57:1057
INHERITANCE AND 1NCONSIS7ENCY
could tolerate without undue cost still greater testamentary laxity-or, more
precisely for present purposes, whether the law in other respects already
relaxes the formal specifications for effective testation in ways that are out of
step with the strictures imposed by the doctrine of incorporation by reference.
Consider again the limitation of extrinsic materials to prior referenced
writings. If the testator refers in her will to a document not yet prepared, but
which turns out to exist by her death, we can assert with fair confidence that
the substantive information indelibly preserved in its lettering reflects what the
testator had in mind; what is less clear is whether that mind was made up,
whether the testator intended this document to be the polished, legally effective
one. Notice that the problem here differs from that of mistaken omissions-it
is, in fact, its structural mirror image. In the case of mistaken omissions, we
had strong evidence of the testator's intent to render extrinsic provisions
effective, but weaker evidence concerning what those provisions were; here,
the case is precisely the reverse. But we touched earlier on another problem
offering a tighter structural analogy to that of incorporating subsequent
documents by reference-namely, the problem of holographic wills. Like
referenced documents, handwritten wills also provide sound, if not sounder,
evidence of their substance. 137 But the testator's resolution to put them into
legal operation is no less problematic in the one case than in the other. In those
states that admit into probate holographic wills in lieu of a properly executed
writing, courts must conduct an inquiry along these lines. Admission into
probate of subsequent referenced writings seemingly would entail the same sort
of inquiry, yet these are everywhere barred, even in states that do validate
holographs. 135
the document by type-writing. Still, because a document incorporated by reference is
deemed to be located "outside" of the will (although thereafter drawn inside), many though
not all courts have permitted holographic wills effectively to incorporate type-written
provisions. See 2 PAGE, supra note 11, § 20.5, at 286-87. Criticizing this inconsistency, see
Bird, supra note 47, at 624-28; Philip Mechem, The Integration of Holographic Wills, 12
N.C. L. REv. 213 (1934). But see Thomas H. Malone, Incorporation, by Reference, of an
Fxtinsic Docunent into a Holographic Will, 16 VA. L. Rnv. 571 (1930) (defending the
disparity). Even the technical distinction between integration and incorporation in this
context can be fuzzy. See Jodi M. Graves, Note, Incorporation by Reference, Integration,
and Holographic Wills in Gifford v. Estate of Gifford, 46 ARK. L. RLv. 1013 (1994). But
see Evans, supra note 82, at 888-91 (asserting the distinctness of the distinction).
137 Both handwritten documents and referenced documents also provide a measure of
protection against fraud. See supra note 134.
138 The doctrine of incorporation by reference and proof of holographic wills have
nowhere been compared. But at least one court has endorsed (implicitly) the principle of
allowing testators to incorporate by reference writings prepared after a will is executed, by
giving effect to such a writing by resort to legal fiction where the evidence demonstrated
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The Uniform Probate Code, which endorses holographs, nonetheless limits
incorporation by reference in general to preexisting writings, as tradition, if not
structural consistency, would dictate. 139 But the drafters created an exception
with respect to the disposition of tangible personalty, which can be made by
reference to subsequent writings under the Code.140 This provision suggests
some recognition on the part of the drafters that the traditional limitation is
anomalous, or at least unnecessary, 141 though their decision to abrogate the
limitation only in this one respect has no clear basis in policy-and so, by half-
disposing of one anomaly, the drafters ushered in another. 142
Consider also the writing requirement. By universal consensus, a will can
incorporate by reference only lettering, not speech. Is such a limitation
justified? References in a will to prior communications, whether set down on
paper or merely uttered, would appear equally to manifest the testator's resolve
to infuse them with performative power. However informally or even
equivocally expressed at the time, those communications have now been
recalled in an executed document. What remains more doubtful is our ability
accurately to reconstruct the substance of a statement that was issued not in ink,
but through the evanescent medium of sound. Here the case is structurally
analogous to that of mistaken omissions and inclusions, where we again have
strong evidence of the testator's intent to include in a will extrinsic material,
convincingly that the writing was intended to be legally effective and was untainted by fraud
(having been stored in a vault). See Simon v. Grayson, 102 P.2d 1081 (Cal. 1940).
139 The Uniform Probate Code posits both traditional rules without evidentiary
comparison. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-502(b) & cmt., § 2-510 & cmt.
The Model Probate Code failed to address at all the problem of incorporation by reference.
140 The two additional requirements are that such writings be signed by the testator
and that they not contradict specific bequests within the will. See id. § 2-513. This provision
also appeared with minor modifications in the original version of the Code. See id. app.
VII, § 2-513 (pre-1990 art. 2).
141 The drafters justified the provision as "part of the broader policy of effectuating a
testator's intent and of relaxing formalities of execution." Id. § 2-513 cmt.
142 The provision appears to have been premised on the assumption that tangible
personalty is typically of small value; one draft version of this section of the Code limited to
$500 the value of the personalty disposed of in a subsequent referenced writing if the items
were used in a trade or business. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-512 (Fourth Working Draft,
Second Tentative Draft, July 22-Aug. 1, 1968). No formal limitation on value found its way
into the final version of § 2-513, however, and in some instances the personalty thus
bequeathed has held substantial value. See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.3, at 251
& n. 16; see also Clark v. Greenhalge, 582 N.E.2d 949 (Mass. 1991); JESSE DUKEMINIER &
STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 293 n.27 (5th ed. 1995) (further
elaborating aark v. Greenhalge, where a $35,000 painting was at issue, but where § 2-513
was not explicitly in force). See generally A.L. Moses, Mountains, Molehills and Separate
Memos Under the UPC, 3 PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 35.
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but weaker evidence concerning the precise terms that were left out. One finds
no reason to treat the two cases differently, 143 and their respective doctrines
arguably ought to correspond-though as the law now stands not even the
doctrines applicable to mistaken omissions and inclusions correspond. 144
Whereas the latter asymmetry is too obvious to miss, 145 neither courts nor
commentators have ever compared the problems of proof of mistake and
incorporation by reference. 146
When a will purports to incorporate subsequent oral communication, we
face dual evidentiary obstacles. We can be confident neither that the testator
meant her words to be final nor even that they have been reported accurately.
Lawmakers have rejected such an inquiry with respect to nuncupative wills,
which likewise offer no assurances either of finality or accuracy, apparently in
the interest of judicial certitude as well as efficiency. 147 If we bar one, then
arguably we should bar the other-as in fact we do, though not, once again, by
virtue of explicit structural comparisons.
Yet there remains still another doctrine that can play upon cases of
intentional omissions from wills, with results so incongruous as to verge on the
bizarre. If a testator bequeaths outright to a legatee and also asks for and
secures from that legatee, either affirmatively or by virtue of her silence,'148 a
promise to hold the property for other beneficiaries (a so-called "secret trust"
because this intention is not evidenced by the will), equity steps in to enforce
143 The cases do differ in that in one instance the testator omitted material from an
executed document intentionally and in the other not. But that difference is immaterial from
the standpoint of intent effectuation. In that light, the relevant question is whether courts can
determine intent with reasonable confidence, and with respect to the evidentiary task at hand
the two scenarios appear to correspond quite closely.
144 See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
146 Notice also the unexplained inconsistency within the Uniform Probate Code
between the invalidity of parol provisions referred to in a will (under the doctrine of
incorporation by reference) and the enforceability of parol agreements referred to in a will
(under the doctrine of contracts to make wills). See supra note 76.
147 See the brief discussion in McGovERN ar AL., supra note 8, § 4.5, at 177-78.
148 In this context, "mere silence is ordinarily a sufficient indication of
... agreement." All that is required is that the legatee "does not refuse to hold the property
upon the [terms] intended." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 55 cmt. d & illus. 3
(1959); RESTATEMENT OF RESTrruION, supra note 63, § 186 cmt. c & illus. 3. Such would
not be the rule under the standard principles of contract law, however, where silence
implies agreement only under very restrictive circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACrs, supra note 61, § 69; Michael Ansaldi, The Do-Nothing Offeree: Some
Comparative Reflections, 1 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL'Y43 (1992).
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the promise.149 Here extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove the terms of the
testator's communication with the legatee, irrespective of whether that
communication occurred before or after the will was executed, and irrespective
of whether it was delivered orally or in writing. 150
Courts have traditionally justified this result as necessary to avoid unjust
enrichment: But for the legatee's promise to carry out her wishes, the testator
would have altered her will to benefit the true object of her bounty.15 1 The
doctrine, in fact, bears a close resemblance to promissory estoppel with
detrimental reliance, where the promisee, in this case the testator, suffers the
detriment (as it were) posthumously.
Yet what is truly at stake here? In cases of inheritance induced by fraud,
we invoke the doctrine of unjust enrichment to prevent the beneficiary from
profiting from her tortious act of deceiving the testator, conduct which the legal
system strives to deter.152 Though promissory estoppel has also often been
likened to an action ex delicto,153 this characterization is inapt. The act of
casual promise-making is benign so long as no overt deception is involved, for
it reflects simply a state of mind-which, as everyone knows, is protean by
14 9 See generally RESTATEMENT OF RmTmTuION, supra note 63, § 186; RESTATEMENr
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 148, § 55. The remedy applied here is an equitable
constructive trust: The named legatee inherits as the will mandates but is deemed a
constructive trustee for the benefit of the intended beneficiary. The substantive result is that
the intended beneficiary takes precisely as if the will incorporated the provision that was left
out of the executed document and so, it seems fair to say, this equitable process is mere
judicial clothing for an otherwise naked incorporation into a will of provisions expressed
beyond it. "But call it what you will, and argue as you may, a parol trust ingrafted upon a
written bequest by parol testimony, by a decree of a court, after the death of a testator, is
pro tanto the establishment of a parol will for the testator." Moore v. Campbell, 14 So. 780,
782 (Ala. 1894) (Coleman, J.).
150 See RESTATEMENT OFRESTrrUTION, supra note 63, § 186 cmt. c & d & illus. 1 &
4; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS, supra note 148, § 55 cmt. c & d & illus. 1 & 2.
151 E.g., RESTATEMEN OFREsTrruTiON, supra note 63, § 186 cmt. b; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 148, § 55 cmt. a.
152 E.g., ATKINSON, supra note 30, § 56, at 264. Deceit harms persons, in economic
terms, by increasing information costs. See POSNER, supra note 32, § 4.6.
153 What is the justification for [promissory estoppel]? The possibility of an answer
founded on principles of tort law is inescapable .... One person has caused harm to
another by making and then breaking a promise in circumstances that the promisor
should reasonably have expected would cause such harm, and the promisor is therefore
held liable for the harm caused.
1 E. ALLANFARNSWORTH, ON CONTRACTS § 2.19, at 146-47 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995);
see also, e.g., Warren A. Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct,
64 HARv. L. REv. 913,926-28 (1951).
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nature and which, at any rate, promisees have no legal right to rely on. 154 The
harm in a promissory estoppel case-and, by the same token, in a secret trust
case-flows not from wrongdoing, but rather from error,15 5 to wit, the
promisee's error in assuming that the promise was enforceable 56 and her error
in acting on that assumption. 157
154 As a general rule, of course, donative promises are unenforceable. This rule has
been said to follow from extra-legal expectations: "The most uneducated layman today
understands that if he makes a bargain he is binding himself in a way in which he does not
conceive that he is binding himself if he gratuitously promises to do the same thing."
Hamson, supra note 68, at 242. Alternatively, for a recognition of the circularity of the
conventional reliance rationale, see Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The
Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.. 1249, 1254
(1996).
155 Some courts have seen fit to limit the doctrine of promissory estoppel to cases
savoring of fraud, however. "These attitudes may simply reflect the belief that, absent
conduct approaching willful concealment or misrepresentation, reliance upon an oral,
unenforceable promise cannot be justified." Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel
and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 382 (1969); see id. at 380-82; see
also Michael B. Metzger & Michael I. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as
an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RuTGulS L. REv. 472, 542 (1983). But most courts
have not so restricted the doctrine, and certainly the secret trust doctrine is in no wise
limited to instances of fraud-for it is routinely invoked even in cases where the promise is
imputed from the legatee's silence. See supra note 148. Though some early courts described
the legatee's conduct in the secret trust scenario as "fraudulent," they do not appear to have
meant the term in the conventional sense and, at any rate, more recent decisions in general
have eschewed this characterization. See 4 PALMER, supra note 119, § 20.6, at 208-09.
156 Alternatively conceptualized within a tort framework, one might say that, however
negligent the idle promise on the part of the promisor, there has been contributory
negligence on the part of the promisee in faling to know (or learn) the law of donative
promises.
157 Were the promisee not mistaken about the state of the law, she could not invoke
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing
Pronises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALEL.J. 1261, 1306 n.107 (1980).
Likewise, were the testator-promisee aware that her request that a legatee apply the bequest
for the benefit of others was not enforceable, it would be deemed a precatory instruction
rather than a secret trust. See REsTATEmET (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 148, § 55
cmt. g (denying effect to requests to a legatee where the testator "does not intend to impose
any legal obligation upon him"). Nonetheless, promissory estoppel and secret trusts have
not traditionally been conceptualized in precisely these terms. Wfllston came closest in the
course of discussing the antecedent doctrine of equitable estoppel:
The doctrine of equitable estoppel exists to prevent fraud or injustice; to the extent that a
person has made a statement ... it is unjust and tantamount to fraud to permit him
thereafter to allege and prove facts contrary to his previous statements. In its pure
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In essence, secret trust cases are mistake cases. Here, the testator has relied
on the mistaken assumption that the promise made to her by the legatee was
effectively included within her estate plan. The situation is of a piece with other
instances where the testator fails properly to formalize her intent because she
believes she has taken all of the steps necessary to do so. Whether the testator
relies on a legatee's promise or simply on an extrinsic statement or document
identified in her will to supplement her estate plan, she has made a mistake that
induces her to leave the will unamended; in both instances, the law's failure to
correct the mistake would result in enrichment, no more and no less just, of the
taker under the executed writing alternative to the intended one. Yet against
this "error cost" to the testator must be weighed the advantages gained by
fortifying the four walls of the will against verbal encroachments from without.
As we have seen, those advantages involve the confidence with which we can
posit (1) as a matter of ritual, that the testator intended to set in motion an
estate plan, and (2) as a matter of evidence, that the testator had a particular
plan in mind.' 58 In both respects, the admission of extrinsic words is fraught
with peril and hence could again give rise to error-now by the court, in
endeavoring to rectify that of the testator.
The doctrine of incorporation by reference resolves this dilemma by
deeming effective only those extrinsic provisions that are in writing, antedate
the will, and are identified within it. The secret trust doctrine waives all of
these requirements. So long as the testator informed the legatee of her intent,
courts give effect to her ostensible estate plan in equity, even if unreferenced,
even if formulated after the will was executed, and even if communicated by
word of mouth.
Compare the alternatives:
Scenario # 1: Testator's will bequeaths the whole of her estate to A. The
common-law form, this formulation of equitable estoppel necessarily precludes reliance
on representations of present or future intention, since representations of intention are
by their nature uncertain and likely to change, and therefore... the party to whom the
representation was made would have no right to rely upon it and could not reasonably
do so. However, it is clear that in many instances one to whom the representation ... is
made will rely upon it, so that an injustice might well occur in that instance as well. It is
precisely for this reason that the law of promissory estoppel developed.
4 SAMUEL WILLiSTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW Op CONTRACTS § 8:3, at 35-38 (Richard A.
Lord ed., 4th ed. 1992) (citations omitted); see also Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and
Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Conpulsory Ter=
and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 635 (1982) (associating promissory
estoppel with paternalism in order to protect "an innocent party too dumb to realize he
hadn't done what he needed to do to get a binding obligation").
158 Not to mention the administrative costs of establishing both.
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will also refers to a letter to be prepared later and turned in to her attorney, B,
that will dispose of $10,000 out of the estate to takers named therein. Such a
letter is in fact tendered to B. Result: the letter is ineffective. A will cannot
incorporate by reference a subsequent writing.
Scenario # 2: Testator's will bequeaths the whole of her estate to A.
Subsequently, the testator tenders to A a letter informing A that $10,000 of the
sum bequeathed to A should be handed on to takers named therein. A does not
refuse to comply. 15 9 Result: the letter is effective in equity as a secret trust. A
secret trust can postdate the will it modifies.
So, when we press the doctrine of incorporation by reference up against
the secret trust, we find that the outcome can hinge on whom the subsequent
communication was directed toward. If a legatee, one outcome follows;
otherwise, another. 160 Yet there would seem not the slightest ritualistic or
evidentiary difference between the two. 161 Nor is there any substantively
greater injustice in one case than in the other. In Scenario # 1, the testator was
mistaken about the legal effectiveness of a subsequent letter. The law's failure
to correct the mistake would enrich A. In Scenario # 2, the testator was
mistaken about the legal effectiveness of A's (imputed) promise. The law's
failure to correct the mistake would again enrich A. To discover "unjust
enrichment" in the second case and not in the first is to draw a distinction, shall
159 Recall that silent nonrefusal qualifies as an affirmative promise in secret trust cases.
See supra note 148.160 The requirement of communication with the legatee in order to create a secret trust
is strictly enforced. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrUTrON, supra note 63, § 186 cmt. f;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS, supra note 148, § 55 cmt. f; IA ScoTr, supra note 85,
§ 55.5.
161 Several commentators have criticized secret trust doctrine, though without directly
comparing it to the doctrine of incorporation by reference. See McGOvERN ET AL., supra
note 8, § 6.2, at 247 (characterizing secret trust doctrine as "odd"); Ralph W. Gifford, Will
or No Will? The Effect of Fraud and Undue Influence on Testamentary Instruments, 20
COLUM. L. REV. 862, 872-74 (1920) (characterizing secret trust doctrine as "unsound");
Frank L. Simpson, Constructive Trusts and the Statutes of Frauds and Wills, 11 B.U. L.
REV. 22, 30 (1931). For the one explicitly comparative analysis, see T.L. Tolan, Jr.,
Comment, Wills-Incorporation by Reference-Comparison with Secret Trusts and Acts of
Independent Significance, 46 MICH. L. REV. 77 (1947) (see especially 84-85).
Conceivably, one might argue (though no one has) that the testator's action of
communicating with the legatee denotes greater finality of intent than when she
communicates with others, or, in perhaps a more significant comparison, than when she
simply prepares a memorandum of instructions and fls to communicate it to anyone. But
the difficulty is that the act of communicating is not inherently ritualistic-if it were, then we
could give nuncupative wills (which, by definition, must be broadcast) greater credence than
holographs!
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we say, exceedingly nice and refined. But, once again, courts (and
Commissioners162) have failed to draw any connection at all between the two
doctrines.163
And that is not all. Consider:
Scenario # 3: Testator's will bequeaths the whole of her estate to A. The
will also refers to a letter to be prepared subsequently that will require A to
hand $10,000 of the sum bequeathed to A to takers named therein. In due
course, the testator tenders such a letter to A, who does not refuse to comply.
What result? A fortiori, one would suppose, courts will correct the mistake.
Here our evidence that the testator intended the extrinsic document to be legally
binding is marginally better, because she did at least refer to it explicitly in her
will. By comparison, the doctrine of incorporation by reference requires that all
documents offered for incorporation be identified in an executed writing. Yet
under the doctrine of secret trusts the testator's addition of a reference to the
document has the opposite effect of rendering it invalid! This remarkably
incongruent result follows not from a comparative view of the cases (needless
to say), nor even from a narrower policy analysis of the evidentiary problem at
hand, but simply from the reified traditions, and traditional boundaries, of
equitable relief. In the instant scenario, the call to prevent unjust enrichment
ceases, ostensibly, because a finding that the extrinsic document was
mistakenly ineffective does not leave A with the $10,000. Rather, the bequest
162 Though the Uniform Probate Code addresses the problem of incorporation by
reference, see UNIP. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-510, it fhils to cover secret trusts.
This fiilure must be accounted a flaw in the Code, for both doctrines are aimed in substance
at the same structural problem-namely, establishing the metes and bounds of the estate
plan. That secret trusts have not, by tradition, been categorized as an aspect of probate law,
but rather have been dealt with under Wrust law, stems apparently from the different
remedies (incorporation versus equitable constructive trust) applied in the two cases. This
difference is entirely artificial and has had the unfortunate consequence of masking the
structural proximity of the two doctrines-perverse camouflage that succeeded in distracting
the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code. (Yet those drafters did not shrink from extending
their codifications into the traditional category of trust law in some other respects. See e.g.,
id. § 2-707 (b).)
163 The connection does not appear to have been made in any published cases. For the
sole academic discussion, see Tolan, supra note 161. Tolan speculated that the inconsistency
traces to "the psychological effect of terms such as 'unjust enrichment' ... or in the
gradual extension of the trust remedy into fields of unintentional fraud without a sidelong
glance toward the supposedly rigid and encrusted doctrines already occupying the area." Id.
at 90. Compare Professor Evans, who referred to the two problems comparatively as
"perhaps similar," but then proceeded to deny the aptness of the analogy, on the technical
basis that secret trusts violate the Statute of Wills, whereas incorporation by reference
(ostensibly) does not. See Evans, supra note 83, at 652-53.
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of $10,000 to A for the stated benefit of unnamed others fails for want of
beneficiaries and goes instead under this scenario to the testator's heirs-at-law
-who, casuistry tells us, are thereby enriched with perfect justice. 164 Non
SeqUitUr. 16 5
By now the reader may be forgiven for wishing to avert her eyes, but we
have still one more embarrassing scenario to look at. This one is suggested by
the rule permitting testators to create secret trusts via subsequent oral
communication with a beneficiary. 166 Recall that if a testator were to identify in
her will a sum to be disposed of in accordance with a subsequent oral
declaration of hers, the bequest would fail under the doctrine of incorporation
by reference. Both the evidence and finality of the declaration would, in
combination, be too difficult to confirm. It is this policy that long ago
prompted the abolition of nuncupative wills and that, by the same token, bars
nuncupative codicils to executed wills.
Never mind all that. Consider:
Scenario # 4: Testator executes a will bequeathing her entire estate to A.
Subsequently, from time to time, she gives A oral instructions concerning who
is to get what out of her estate. A does not refuse to comply. The instructions
are enforceable as a secret trust. Thus can the testator effect changes in her
estate plan as the spirit moves her, merely by blurting them out. In this
connection, the formal requisites of the Statute of Wills fail to apply. 167
164 See IA ScoTT, supra note 85, § 55.8. The locus dassicus of this result is an old
chestnut, Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221 (1881). English courts have not followed this rule,
but rather treat "semi-secret trusts" (as instructions to legatees referred to, but not set down,
in wills are known) no differently from secret trusts, an approach also followed in a small
minority of American jurisdictions. See IA SCOTr, supra note 85, § 55.8, at 82-84.
165 The point has been recognized, though again without comparison to incorporation
by reference. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs, supra note 148, § 55 cmt. h;
McGoVERNLr AL., supra note 8, § 6.2, at 249; 4 PALMER, supra note 119, § 20.7, at 231;
IA ScOrr, supra note 85, § 55.8, at 86-87; Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 123, at 576
n.210; Julius B. Levine & Randall L. Holton, Enforcement of Secret and Semi-Secret
Trusts, 5 PROB. L.J. 7, 7, 16 (1983).166 See supra note 150.
167 This assumes, however, that someone was in earshot to testify as to what the
testator told A, and that the testator was unaware that as a matter of law binding
testamentary instructions must be executed. See supra note 157. A similar aberration arises
out of the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act, grafted onto the Uniform Probate
Code. By this Act, a testator can bequeath her entire estate to an empty inter vivos trust and
then revise the substantive terms of that trust by repeated oral declarations. These oral
declarations can be effective to alter the terms of the trust into which the probate estate will
pour-over. The revised version of the Uniform Probate Code leaves standing this result. See
UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-511 & cmt.; DUKBEI & JoHANsoN, supra note
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We have completed our foray into the legal process of making a will.
Along the way, we have encountered a maze of inconsistency that has
demanded patience and, on occasion, suspension of disbelief. But we cannot
yet have done with it all. Determining what comprises a justiciable estate plan
is only the half of it.
III. TESTAMENTARY HERMENEUTIcs
A. Theoretical Prologue
We turn now from form to substance-that is, to the substantive provisions
of the estate plan itself. Having found that a testator expressed herself in a
legally proper manner, how does a court go about deciphering the information
so recorded? It is the age-old problem of hermeneutics, first addressed by the
Roman jurists who faced Latin as opposed to English texts, but texts all the
same.
168
In the testamentary setting, the process of textual interpretation-like that
of textual authentication-is complicated by the fact that the author of the
document needing to be clarified can no longer testify as to what the document
means, or was meant to mean.169 But the guiding principle here is plain
enough. As judges never tire of reiterating,' 70 the object of the exercise is to
glean the intent of the testator.171 That is "the pole-star by which the courts
must steer."' 7 2 Whether intent-effectuation is the only policy courts ever follow
142, at 366-67 & n. 11 & problem 2.168 See generally A. Arthur Schiller, Roman Interpretatio and Anglo-Ameican
Interpretation and Construction, 27 VA. L. REV. 733 (1941).
169 At least when courts misconstrue legislative intent, the legislature can correct them.
See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REv. 241, 263-66 (1992). When it comes to
testamentary instruments, however, "the difficulties that arise in discerning the true meaning
of the testator, or sometimes in discovering any meaning at all" have long been notorious. 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *7-8; see also, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 80 Eng. Rep.
1002, 1008 (K.B. 1613) (Coke, C.J.). Once again, ante-mortem probate would alleviate
some (though not all, see infra Part UI.C.) of the problems of testamentary hermeneutics,
assuming that construction proceedings were held as a routine part of that process. See also
supra note 12.
170 "Traditionally, and perhaps rather monotonously, courts have repeated, as we do
here again... ." Engle v. Siegel, 377 A.2d 892, 893 (NJ. 1977).
171 E.g., In re Estate of Herz, 651 N.E.2d 1251, 1253 (N.Y. 1995). For an Everest of
citations, see 4 PAGE, supra note 11, § 30.6.
172 The phrase traces to Chancellor Kent early in the nineteenth century. 4 J.AMEs
KENT, COMMENTARiES ON AMERICAN LAw 521 (photo. reprint 1971) (1826-30). See, e.g.,
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as they navigate testamentary texts is another question. Perhaps the judges doth
protest too much, for at times they do seem to have an eye on a constellation of
other concerns, 73 however obscured by the cant of intent. As a general
proposition, however, intent is key to the construction of wills. Indeed, to hold
otherwise could be said to amount to a contradiction in terms: for what else
could iw mean by construing a text other than determining what it seeks to
articulate?
B. Word Ambiguities
Yet determining the substantive import of an estate plan is often a difficult
matter. The principal source of that difficulty appears readily: Wills are
couched in language, and one need not be versed in Wittgensteinian philosophy
to recognize that language by its nature is prone to ambiguity.174 Just because a
Biles v. Martin, 259 So. 2d 258, 262 (Ala. 1972); Smith v. Weitzel, 338 S.W.2d 628, 635
(renn. Ct. App. 1960). In medieval times, only the metaphor was different:
It is written, that the will or meaning of the testator is the Queene or Empresse of the
testament. Because the will dooth rule and governe the testament.., and in every
respect moderate and direct the same .... Mherefore [the] meaning of the testator,
ought before all thinges to bee sought for.. .as earnestly as the hunter seckth his
game.
SWINBuRNE, supra note 25, at 9a. For still other metaphors, see 4 PAGE, supra note 11,
§ 30.6, at 32-33 n.1. Sans metaphor, the Commissioners and Restaters have both adopted
this credo. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 1-102(b)(2); RESTATEMENT (THmRD)
OF PROPERTY, supra note 39, § 10.1 cmt. c. On courts' success in this enterprise, see
generally William M. McGovern, Facts and Rules in the Construction of Wdls, 26 UCLA
L. REv. 285 (1978).
173 Administrative convenience and protection of the family are the principal ones.
174 For a recent revisionist look at Wittgenstein's linguistics and its application to legal
theory, see Christian Zapf & Eben Moglen, inguistic Indeterninacy and the Rule of Law:
On the Perils of Misunderstandng Wittgenstein, 84 GEO. L.. 485 (1996). Long before
Wittgenstein took up the subject, John Locke observed that "the very nature of Words,
makes it almost unavoidable, for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their
significations." Locke went so far as question whether "Language, as it has been employ'd,
has contributed more to the improvement or hinderance of Knowledge amongst Mankind."
JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. III, ch. IX, § 1 & ch.
XI, § 4 (P.H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (1690).
Sometimes ambiguity is even deliberate, serving the purposes of the speaker (for
example, in the context of poetic or political discourse)-a phenomenon known in
theoretical linguistics as equivocation. For discussions, see JANET BEAviN BAVELAS ETr AL.,
EQuIVOCAL COMMUNICATION (1990); IsRAEL ScHEFFER, BEYOND THE LETmR 17-20
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testator expresses herself with words-even written words-does not ensure
that she will express herself clearly. Alas, "[i]t is easy to say nothing with
words."17
5
Ambiguity can creep into wills in a variety of ways. One source of
ambiguity is the fact that different persons may use the same word to mean
different things. To speak of a "language" is in truth to generalize, for every
language is an amalgam of dialects-a point remarked by George Bernard
Shaw in his famous quip that Americans and Britons are "divided by a
common language." 176 But even to speak of a dialect is itself a generalization,
for each of us in truth has her own dialect-what is known in theoretical
linguistics as an idiolect. What you or I mean by a particular word could differ
from what a testator meant by that very same word. 177 Hence arises the
(1979). For an illustration of the potential political expediency of equivocation, see Thomas
Powers, The Spook of Spooks, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Dec. 1, 1994, at 8, 10. It seems doubtful,
however, that many testators inject ambiguity into their wills for strategic purposes.
175 Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 559 (1967).
176 Though attributed to Shaw, this clever bit of trope could not be found among his
surviving papers and may be apocryphal. See THE OxFORD DICIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
638 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992). Whether Shaw's or no, the point is elaborated in
exquisite detail in H.L. MENCKEN, THE AMECAN LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1936). Distinctions
between linguistic usage on opposite sides of the Atlantic continue to intrigue linguists (e.g.,
Playing udth Words, THE ECONOMIST, July 30, 1994, at 78) and have also been
acknowledged by lawmakers. See 3 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 242 cmt. g (1940).
177 John Locke recognized the point over three centuries ago:
Words ... often fail to excite in others (even that use the same Language) the same
Ideas, we take them to be the Signs of: And every Man has so inviolable a Liberty, to
make Words stand for what Ideas he pleases, that no one hath the Power to make others
have the same Ideas in their Minds, that he has, when they use the same Words, that he
does.
LocX, supra note 174, bk. III, ch. If, § 8 (emphasis omitted); see also Letter from John
Locke to Bishop of Worcester, quoted in 9 WIGMORE, supra note 119, § 2462, at 192.
Hobbes took a similar (though not quite so bold) view, asserting that sensory words, "[tihe
names of such things as affect us," were of "inconstant signification," and that in general
persons might use any words in a manner different from their accepted meaning, which he
termed "Metaphors ... of speech." THoMAs HOBBES, LEvIATHAN, 109-10 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651) (emphasis omitted). See also id. at 102, 322.
The point was also well understood by Lewis Carroll, needless to say. See LEWIS CARROLL,
THROUGH THE LooKING-GLAss 29, 93-94 (Random House 1946) (1872). Recognizing the
phenomenon in political discourse, see ABRAHAM LINCOLN, ADDRESS AT A SANrrARY FAIR
IN BALTIMORE (Apr. 18, 1864), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: His SPEECHE AND WRrrINGs 748-
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question: to what extent can courts explore the personal, individual usage of a
word once it is lodged in a testamentary instrument?
The general answer is that they cannot. Under the so-called plain meaning
rule-which I prefer to call the meaningless plain meaning rule 178-most courts
have refused to explore subjective sense in the course of construing the text of
a will. They have rather construed text by recourse to dictionary definitions-as
though every word in our language were a term of art.179 That way lies a
theoretical travesty, it cannot be too strongly said, for the intent of the testator
is secreted in her own purport of the words she chose. Words simply have no
49 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946). For modem discussions, see R.H. ROBINs, GENERAL
L~mGis 48-60 (4th ed. 1989) (noting that idiolects have a situational component,
varying with the speaker's role in a given social setting); Alexander George, Whose
Language Is It Anyway? Some Notes on Idiolects, 40 PiL. Q. 275 (1990) (noting that
idiolects also have a dynamic component, fluctuating over time).
178 For an early formulation of the rule, see JAMES WGRAM, AN EXAMINATION OF THE
RULES OF LAW RESPECGNG Tim ADMISSION OF ExTRINsIc EVIDENCE IN AID OF THE
ITRPRTATION OF WILLS 18 (5th ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1914) (1831). Professors
Langbein and Waggoner call it the "no-extrinsic-evidence rule," but I think my term is
more apt for reasons that will appear hereafter. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 123,
at 521.
179 "Mhe real question is not what the testator meant to say, but what he meant by
what he said.... [Eiffect is given to the intent which finds expression in the language
used." Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Clyde, 121 A.2d 625, 628 (Conn. 1956); see also,
e.g., In re Estate of Palizzi, 854 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Colo. 1993); McFarland v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 337 A.2d 1, 7 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973), qf'd, 362 A.2d 834
(1975); In re Estate of Kiel, 357 N.W.2d 628, 631 (Iowa 1984); In re Estate of Nagl, 408
N.W.2d 768, 771 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); State ex rel. Secretary of Soc. & Rehabilitation
Servs. v. Jackson, 822 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Kan. 1991); In re Estate of Herz, 651 N.E.2d
1251, 1253 (N.Y. 1995) ("ordinary and natural meaning"); In re Estate of Baxter, 798 P.2d
644, 647-48 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990); In re Clark, 417 S.E.2d 856, 857 (S.C. 1992)
("ordinary and grammatical sense of the words employed"); cf., e.g., Gillespie v. Davis,
410 S.E.2d 613, 615 (Va. 1991) (recognizing that "there are many different shades of
meaning which a group of words may convey; individuals differ in their knowledge of
grammar and in their manner of expression"). Some courts have been willing to explore
subjective sense when a will was prepared without the assistance of counsel. See Matheny v.
Matheny, 392 S.E.2d 230, 233 (W. Va. 1990); see also Bosley v. Wyatt, 55 U.S. 390, 397
(1852) (Taney, CJ.) (questioning strict adherence to legal terms of art found within wills
drawn by lay persons). But see In re Estate of DeLong, 788 P.2d 889, 891-92 (Mont.
1990) (warning those lay persons who wish to ensure that their intent is given effect to
consult attorneys: Caveat testator.). Many, many commentators have poured their venom
upon the plain meaning rule (see infra note 181) and though it is not followed uniformly,
still it has exhibited a hardy resistance to criticism. For a doctrinal survey, see 4 PAGE,
supra note 11, §§ 30.7-.9, 30.21-22, 32.1, 32. 10-.11.
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plain meaning and cannot be construed simpliciter 80 for there exists no
linguistic ether, just a babble of relative utterances. To break ranks with the
speaker and insist on giving her words their "plain" meaning, in the plain
language of Professor Wigmore, is simply to substitute "the meaning of the
people who did not write the document"-a practice Jeremy Bentham equated
with forgery!18 1
Still, there is a way out of this linguistic straitjacket. The key is to be found
in another variety of ambiguity: even after courts have assigned to the words of
a will their plain meaning, it still may not be possible to pin down what those
words were intended to mean, by virtue of the fact that they fail to divulge
sufficient information. 182 As linguistic theory indicates, this insufficiency can
derive from several sources. First, the words chosen, even when confined to
their dictionary definitions, may have multiple meanings (a phenomenon known
technically as polysemy). The word "estate," for example, can refer
alternatively to assets the speaker seeks to bequeath or merely to a description
of the extent of her possessions. In such a case, we have still to determine
which idea the testator intended to evoke by the word. 183 Second, the words
180 To pose the paradox: If words have a plain meaning, then whence comes the
litigation over what they mean? See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCrION § 46.01, at 82 (5th ed. 1992 & Supp. 1996). . supra note 32.
181 9 WIGMORE, supra note 119, § 2462, at 191-92 (quoting Jeremy Bentham,
Rationale of Judicial Evidence). For other criticism, see for example 3 RESTATEMENr OF
PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 241 cmt. a, § 242 cmts. c & d (purporting to abolish the
rule); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, supra note 39, § 12.1(2) & cmt. d (same); 3
CORBIN, supra note 29, §§ 535, 542, 542A; JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 428-29 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.
1898); Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630 (1992). For
a semantic discussion, see SEARLE, Literal Meaning, in EXPRESSION AND MEANING, supra
note 15, at 117. But see the defense offered by Hosmer, C.J.: "This principle has the force
of demonstration; for why seek, by parol, to explain that, which needs no explanation?"
Hall v. Rand, 8 Conn. 560, 574 (1831). The prosecution rests!
182 Or, the words may be self-contradictory-what Hobbes called a "nonsense" or
"absurdity." HOBBES, supra note 177, at 113. For a modem discussion, see SCHEFFLER,
supra note 174, at 102-07. This problem crops up occasionally in the construction of wills.
See 4 PAGE, supra note 11, § 30.20.
183 See In re Estate of Johnson, 630 P.2d 1039 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); John 0. Fox,
Estate: A Word To Be Used Cautiously, If at All, 81 HARv. L. REv. 992 (1968). But Cf. In
re Estate of Kiel, 357 N.W.2d at 631 (questioning whether the word "estate" is ambiguous
when used in a will). For some other examples, see 4 PAGE, supra note 11, § 30.23. On
polysemy, see STEPHEN ULLMANN, SEMANTICS 159-88 (1962). A related source of
ambiguity is grammatical rather than lexical: words which individually are monosemous
may in combination be interpreted in alternative ways, because a word within the statement
could be read to modify more than one of the others-a phenomenon known as
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chosen may generalize, adverting within their singular definitions to more than
one referent. For example, a testator might bequeath her "diamond solitaire
ring" to A, when either the will or other evidence reveals that the testator
owned two. In such a case, we still need to establish which ring the testator
meant to single out.184 Third, and most important for present purposes, the
words chosen may be imprecise at the fringes of their definitions, a semantic
phenomenon known as borderline vagueness.185 For instance, a testator might
bequeath the "personal belongings in [my] house," to A, when a desk in the
house is discovered to contain intangible securities.186 Whether the words
"personal belongings" encompass intangibles is not something we can clarify
by turning to the dictionary.
Under current law, courts faced with these sorts of ambiguity in a will-
known as a patent ambiguity if it is apparent from the face of the instrument or
a latent ambiguity when it appears only in the light of external circumstances-
can admit extrinsic evidence to interpret sense. 187 In the last example, a court
araphibology. See id. at 158. For some examples, see Virginia Nat'l Bank v. United States,
443 F.2d 1030 (4th Cir. 1971); In re Estate of Smith, 580 P.2d 754 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).184 See Orcutt v. Hoyt, 77 A.2d 227 (N.J. 1950); see also Britt v. Upchurch, 396
S.E.2d 318 (N.C. 1990). On semantic generalization, see JAN G. Koon, AMmGurrY IN
NATURAL LANGUAGE 119-21 (1971); SCHMFFLER, supra note 174, at 40-43.
185 For modem treatments, see MAX BLACK, LANGUAGE AND PHILOsOPHY 25-58
(1949) (asserting that al words in a natural language are surrounded by a borderland); MAx
BLACK, THE LAYRINTH OF LANGUAGE 134-38 (1968) (same); LINDA CLAIRE BURNS,
VAGUENESS (1991); SCHFLER, supra note 174, at 37-78; TIMoTHY WILLIAMSON,
VAGUENESS (1994). (For a further discussion of the distinction between borderline
vagueness and generality and their occasional confusion, see Roy A. Sorensen, The
Ambiguity of Vagueness and Precision, 70 PAC. PHIL. Q. 174 (1989).) Once again, Locke
apprehended the germ of the idea. See LOCKE, supra note 174, bk. III, ch. 10, § 2. For
other early discussions, see FRANCIS IEBER, LEGAL AND PoLnmCAL HERMENEUTICs ch. 2,
§§ 2, 5 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown, 1839); THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
186 See In re Estate of Harris, 414 N.Y.S.2d 835, 839 (Surr. Ct. 1979) (emphasis
omitted); see also In re Clark, 417 S.E.2d 856 (S.C. 1992); Davis v. Shanks, 898 S.W.2d
285 (rex. 1995).
187 E.g., In re Estate of Holmes, 821 P.2d 300,303-04 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991):
If the terms of a will are unambiguous, extrinsic evidence may not be considered to
determine the testatrix's intent. However, if the language of the will, although clear on
its face, is susceptible of more than one meaning when applied to the extrinsic facts to
which it refers, a latent ambiguity exists and extrinsic evidence must be considered.
Id. See also In re Estate of Kirk, 907 P.2d 794, 800-01 (Idaho 1995). For a doctrinal
survey, see 4 PAGE, supra note 11, §§ 32.2-.9. In some jurisdictions, extrinsic evidence is
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could (and did) look beyond the will in order to determine whether the testator
meant to signify intangibles by the phrase in question. 188 And given this
power, we also have a way around the plain meaning rule: for whether a
particular word or string of words requires interpretation can itself be
ambiguous; ambiguity, so to say, is in the eyes of the beholder and can be
perceived by those who are on the lookout practically anywhere. Take another
example: a testator bequeaths $10,000 to "my children," when she has two
natural children and also two step-children. Is the textual reference to
"children" precise (hence hamstrung by the plain meaning rule) or imprecise
(being the key to evidentiary liberation)? Well, yes and yes-hence either.189
This duality is known in linguistic theory as higher-order vagueness or, more
felicitously, the vagueness of vagueness.190 Doubtless, it is the culprit
responsible for those cases, not few in number, where majority and dissenting
opinions wrangle over whether any ambiguity exists in the testamentary
instrument, whether the case is bound by the plain meaning rule or freed by the
inadmissible to clarify a patent ambiguity, however. See infra note 195.188 See supra note 186.
189 Whereas some early cases took the view that this scenario comes under the plain
meaning rule (e.g., Sydnor v. Palmer, 29 Wis. 226, 244-45 (1871)), the modem approach
has been to admit extrinsic evidence in such cases. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfwilies
in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 940-42 & n.95
(1989). Cases are compiled in 4 PAGE, supra note 11, § 34.17; J. Kraut & B. de R.
O'Byrne, Annotation, Testamentary Gift to Children as Including Stepchild, 28 A.L.R.3d
1307 (1969).
Take another example: testator bequeaths a portion of his estate "[tlo my housekeeper
of many years... if she be in my employment at the time of my death." In re Estate of
Quinn, 450 N.W.2d 432, 433 (S.D. 1990). Subsequently, the testator's health deteriorates
and he checks into a hospital. The housekeeper comes to visit him frequently and he
expresses the desire that she resume work as soon as he can return to his apartment but dies
without doing so. Does "if she is in my employment" plainly mean ifshe is being paid for
her labor, or, in context, should it be interpreted to mean if she does not resign her
position? Is there ambiguity as to whether the words need clarifying? Enough, at least, for
the trial and appellate courts to take opposing views on the issue. See id. at 433-34.
190 See BURNS, supra note 185, at 77-80; WILLIAMSON, supra note 185, at 2-3, 57-58
pasim; Dominic Hyde, Why Higher-Order Vagueness Is a Pseudo-Problem, 103 MIND 35
(1994); Mark Sainsbury, Is There Higher Order Vagueness?, 41 PHIL. Q. 167 (1991); Roy
A. Sorensen, An Argunent for the Vagueness of 'Vague,' 45 ANALYSIS 134 (1985); Michael
Tye, Why the Vague Need Not Be Higher-Order Vague, 103 MIND 43 (1994); Crispin
Wright, Further Reflections on the Sorites Paradox, 15 PHIL. Topics, Spring 1987, at 227,
261-68, 279-80. For an early recognition, see Bertrand Russell, Vagueness, 1
AUSTRALAISIAN J. PSYCHOL. & PHIL. 84, 87 (1923), reprinted in 9 COLLECTED PAPERS OF
BERTRAND RUSSELL 145 (John G. Slater ed., 1988).
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latent ambiguity rule.191 Oddly, though, few courts have discerned the
slipperiness of this semantic issue. 192 Some courts have even claimed that the
wills they construed were "clearly ambiguous" 193-a phrase which, on
reflection, is amusingly ironic, not to say oxymoronic!
And so we may conclude, appropriately enough, that the plain meaning
rule is meaningless in two senses of the word: meaningless in terms of
theoretical incoherence and also meaningless in terms of functional
insignificance.1 9 4  But this insignificance also suggests a structural
inconsistency. For if the variance of individual usage of words and the
vagueness of common usage of words are overlapping concepts, tending so to
191 The U.S. Supreme Court has occasionally argued over this issue in the context of
statutory interpretation. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994) (see
especially 1766) (Scalia, J. versus Souter, J., each playing against type); Dewsnup v.
Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 ("given the ambiguity in the text"), 780 ("unambiguously
provides") (1992) (Blackmun, J. versus Scalia, J., here joined by Souter, I.). In connection
with probate code construction, see Zuckerman v. Alter, 615 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1993). In
connection with testamentary instruments, see Tucker v. Bradford, 599 So. 2d 611 (Ala.
1992); In re Estate of Walker, 609 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); State ex rel.
Secretary of Soc. & Rehabilitation Servs. v. Jackson, 822 P.2d 1033 (Kan. 1991); In re
Dimmitt's Estate, 3 N.W.2d 752 (Neb. 1942); In re Estate of Bergau, 693 P.2d 703 (Wash.
1985). Sometimes even a single opinion has swayed back and forth on the question. See
Wilson v. Flowers, 277 A.2d 199, 206 (N.J. 1971) ("'[P]hilanthropic'... has come to
mean ['charitable'] in modem usage. However, even if it has not, it is ambiguous enough to
be construed as such."). See also 3 CORBIN, supra note 29, § 542, at 122 & n.85.20 (on
contract interpretation).
192 But see Barbee v. United States, 392 F.2d 532, 535 n.4 (5th Cir. 1968) (Goldberg,
J.) (observing that cases applying the plain meaning rule to statutes "continually beg an
important issue. Whether or not the words of a statute are clear is itself not always clear.").
193 E.g., In re Hollenbeck v. Gray, 185 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Iowa 1971); In re Barnett,
245 So. 2d 418, 422 (La. 1971); Estate of Taitt, 386 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310 (Surr. Ct. 1976).
194 As one court complained dryly, "[slome will find ambiguity even in a 'No
Smoking' sign... ." International Union UAW v. General Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815
F.2d 1570, 1575 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J.). Fulfilling the prophecy, in effect, see
NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995) (finding
ambiguity in the word "insurance"), strongly criticized in William Funk, Supreme Cowl
News, 20 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEws, Spring 1995, at 4, 5. The functional insignificance of
the plain meaning rule does, however, have the very significant consequence of enhancing
the power of courts, sotto voce, to reach results in keeping with their own moral lights.
Whether ambiguity is or is not discovered by the court may depend tacitly on the outcome
of such a finding. For an unusually blatant example, see Re Herlichka, 3 D.L.R.3d 700
(Ontario 1969). But see In re Estate of Kiel, 357 N.W.2d 628, 630-31 (Iowa 1984) ("[A]
court may not, under the guise of ambiguity, implement broad principles of equity and
justice.").
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blur together that they often cannot be told apart, then why treat them
differently under the law?195 Both are aspects of the same core problem:
determining what a testator sought to convey by the words she employed. To
draw a legal distinction between phenomena that are often indistinguishable
seems on the face of it a dubious exercise.
Is there any justification for the plain meaning rule at all? Its origins appear
to lie, once again, in the notion of words as performatives, as doing things:196
here, however, the invocation of a verbal formula producing a result is deemed
to do so whether the testator (like the sorcerer's apprentice) intended to or not.
The time for such notions has long since passed, 197 but in their wake courts
195 Corbin comments in connection with contracts: "It is remarkable how much time
has been wasted (at the expense of the litigants and of the state) in determining whether the
words used by the parties are 'ambiguous,' when the issue ... is ... the 'intention of the
parties'...... 3 CoRBIN, supra note 29, § 542, at 122-24. Historically, lawmakers drew a
further distinction between latent and patent ambiguities, admitting extrinsic evidence only
in the first case and not in the second. Derived from one of Bacon's maxims, this "artificial
distinction" has long been criticized and is widely abolished today. See 3 RmSATEMEr OF
PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 241 cmt. a, § 242 cmt. j; RESTATEMNT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY, supra note 39, § 11.2(a) & cmt. d; McGovERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.1, at
237-38; 4 PAGE, supra note 11, § 32.7, at 258-59; THAYER, supra note 181, at 423-25; 9
WiGMORE, supra note 119, § 2470, at 236-38, § 2472, at 249-50 (quotation at 250). For a
discussion of the case law, see 4 PAGE, supra note 11, § 32.7.
196 See 9 WIGMORE, supra note 119, § 2461, at 187-88.
197 By contrast, a testator must intend to give legal effect to words in order for them to
comprise (as opposed to explicate the substance of) a will. See supra notes 24, 27 and
accompanying text. The idea of verbal formulae as substantively performative similarly
underlay the ancient writ system in Great Britain, whose forms had to be observed not
merely to the word but literally to the letter. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *409;
S.F.C. MIISOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAw 27-28 (1969). It was a
requirement that again drew protracted criticism and has long since been abandoned. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f). It bears noticing that even in the sixteenth century such ideas were not
universally shared. Swinburne breasted the tide by rejecting the plain meaning rule:
The will therefore and meaning of the testator, ought before all thinges to bee sought for
diligently... And as to the sacred anker ought the judge to cleave unto it: Pondering
not the words, but the meaning of the testator. For although no man be presumed to
thinke otherwise then hee speaketh ... yet cannot every man utter al that he thinketh,
and therefore are his wordes subjecte to his meaning. And as the mind is before the
voyce, (for we conceive before we speake) so is it of greater power, for the voyce is to
the minde, as the servant is to his Lord.
SWINBURNE, supra note 25, at 9a; see also id. at 190a-91 (rejecting the requirement that the
testator use legal terms of art to express intent: "the wil and the intent of the testator is
preferred before formal or prescript wordes"). Swinburne's distinction of thought from
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have made a number of substantive arguments in favor of the plain meaning
rule: it has been suggested, for example, that "if a man was assured that
whatever words he made use of his meaning only should be considered, he
would be very careless about the choice of his words, and it would be the
source of infinite confusion and [u]ncertainty ... -198 The plain meaning rule
encourages the testator ey ante to select her words carefully, averting costly
litigation-thus helping to perform what we would now call the channelling
function of the Statute of Wills. 199 And the rule is said also to lessen the risk of
fraudulent claims of unintended constructions, 200 thus mirroring the evidentiary
function of will formalities.20 1
The potency of these arguments is open to question. The canny Civilians,
having bequeathed to us the plain meaning rule, have themselves long since
language, which he used to undermine the plain meaning rule, of course stands today as a
basic tenet of linguistic science. See STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INsTINCt 55-82
(1994).
198 Throckmerton v. Tracy, 75 Eng. Rep. 222, 251 (K.B. 1554-55) (Brook, CJ.).
"But," added Brook,
in testaments the intent only shall be observed and considered, because it r's] presumed
that the testator has not time to settle every thing according to the rules of law, and wills
are most commonly made on a sudden, and in the testator's last moments; and so is the
difference between them and acts executed in the party's life-time.
Id. at 251. Echoing Brook's defense of plain meaning, see Hick v. Dring, 105 Eng. Rep.
447, 450 (K.B. 1814) (Ellenborough, CJ.); Perrin v. Blake (Ex. Ch. 1772) (Blackstone,
J.), reprinted in FRANCS HARGRAVE, A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAw oF
ENGLAND 487, 495 (London 1787). Three and a half centuries later, Justice Holmes
characterized the plain meaning rule as a literary form of the prudent man standard. See
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REV. 417, 418
(1899). Yet Holmes was also well aware of the idiolectic significance of words. See Towne
v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1917).
199 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
200 See Goode v. Riley, 28 N.E. 228, 228 (Mass. 1891) (Holmes, J.) ("[You cannot
prove a mere private convention... to give language a different meaning from its common
one. It would offer too great risks if evidence were admissible to show that when they said
500 feet they ... mean[t] 100 inches.") (citations omitted); Moseley v. Goodman, 195
S.W. 590, 593 (Tenn. 1917) ("It is not permissible to go outside of the will, and show that
the testator was accustomed to attach a meaning to these words peculiar to himself. If such
evidence were permissible, truly no will would he safe.").
201 See supra notes 12-14, 29-30 and accompanying text. The problem here
addressed is structurally analogous to the two-sided issue of admitting extrinsic evidence in
the context of will formalization and correction of mistakes, discussed supra Part I.
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abandoned it without ill consequence. 202 Whereas statutes and contracts depend
on some shared understanding of meaning, a will, expressing unilateral
decisions, does not-hence testators may be more prone to linguistic
idiosyncrasy and also cause less harm by it.20 3 At any rate, these arguments
would appear no less pertinent to the problem of semantic vagueness and
generality, where they have been ignored, than to the problem of idiolectic
glosses, where they have been followed.
What is more, having promulgated the plain meaning rule, lawmakers have
not even applied it consistently within its ostensible parameters. Under a related
doctrine known as the personal usage rule, the meaning of a testator's words
when used to denote a particular person or thing can be elucidated by
consulting extrinsic evidence, including the testator's personal vocabulary. 204
One is again hard pressed to discern any reason for distinguishing this scenario
from those otherwise governed by the plain meaning rule. Identifications are,
of course, an obvious and abundant source of idiolectic variation-a fact which
our language concedes by its adoption of the expression nicknames. Yet those
variations are conceptually indistinguishable from others and would seem to
carry in their train the very same channeling and evidentiary problems.20 5
Perhaps we could posit that by making allowances for personal usages only in
202 Se RESTATEMENT (THwRD) OF PROPERTY, supra note 39, § 12.1 reporter's note 4;
Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 123, at 527-28. On the rule's civil law origins, see
McGovern, supra note 172, at 315; Schiller supra note 168, at 760-61.
203 Noting this distinctive quality of wills, see for example RESTATEMENT ("HIRD) OF
PROPERTY, supra note 39, § 12.1 reporter's note 4; ATKINSON, supra note 30, § 60, at 286;
3 CORBN, supra note 29, § 532, at 4-5; 4 PAGE, supra note 11, § 30.1, at 2-3, § 30.2, at
8; Holmes, supra note 198, at 419-20. Nor is it probable that the plain meaning rule will
have significant e ante consequences: lay persons who draw up their own wills are unlikely
to be aware of a rule as obscure as this, and so its existence probably will not influence their
choice of words before the fact (assuming they are even cognizant that their idiolect differs
from that of a court); whereas, attorneys who prepare wills for others need no
encouragement to use technical language, for it is their mother tongue! Cf supra notes 30-
31, 33 and accompanying text.
204 For a brief doctrinal survey, see ATKINSON, supra note 30, § 60, at 285-86. The
locus casicus is Moseley v. Goodman, 195 S.W. 590 (Tenn. 1917). See also 3
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 242 cmt. d (expanding the concept);
RESTATEMENT ('HIRD) OF PROPERTY, supra note 39, § 11.2(b)(3) & cmt. r (same). On the
semantics of naming, which has spawned a large literature, see MICHAEL DE=vT,
DESIGNATION (1981); JAY F. ROSENBERG, BEYOND FORMALISM: NAMING AND NECESSrTY
IOR HUMAN BEINGS (1994); THE PHILOOPHY OF LANGUAGE 187-347 (A.P. Martinich ed.,
2d ed. 1990).
205 "The statement that no word or phrase has one true and unalterable meaning is as
true of proper names as it is of common nouns and verbs." 3 COP.BIN, supra note 29, § 535,
at 16.
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those semantic instances where they are likeliest to arise, lawmakers have come
up with an efficient, limited solution to this problem of construction. It's a
debatable point. What is indubitable is that the coexistence of the two rules has
never been adequately, or for that matter inadequately, addressed either in the
judicial or scholarly sources.
C. 7Tme Ambiguities
A second genus of ambiguity in wills stems not from the uncertain meaning
of words, but rather from the passage of time. Some hiatus always separates
the moment when a will is executed from the moment when it matures. If
occurrences significant to the testator's estate plan have intervened, their effect
on her intent-not reflected in the executed writing-raises another host of
construction problems. 20 6
The core difficulty here identified is not confined to the interpretation of
wills, of course. It also arises, inter alia, in connection with statutes and
constitutions. From these vantage points, the appropriate treatment of time
ambiguities has been vigorously disputed and much puzzled. The central
approach taken in the law of wills is, however, a matter of consensus: in this
arena, courts uniformly take an "originalist" perspective, adhering to the estate
plan as the testator originally intended it to be carried out.207 With only
a few exceptions20 8 (but exceptions that have themselves spawned
206 This phenomenon is known in the trade as the problem of "stale" wills.
Professional estate planners have at their disposal two preservatives: they can anticipate
future contingencies in their original estate plan, or they can update wills periodically. For
an estate planning discussion, see Addison E. Dewey, Testators Who Die Intestate, 7 PROB.
LJ. 221 (1987).
207 See UNIV. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-508; 4 PAGE, supra note 11, § 30.26.
208 In the event of a drastic change in domestic circumstances, courts have imputed
changes of intent and implemented them "by operation of law." The three usual instances
are maniage, where intent to bequeath an intestate share to the omitted spouse is inferred
despite failure to revise the pre-marital will, birth of a child, where intent to bequeath an
intestate share to the omitted child is likewise inferred despite failure to revise the pre-natal
will, and divorce, where intent to revoke bequests to the divorced spouse is inferred despite
failure to revise the pre-dissolution will. See McGovEN Elr AL., supra note 8, §§ 3.6-.7,
5.4. For historical discussions, see J.H. Beuscher, Note, Wais-Revocation by Divorce of
Testator, 5 Wis. L. REV. 377 (1930); W.A. Graunke & J.H. Beuscher, The Doctrine of
Iplied Revocation of Wills by Reason of Change in Domestic Relations of the Testator, 5
Wis. L. REV. 387 (1930). These inferences may be related to the presumption against
absurd or unreasonable testamentary intentions (see 4 PAGE, supra note 11, § 30.12) which
has also been made in the venue of statutory construction, see for example United States v.
Wilson, 112 S. Ct. 1351, 1354 (1992); United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S.
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inconsistencies2°9), courts have declined to second-guess the testator's eventual
wishes on the basis of changed circumstances. 210 Such an approach appears
693, 710 (1988) (Stevens, I., dissenting), although they may also reflect the independent
public policy of protecting the family. See the brief discussion in Elizabeth Durfee,
Revocation of Wills by Subsequent Change in the Condtion or Circwnstances of the
Testator, 40 MICH. L. REv. 406, 416 (1942). For early discussions, see 2 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 26, at *376, *502-03; 4 KENT, supra note 172, at 506-13; SuGDEN, supra note
14, at 201-04 app. (urging abolition of these inferences); Sugden, supra note 31, at 29-31
(same). For an earlier common law variant of revocation by operation of law, see
SWINBURNE, supra note 25, at 286 (indicating the implied revocation of a bequest to a
legatee who "become[s] enimie to the testator").
209 As codified in the revised Uniform Probate Code, provisions for changes of an
estate plan by operation of law contain asymmetries that are never explained, because the
separate provisions covering each of them are nowhere compared in the accompanying
comments or scholarly commentary. Compare UNIP. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-
301(a) (revising pre-marital wills by implication of marriage) with id. § 2-804(b) (revising
pre-dissolution wills along with other will substitutes by implication of divorce); and
compare id. § 2-301(a)(1) (excepting from revision pre-marital wills made in contemplation
of marriage) with id. § 2-804(b) (containing no comparable exception for pre-dissolution
wills made in contemplation of divorce); and compare id. § 2-301(a) & cmt. (subjecting to
revision pre-marital wills that do bequeath to the individual who subsequently became a
spouse, but which fail to contemplate that individual as a spouse) with id. § 2-302(a) (failing
to subject to revision pre-adoption wills that provide for an individual who the testator
subsequently adopts as a child, cf In re McPeak Estate, 534 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995)); and cwmpare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 33, § 31.2 cmt. c,
illus. 5-9 & reporter's note 3 (gifts made in contemplation of marriage are by implication
conditional on subsequent marriage) with UNuT. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, §§ 2-508, 2-
804(f) (creating no comparable implied condition of subsequent marriage or implied
revocation of bequests made in contemplation of marriage when the marriage fails to
ensue); and compare id. § 2-601 & cmt. (extrinsic evidence of intent contrary to rules of
construction applicable to time ambiguities in general is admissible) with id. §§ 2-301(a)(2),
2-302(b)(1), 2-804(b) (rendering inadmissible, for the most part, extrinsic evidence of intent
contrary to the rules governing pre-marital, pre-dissolution, and pre-natal wills). Noting two
inconsistencies between the elective share and the treatment of pre-marital wills under the
Uniform Probate Code, see DuiEmmRr & JOHANSON, supra note 142, at 549. For (non-
comparative) commentary, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multple-
Mariage Society: The Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. L 683,
689-701, 748-51 (1992).
2 10 To grant courts discretionary authority to revise wills on the basis of any changed
circumstances would "inevitably invite litigation and 'produce infinite uncertainty and delay
in the settlement of estates,' ...." Hoitt v. Hoitt, 3 A. 604, 616 (N.H. 1886). In some
cases, it is unclear whether the testator herself anticipated the possibility of a change of
circumstances and whether the words of her will are intended to provide for that future
contingency or not. The phrase "to A and her heirs," for instance, could be meant to
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warranted: for the central argument against originalism-that, in practice, the
unwieldiness of a constitutional or legislative body precludes periodic review
and systematic revision of its texts by the body itselt2 n-fails to apply to
testamentary instruments. It seems reasonable enough to assume that once an
estate plan the testator has troubled herself to execute no longer corresponds
with her wishes, she will trouble herself to amend it. Failure to amend, more
likely than not, reflects an advertent decision on the testator's part,212 and so
courts justifiably may infer that the intent expressed in her last will reflects her
intent at death (when the transfer becomes effective), even if the estate plan has
been overtaken by significant events. 213
So far, so good. Still, this principle cannot be followed in every instance.
designate an alternative taker in the event that A predeceases the testator, or it could be
meant simply to bequeath to A a fee simple absolute. Such facts present a word ambiguity
rather than a time ambiguity. E.g., Jackson v. Schultz, 151 A.2d 284 (Del. Ch. 1959);
Estate of Renner, 895 S.W.2d 180 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). Once again, however, whether the
words of a will are ambiguous concerning their application to the future change of
circumstances that occurs can itself be ambiguous. See, e.g., In re Estate of Bulger, 586
N.E.2d 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (where the trial and appellate courts differed over whether
testamentary language concerning future circumstances required construction); In re Estate
of Quinn, 450 N.W.2d 432 (S.D. 1990) (discussed supra note 189). Therefore, courts again
have some leeway (if they are minded to use it) to find ambiguity in the words of a will as a
surreptitious means of curing time ambiguities.
211 E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRMGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY IERPRETATION 50
(1994); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Orginal Undemtanding, 60 B.U. L.
Rav. 204, 236 (1980), reprinted in INTERPRETIG THE CONSTTUTION 227 (Jack Rakove
ed., 1990).
212 E.g., In re Estate of Baxter, 798 P.2d 644, 647 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990). This is not
always true, of course-and in some instances it is definitely not true: Where the testator
after executing a will loses testamentary capacity, or where the event that changes the
testator's intent simultaneously disables the testator from altering her will (common
calamities and intentional inffictions of mortal wounds being the principal examples), we
can be certain the testator's failure to alter her will was not advertent. In such cases,
lawmakers have had to draw inferences about the effect of changed circumstances on
testamentary intent. These problems are handled under the doctrine of substituted judgment,
simultaneous death laws, and slayer laws, respectively. On these doctrines, see McGovERN
ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 2.4, 10.5; Fellows, supra note 51, at 622-30.
213 And the alternative: "[W]here are we to stop? Is the rule to vary with every change
which constitutes a new situation giving rise to new moral duties on the part of the
[testator]?" White v. Barford, 105 Eng. Rep. 739, 739 (K.B. 1815) (Ellenborough, C.J.).
The very fact that this general rule of construction is in place should also operate ex ante to
encourage testators to update their wills. For courts to undertake this task on the testator's
behalf-apart from being problematic-is obviously inefficient from the perspective of legal
process. See also supra note 210.
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In some cases, circumstances will have rendered impossible the literal
effectuation of testamentary intent. When beneficiaries named in a will
predecease the testator, she cannot (except in some metaphysical sense) give
them property-they no longer possess the capacity to enjoy it. Similarly, when
property specifically bequeathed in a will has departed the testator's ownership
before her death, she cannot dispose of it. Assuming it still exists, the property
is no longer hers to give away.
Faced with a statute that cannot be implemented-unconstitutionality being
the usual stumbling block-courts simply hold it void, restore the status quo,
and leave it to the legislature to contrive a viable alternative. Faced with an
impossible bequest, courts cannot restore the status quo, any more than they
can bring the testator back to life: having failed to revise her will before her
death, the testator manifestly succumbed to distraction or procrastination and
has lost the chance to correct her oversight. By default, the lot falls to
lawmakers; they must now pencil in revisions calculated best to accord with the
testator's probable intent, had she anticipated the circumstance that foiled her
estate plan.
That was not the traditional theory, however. Early English courts took the
view that when beneficiaries predeceased a testator, their bequests "lapsed"
into the residuary, not because that was what the testator would have wanted,
but rather by necessary implication of the fact that they no longer existed: "For
it is a principle in the law that in all gifts... there ought to be a donee in
esse .... For if there be none such in rerwn naturd when the thing ought to
vest, the gift shall be void." 214 By the same token, when property specifically
bequeathed by a testator failed to survive her, the bequest was "adeemed by
extinction": The beneficiary took nothing, "there [being] nothing on which the
bequest can operate. And I do not think that the question in these cases turns on
the intention of the testator." 215 This came to be known as the identity theory
of ademption.
By the nineteenth century, lawmakers rejected such syllogistic analyses in
the context of lapse, accepting that the problem was one of intent effectuation
after all. Because "[t]he rule, that gifts lapse.., defeats in many cases the
214 Brett v. Rigdon, 75 Eng. Rep. 516, 524 (C.P. 1568); see also 1 JARMAN, supra
note 118, at 438 (quoting 1st ed., 1841-43). On the early common law of lapse, see
SWINBURN, supra note 25, at 289a-92a.
215 Stanley v. Potter, 30 Eng. Rep. 83, 84 (Ch. 1789) (Thurlow, C.). See also
Ashburner v. MacGuire, 29 Eng. Rep. 62 (Ch. 1786) (Thurlow, C.). Intent, however, had
been considered in still earlier discussions of the ademption problem, though the references
are sparse. For a historical discussion, see Joseph Warren, The History of Ademption, 25
IOWA L. Rnv. 290 (1940). On the early common law of ademption, see SwNBURNE, supra
note 25, at 281a, 292a-93a.
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intention of the Testator," Parliament in 1837 refined the doctrine, imputing an
intent that property go to decedent beneficiaries' estates rather than flow into
the residuary when the intended beneficiaries were lineal descendants of the
testator.216 American statutes, several of which antedated the English version,
have mandated variants of this scheme. These revised approaches to the
problem are predicated on the assumption that when a testator bequeaths to her
close relatives, her wish to provide for them usually extends to their progeny;
the testator's decision to benefit only the older generation ordinarily follows
from a desire to give it priority, and so when members of that generation fail to
survive, the testator will likely wish their descendants to take in their stead.
When a testator bequeaths to nonrelatives, by contrast, she is less apt to have a
sociological relationship with their offspring, and so will less probably desire to
treat them as testamentary surrogates; lapse into the residuary then will more
likely accord with the testator's preferences.217
One might have expected that the theoretical premises of ademption would
have evolved par passu with changing conceptions of lapse. Instead, in most
jurisdictions the identity theory of ademption has lingered, even as its analogue
in the context of lapse long ago fled the scene. Many courts today continue to
parrot the notion that ademption "is not founded on any presumed intention of
the testator" but rather follows from the "fact that the thing bequeathed does
not exist."218 The upshot is an odd conceptual asymmetry between two
216 See 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., ch. 26 (1837) (Eng.); Susan F. French, Antlapse Statutes
Are Blunt Instnrments: A Blueprint for Reform, 37 HASTINGs L.J 335, 338 n.13 (1985)
(quoting the drafters' report).
2 17 This inference is spelled out, for example, in In re Estate of Niehenke, 818 P.2d
1324, 1328 (Wash. 1991). Noting generally the primacy of intent-effectuation as the
premise for modem statutes governing lapse, see RESTATEMeT (SEcOND) OF PROPERTY,
supra note 33, § 18.6 cmt. a; ATKINSON, supra note 30, § 140, at 779; 6 PAGE, supra note
11, § 50.10, at 77. For a catalogue of the statutes, see RESTATEmEmNT (SEcOND) OF
PROPERTY, supra note 33, § 34.6 statutory note. For criticisms of the modem statutory
schemes, see French, supra note 216; Philip Mechem, Some Problems Arising Under Anti-
Lapse Statutes, 19 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1933); Patricia I. Roberts, Lapse Statutes: Recurring
Construction Problems, 37 EMORY L.J. 323 (1988). For an inconsistency between the statute
governing lapse and the statute governing absentee beneficiaries in the state of Washington,
see Mark Reutlinger, Legislative Lapses: Some Suggestions for Probate Code Reform in
Washington, 10 U. PuGET SOUND L. REv. 173,226-27 (1987).
218 In re Estate of Fox, 431 A.2d 1008, 1010 (Pa. 1981) (quoting Hoke v. Herman, 21
Pa. 301, 305 (1853)). "[llntention has nothing to do with the matter." In re Wright's Will,
165 N.E.2d 561, 562 (N.Y. 1960); see also, e.g., In re Charles' Estate, 158 N.Y.S.2d 469,
472 (App. Div. 1957); MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 10.1, at 397 & nn.3-4. C. In re
Estate of Mayberry, 886 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Ark. 1994) ("[In most instances a
determination of whether a change in the gift's form or substance occurred will decide the
112919961
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
doctrines that form close structural parallels but which nonetheless have
developed independently. 219
The theoretical cleft between ademption and lapse is reflected in the
corollary rules that have grown up around them. One way to excuse any rule of
construction is to point out that a testator who disapproves can still effectuate
her intent by executing a new will. But this reasoning, which of course applies
only to an attentive testator, collapses altogether when for one reason or
another the testator loses her ability to revise her estate plan. That scenario
proved too much even for lawmakers wedded to the identity theory to swallow,
and accordingly many courts have reversed the presumption in favor of
ademption if the conversion of bequeathed property occurs while the testator
lacks testamentary capacity220 or where her death follows hard on the
conversion, the testator then lacking a realistic opportunity to amend her
will. 221 In such cases, the beneficiary receives a general pecuniary bequest or
issue of what the testator intended."); Wasserman v. Cohen, 606 N.E.2d 901, 902-03
(Mass. 1993) ("The doctrine seeks to give effect to a testator's probable intent by presuming
he intended to extinguish a specific gift of property when he disposed of that property prior
to his death.").
219 One conceivable justification for the distinction is the administrative cost of
determining the pecuniary value of a specifically bequeathed item that, absent the
identity theory of ademption, would have to be substituted for the item, were it lost or
conveyed. No comparable administrative cost is entailed in determining the substitute
for a predeceasing beneficiary. Recognizing this difficulty in connection with
ademption, see Philip Mechem, Specific Legacies of Unspecific Things-Ashsburner v.
MacGuire Reconsidered, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 546, 547, 550 (1939); see also In re
Slater, 1 Ch. 665, 672 (Ch. App. 1907) (hinting at the policy); Wasserman, 606
N.E.2d at 902 (same).
220 "[Ilt seems unfair that acts of... [a] guardian should work an ademption when the
incompetent has no opportunity to remedy the situation by making a fresh will." MODEL
PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 231 & cmt. "[ihe competent testator can always change
his will following changes in the property which he owns. When, however, specifically
devised property was removed from a testator's estate during incompetency, application of
the identity theory seems unjust." In re Estate of Larsell, 495 P.2d 57, 61 (Or. Ct. App.
1972), aff'd, 503 P.2d 500 (Or. 1972). Applying the same principle where the testator
"although not legally declared incompetent, was clearly under the evidence unable to
manage her affairs," see In re Estate of Kolbinger, 529 N.E.2d 823, 829-30 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988). For doctrinal surveys, see 6 PAGE, supra note 11, § 54.18; Jeffrey F. Ghent,
Annotation, Adenption or Revocation of Specific Devise or Bequest by Guardian,
Comnittee, Conservator, or Trustee of Mentally or Physically Incompetent Testator, 84
A.L.R.4th 462 (1991).
221 The typical scenario would be where the testator dies, or is mortally wounded, in a
disaster that also destroys the property bequeathed. In such a case, "there are no facts from
which an intent [to adeem] can be inferred." In re Estate of MacDonald, 283 P.2d 271, 274
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insurance proceeds in lieu of the missing property.
These exceptions to the identity theory, now codified in many jurisdictions,
are themselves its most damning indictment. Notice what lawmakers are telling
us here: where the testator cannot alter her will, we are told, the balance of
probabilities are that she would prefer that bequests not be adeemed. This, to
be sure, is an empirical question, but assuming ex hypothesi that the inference
underlying these exceptions is correct, does it not then follow that non-
ademption should be our usual default rule, to protect as well the testator at
liberty to update her will who simply neglects to do so? Were intent-
effectuation our goal, this conclusion would seem inescapable: 222 But the
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); see also Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 F. 896 (7th Cir. 1910);
In re Estate of Wolfe, 208 N.W.2d 923 (Iowa 1973); White v. White, 251 A.2d 470 (NJ.
Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1969). But see In re Barry's Estate, 252 P.2d 437 (Okla. 1952). For a
doctrinal survey, see John P. Ludington, Annotation, Disposition of Insurance Proceeds of
Personal Property Speifically Bequeathed or Devised, 82 A.L.R.3d 1261 (1978). In one
curious case, where a testator had the misfortune to book passage on the Lusitania and
perished along with the jewelry she had bequeathed, the court ruled that the bequest had not
been adeemed for the reason that the property was not destroyed during her lifetime; for
ademption applies only where the subject matter is converted before the testator's death. See
In re Shymer's Estate, 242 N.Y.S. 234 (Surr. Ct. 1930); see also Thompson v. Ford, 236
S.W. 2 (Tenn. 1921). This led one commentator to note that the issue had hinged on the
so lity of the property in question. See Recent Case, Legacies and Devises-Adenpuion-
Death of Testatrix and Loss of Property Specifically Bequeathed in Corion Disaster, 43
HARV. L. REV. 1311 (1930).
222 A possible counter-argument is that when a testator possesses capacity, her decision
to alienate specifically bequeathed property itself manifests an intent to adeem, see William
H. Page, Adenption by Einct'on: Its Practical Effects, 1943 Wis. L. REV. 11, 20 & n.38,
which (assuming the doctrine of acts of independent significance does not intervene, see
supra note 85 and accompanying text) is lacking when her property is subject to a
conservatorship. Such an analysis would, however, suggest the need to distinguish between
inferences of intent concerning voluntary alienation on the one hand and involuntary or
accidental alienation on the other, a distinction which is of no consequence under the
identity theory. See ATKINSON, supra note 30, § 134, at 743. Suggesting such a general
distinction, see McGovERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 10.1, at 403-04. Still, the assumption
that intentional sale by the testator of an asset she has specifically bequeathed in and of itself
implies an intent to alter her estate plan strikes me as dubious; very likely, such acts are
performed without heed to their testamentary consequences, an intuition shared by
Professor Page. See 6 PAGE, supra note 11, § 54.15, at 266; see also supra text
accompanying note 85.
Intent-effectuation aside, prevailing exceptions to the identity theory arguably present
the least substantial administrative costs of valuing lost specific bequests. See supra note
219. Where property has been liquidated by a conservator on the testator's behalf, the
conservator has a fiduciary obligation to keep records of the transaction. And where a sale
price or insurance proceeds are owed on property sold or destroyed shortly before death,
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trouble is that the identity theory rests not upon intent, but rather on a hollow
abstraction-one that gave way long ago in connection with lapse. As a
consequence, the law of lapse makes no analogous exceptions for beneficiaries
who predecease the testator while she lacks capacity or within close proximity
of her own death. It does not have to: its rules are already geared toward
effectuating the probable intent of a testator who, for whatever reason, fails to
update her estate plan in the face of her beneficiaries' mortality.2 23
The callousness of the ademption doctrine to the intent of the testator has
been noticed and criticized for a long time.224 Nonetheless, the drafters of the
value can again simply be determined by looking to the sum due.
223 By statute in all jurisdictions, the principles of lapse expressly extend to cases in
which the testator and beneficiary both die in a common calamity-the so-called
"simultaneous death" problem. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-702. This
problem mirrors that in which the testator and property bequeathed both expire in a
common calamity-which might be dubbed by analogy the problem of "simultaneous death
and destruction"-where, by contrast, the principles of ademption are generally held not to
apply. In at least one published case, both issues arose at once and were treated without
comparison. See In re Buda's Will, 197 N.Y.S.2d 824 (Surr. Ct. 1960).
224 E.g., In re Estate of Hobson, 456 A.2d 800, 802 (Del. Ch. 1982); Trustees
Unitarian Soc'y v. Tufts, 23 N.E. 1006, 1007 (Mass. 1890) (Holmes, J.); Douglas v.
Newell, 719 P.2d 971, 976 (Wyo. 1986); MODEL PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, at 20-21;
MCGoVERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 10.1, at 397-98; Gregory S. Alexander, AdempTfion and
the Domain of Fonnality in Wills Law, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1067, 1068-69, 1089 (1992);
Fratcher, supra note 71, at 1086-87; Mary Kay Lundwall, The Case Against the Ademption
by Extinction Rule: A Proposal for Reform, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 105 (1993/94); Mechem,
supra note 38, at 514-17; Page, supra note 222, at 26, 28, 38; John C. Paulus, Ademption
by Exninction: Smi'ing Lord Thurlow's Ghost, 2 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 195 (1971). But cf
Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, or More Like the
Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MiNN. L. REy. 639, 643-45 (1993) (suggesting that the identity
theory is likely to reflect the wishes of testators whose wills have been professionally drafted
and which accordingly avoid use of specific bequests to transmit pecuniary value to
beneficiaries). In implicit agreement with criticisms of the identity theory, some courts have
avoided its strict application by recourse to a variety of legal fictions. See DUKEBmINmR &
JOHANSON, supra note 142, at 466-67; 6 PAGE, supra note 11, § 54.19; WAGGONER ET AL.,
supra note 88, at 319-22; Bruce L. Stout, Adenption: Cracks in the Idenntfy Theory Provide
Opportunities, 10 PROB. & PROP., May-June 1996, at 38. Other courts, refusing out of
principle to arrogate such devices, have fairly writhed in agony:
Except for the ingenuity of an Appellate Court, not bound by prior determinations, to
grant relief by making new decisional law, it would appear that only legislative action
can provide needed redress. This court has exhausted every avenue it could think of
without success. Reluctantly, it holds the ... property... has adeemed.
In re Estate of Harris, 414 N.Y.S.2d 835, 838-39 (Surr. Ct. 1979).
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original Uniform Probate Code went ahead and codified the identity theory,
along with its exceptions, without substantive comment.225 As revised in 1990,
the Uniform Probate Code abandons the identity theory, replacing it with a
rebuttable presumption of intent not to adeem, on the assumption that this
approach is more likely to accord with the testator's wishes. 226 Thus,
ademption principles posited by the Code are once again conceptually
harmonious with those of lapse2 27 (although at a technical level they leave a bit
too much to the imagination228). Perhaps under the Code's influence, the
225 See UNU'. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, app. VII, § 2-608 & cmt. (pre-1990 art.
2); cf. id. app. VII, § 2-605 & cmt. (pre-1990 art. 2) (setting out an intent-focused provision
on lapse). For some technical criticisms of these provisions, today codified in many
jurisdictions, see MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 10.1, at 402-03; Richard W. Effland,
Wdl Construction Under the Unijform Probate Code, 63 OR. L. REv. 337, 349-54, 358-63
(1984). Whereas the Model Probate Code included a provision on lapse, its drafters
preferred to leave the general issue of ademption to judicial development. See MODEL
PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, at 20-21, §§ 57, 231.
226 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-606(a)(6) & cmt. In this respect, the
revised Uniform Probate Code follows the result reached in a small minority of modem
cases rejecting the identity theory. E.g., Estate of Austin, 169 Cal. Rptr. 648, 652 (Ct. App.
1980) ("In absence of proof of an intent that the gift fail, there should be no ademption.");
McIntyre v. Kilbourn, 885 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Somewhat incongruously,
the Code's revised section on ademption still retains the traditional exceptions carved out of
the identity theory that the Code has now jettisoned, although these are arguably subsumed
within the new clause. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-606(a)(1)-(3), (b).
227 One minor theoretical disparity between ademption and lapse does remain. Under
the Uniform Probate Code, all rules of construction create mere rebuttable presumptions
and extrinsic evidence to rebut them is admissible. See UNi. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5,
§ 2-601 & cmt. Whereas the presumptions created under the lapse provision are supposed
to be rebuttable only by "persuasive evidence," the analogous provision inferring an intent
not to adeem creates instead "a mild presumption." Compare id. § 2-603 cmt. with id. § 2-
606 cmt. The reasons for this disparity are nowhere discussed or explained. And compare
with the general rebuttable presumption of the Code's rules of construction under § 2-601
the requirement of "clear and convincing evidence" (a standard different from
"persuasive"?) applicable to extrinsic proof of an improperly formalized will under the
Code. See id. § 2-503 & cmt.; see also id. § 2-507(b)-(d). Once again, the Code's
commentary nowhere addresses comparatively the standards for extrinsic proof of intent to
make a will and extrinsic proof of its intended substantive contents. See also supra note 59.
228 All rules of construction under the Uniform Probate Code yield to "a finding of a
contrary intention," which can be established by extrinsic evidence. See UNit. PROBATE
CODE, supra note 5, § 2-601 & cmt. In addition, the Code spells out that the general
presumption against intent to adeem applies "unless the facts and circumstances indicate that
ademption of the devise was intended by the testator." Id. § 2-606(a)(6). Several matters
remain unclear: (1) Is extrinsic evidence admissible (a) only to show the testator's intent at
the time the will was executed, or (b) to show her intent at the time the conversion of the
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identity theory will fade away at last.229 Yet what remains striking is the
property occurred, or (c) to show her intent at any time prior to her death? The comment
accompanying the provision suggests that testamentary intent at the time of the conversion is
relevant, but the matter needs to be clarified. See id. § 2-606 cmt. (2) Do the same rules
respecting the time of a legally significant intention to adeem or not under § 2-606(a)(6) also
apply to intentions that a bequest lapse or not under § 2-601? (3) Are the testator's
declarations of intent admissible as a "fact or circumstance" under § 2-606(a)(6) and/or to
support a "finding of... intention" under § 2-601? C. McGovERN ET AL., supra note 8,
§ 6.1, at 239-41 (noting the refusal by many courts to admit extrinsic evidence of
declarations, as opposed to factual circumstances, to clarify will ambiguities). These
uncertainties are bound to sow a measure of confusion in states adopting the revised Code-
and hence could reap a harvest of litigation. (Indeed, quite apart from the uncertainties
surrounding the rules of admissability of extrinsic evidence to clarify time ambiguities, the
Commissioners' fundamental decision to admit extrinsic evidence at all in such cases has
the downside, already identified in connection with will formalization and word ambiguities,
of tending to foment evidentiary disputes and litigation. For an early observation of the
danger in connection with ademption, see Humphreys v. Humphreys, 30 Eng. Rep. 85, 85
(Ch. 1789) ('hurlow, C.).) For commentary on the provisions governing lapse and
ademption in the revised Uniform Probate Code, see generally Alexander, supra note 224;
Ascher, supra note 224, at 643-57; Averill, supra note 117, at 919-25; Martin D.
Begleiter, Article H of the Uniform Probate Code and the Malpractice Revolution, 59 TENN.
L. REV. 101, 120-23, 126-30 (1991); Mary Louise Fellows, Traveling the Road of Probate
Reform: Finding the Way to Your Will, 77 MINN. L. REV. 659, 663-80 (1993); Edward C.
Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC's New Survivorship and Antilapse
Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1091 (1992); Erich Tucker Kimbrough, Note, Lapsing of
Testamentay Gifts, Antilapse Statutes, and the Expansion of Uniform Probate Code
Antilapse Protection, 36 WM. & MARYL. REv. 269 (1994); Mann, supra note 33, at 1053-
57.
22 9 The disintegration of a perverse rule through an initial stage in which it becomes
riddled with (often logically inconsistent) exceptions and then eventually is overruled has
frequently occurred in the common law. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF
THE COMMON LAw 70-74, 105-118 (1988). For another possible example of this
phenomenon within inheritance law, see supra notes 139-42 and acompanying text. In
setting modern ademption policy, however, one further refinement may merit consideration.
Just as modem principles of lapse, as reflected in the Uniform Probate Code, distinguish
between different sorts of predeceasing beneficiaries, presuming an intent to preserve
bequests for the progeny only of close relatives, so perhaps should principles of ademption
distinguish between different sorts of "predeceasing" property. Where the property at issue
is an heirloom or other unique good peculiarly appropriate to the beneficiary, it may be
reasonable to make a rebuttable presumption that the bequest of the item arises chiefly out
of sentiment, which will vanish if the item fails to outlast the testator. On the other hand,
where the bequest is of an item whose principal attribute is pecuniary value, such as a bond
or a security, the likelihood is far greater that the testator would wish the beneficiary to
receive a substitute gift if it is sold or called. Such a distinction (though presenting obvious
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coequal failure of courts and Commissioners to relate ademption to lapse in the
course of whittling away at ademption's theoretical foundation. 23 0 The
comments accompanying the revised Uniform Probate Code's provisions on
lapse and ademption are both fairly detailed, but at no point does either refer to
the other.23 1 The flimsiness of the old foundation for ademption principles was
plain to see; it has escaped no one's attention. On the other hand, as in so many
of the other instances addressed in this Article, the relation of that foundation to
other, adjoining ones has eluded the eyes of practically everybody. 23 2
IV. WHY CONSISTENCY?
I could go on and on, but we need not extend indefinitely our bill of
particulars. 23 3 That inheritance law is replete with structural inconsistencies I
problems of definition and burdens of sorting) is suggested in Mechem, supra note 219, at
550-53,576; Mechem, supra note 38, at 515-16; Comment, The Ademption of Legacies of
Stocks and Bonds, 41 YALE L.J. 101, 107-09 (1931). But cf. Note, Ademption and the
Testator's Intent, 74 HARv. L. REV. 741, 747-48 (1961) (noting that a bequest may be
inspired both by sentiment and by a desire to transmit value). Cf. KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 394.360 (Michie 1984) (distinguishing presumptions of intent to adeem on the basis of the
testator's relationship to the beneficiary).
230 This has been true even in cases raising both problems simultaneously. See supra
note 223.
231 See UNII. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-603 cmt., § 2-606 cmt. As a
consequence, the minor disparity between the strength of the presumptions created under
these sections of the Code is nowhere remarked and justified. See supra note 227.
232 Several commentators have drawn the analogy, however. See 3 AMERIcAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 14.13, at 614 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) ("a somewhat parallel situation");
ATKINSON, supra note 30, § 134, at 748 (parallel legislation "deserves careful
consideration"); Fellows, supra note 228, at 674 ("many parallels"); Mechem, supra note
229, at 553 n.10 ("some analogy"); Mechem, supra note 38, at 514-17 ("[quite similar").
233 For some additional asymmetries within the law of disclaimer of inheritances, see
Hirsch, Insolvent Heir, supra note 63, at 591-92, 596 & n.49, 640-51. For an asymmetry
created in some jurisdictions (and replicated in the Uniform Probate Code) between
restrictions on no-contest clauses and enforcement of family settlement agreements, see
Martin D. Begleiter, Anti-Contest Causes: When You Care Enough to Send the Final
Threat, 26 ARiz. ST. L.J. 629, 640-44 (1994). Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note
5, §§ 2-517, 3-905 with id. § 3-912. Noting unexplained inconsistencies between different
survivorship provisions under the Uniform Probate Code, see Jesse Dukeminier, The
Unifonm Probate Code Upends the Law of Remainders, 94 MICH. L. REV. 148, 148-49 &
nn.4-5 (1995). Discussing an asymmetry between copyright law and inheritance theory, see
Francis M. Nevins, Jr., The Magic Ingdom of Will-Btwnping: Where Estates Law and
Copyright Law Collide, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'y 77 (1988). Suggesting an inconsistency
between protection of dependents and creditors' rights under inheritance law, see Paul G.
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hope already to have demonstrated to the reader's satisfaction. And at the risk
of edging out onto a limb, I dare say that inheritance law is far from
exceptional in this respect. Aspects of inconsistency can be found, and
probably abound, within and between plenty of other legal categories as well-
including trust law,234 future interests law, 235 and, further afield, bankruptcy
law, 236 commercial law,237 contract law,238 tort law,23 9 criminal law,240 and
Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Refonn, 52 GEo. L.J. 499, 508-11
(1964).23 4 Discussing asymmetries between the law of trusts and powers, see George E.
Palmer, The Effect of Indefiniteness on the Validity of Trusts and Powers of Appointnent, 10
UCLA L. REv. 241 (1963); see also Patrick Parkinson, Chaos in the Law of Trusts, 13
SYDNEY L. Rav. 227 (1991) (book review, discussing Commonwealth law).
2 3 5 E.g., LEwis M. SIMEs, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 70-71 (1955); Daniel
M. Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest? (pts. 1 & 2), 56 MICH.
L. REV. 683, 887 (1958) (see especially 687-88, 702-04). Compare UNaF. PROBATE CODE,
supra note 5, § 2-901(a) (permitting private trusts to persist for 90 years) with id. § 2-907(a)
(recommending that honorary trusts be effective for 21 years).
236 E.g., compare 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1994), construed in Paradise Hotel Corp. v.
Bank of Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1988) (allowing fully secured creditors to join in
an involuntary petition for bankruptcy) with 11 U.S.C. § 702(a)(1) (1994) (denying fully
secured creditors the right to vote in an election for the bankruptcy trustee); and compare
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (1994) (denying the trustee in bankruptcy power to assume or to
assign an executory contract that would be unassignable at state law) with 11 U.S.C. §
365(f)(1) (1994) (granting the trustee power to assume and to assign an executory contract
notwithstanding a term in the contract rendering it unassignable); and compare 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(5) (1994) (determining trustee's power to avoid floating liens in bankruptcy) with
11 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (determining trustee's power to avoid structurally analogous rights
of setoff in bankruptcy); and compare 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)-(d) (1994) (setting out complex
restrictions on debtor's power to reaffirm specific debts in bankruptcy) with 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(a)(10) (1994) (setting out minimal restrictions on debtor's power to reaffirm all debts
at once in bankruptcy). Discussing several other structural inconsistencies within the
Bankruptcy Code, see Hirsch, Inheritance and Banknptcy, supra note 63, at 193-96, 240-
42. Discussing structural inconsistencies between bankruptcy law and inheritance law, see
id. at 235-48; Donald L. Swanson, Bankruptcy-Probate... and the Twain Shall Meet, 20
CREIGHTONL. REV. 435 (1987); and between bankruptcy law and banking law, see John R.
Ashmead, In re Colonial Realty Co.: The Second Crcuit Harnonizes Bankruptcy and Bank
Insolvency Law (Rejecting Established Banknptcy Case Law in the Process), 60 BROOK. L.
REV. 517 (1994); and between bankruptcy law and commercial law, compare 11 U.S.C.
§ 546(c) (1994) (setting out the right of reclamation in bankruptcy) with U.C.C. § 2-702(2)
(1991) (setting out the right of reclamation at state law).
237 E.g., compare U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1994) (giving purchase-money creditors a ten-
day grace period to perfect a security interest in any sort of property vis-h-vis competing
judicial lien gap creditors) with id. § 9-312 (giving purchase-money creditors an equivalent
ten-day grace period to perfect a security interest only in non-inventory vis-b-vis competing
1136 [Vol. 57:1057
INHERITANCE AND INCONSISTENCY
tax law.241 The examples, indeed, can be multiplied without end. Roam where
you please: there is a surfeit of inconsistency to be discovered.
This assertion of empirics raises a larger question of theoretics. So we have
happened upon disharmonies between the application of different laws, what
matter? These are, after all, independent rules; we can scarcely wonder that
they operate in different ways. Let's step back for a moment and consider the
import of all of this from the perspective of jurisprudence. Have I, in the
foregoing pages, been brewing up a batch of trouble, or merely a tempest in a
tea kettle? Why, if at all, is structural consistency of law something devoutly to
be wished?
The strong form of the argument for structural consistency is that it is
necessary to preserve the legitimacy or, to use Ronald Dworkin's term, the
"integrity" of law. "Checkerboard" lawmaking, as Dworkin puts it, applying
one legal principle to one problem and a different legal principle to another
analogous problem, would, says he, throw the law into disrepute. For
Dworkin, fidelity to a single, coherent blend of principles that we proceed to
spread evenly over the legal landscape is what defines our community,
interlinking the fate of its members and setting them apart from others.
Structural consistency of law therefore becomes a jurisprudential end in itself,
cherished for its own sake.242 Without it, Dworkin contends, we sacrifice our
consensual lien gap creditors). Discussing other inconsistencies within commercial law, see
Grant Gilmore, The Conmercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.. 1057,
1078-81 (1954); Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uiform
Connercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605, 628 (1981)
[hereinafter, Gilmore, Confessions]; Thomas H. Jackson & Ellen A. Peters, Quest for
Uncertainty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Ar'cle 2 and
Article 9 of the Unifom Commercial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907 (1978).
238 E.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRACrS § 9-
26(b) (3d ed. 1987) (discussing the law of mistakes as to kind versus mistakes as to quality).
239 Addressing inconsistencies between tort law and contract law, see Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., Contortions Along the Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69 TUL. L.
REV. 457 (1994). Discussing an inconsistency between tort law and property law, see David
Cohen & Allan C. Hutchinson, Of Persons and Property: The Politics of Legal Taxonony,
13 DALHousm LJ. 20, 29-53 (1990).
240 Discussing an inconsistency within criminal law, see Kevin R. Reitz, Oients,
Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment: The Need for a Projected Privilege, 41 DuKE L.J. 572
(1991).
241 E.g., compare I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994) & Tres. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1960) (payments in
kind can constitute income) with LR.C. § 71(b)(1) (1994) (payments in kind cannot
constitute alimony). See generally Reed H. Shuldiner, Consistency and the Taxation of
Financial Products, 70 TAXES 781 (1992); Reed H. Shuldiner, Symmetry and Consistency
in the Tax Law (1993) (unpublished paper, on file with author).242 Dworkin is hardly the first thinker to take this view, though he does appear to be
19961 1137
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
sense of political fraternity, and the state forfeits its claim to a monopoly on
coercive power.243
the first to weave it into a broader political theory. A long line of prior scholars also exalted
structural consistency as an aspect of the geometric elegance of law. E.g., DAvID HOFRMAN,
A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY at xviii-xix (Baltimore, Coale & Maxwell 1817) (observing
that the common law "has [n]ever been digested by authority which had the power to lop its
excrescences, and reduce it to symmetry," and therefore is "wanting somewhat in unity and
regularity"); HUGH SWiNTON LEGARP., Kent's Commentaries, in 2 WRTINGS OF HUGH
SWiNTON LEGARt 102, 110-12 (Charleston 1845) (criticizing the "very inelegant and
unphilosophic" common law as "a mass of irregularities and incoherencies, which
consists... in particular usages and occasional decisions"). Blackstone also shared this
concern. See infra note 280; cf. OLuvER WENDELL HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAv 1, 36
(Little, Brown 1948) (1881) (downplaying this concern). Generally on this strain of
jurisprudence, see M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to
Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 95 (1986); Peter Stein, Elegance in Law, 77 L.Q. REV.
242 (1961). Professor Raz also places value in structural consistency of law, for reasons
which he never clearly articulates. Raz asserts that where two rules "pursu[e] different and
inconsistent social goals" they "cannot coexist," but surely he does not mean this literally:
as this Article has demonstrated, many inconsistent rules have coexisted for centuries. See
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AurHoRrrY OF LAW 200-206 (1979) (quotations at 201). Like Dworkin,
Professor Eisenberg views structural consistency (which he terms "systemic consistency")
as contributing to "the legitimacy of the law by demonstrating its formal rationality."
EISENBERG, supra note 229, at 44. Unlike Dworkin, Eisenberg is untroubled normatively by
a progression toward consistency via intermediate stages in which exceptions inconsistent
with a structurally inconsistent rule are carved out of the inconsistent rule before it is
overruled outright. See id. at 136-40. And, in the vein of Professor Raz, Eisenberg also
suggests that structural inconsistencies tend to disappear over time, an assertion called into
question by the instant study. See id. at 45-46, 71, 74, 117-18. Compare Justice Holmes's
organic vision of the common law, developing transient inconsistencies while it evolves, one
doctrine at a time, in response to changing social needs. The common law "will become
entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow." HOLMES, supra, at 36. See also Robert
Nozick's more general philosophical endorsement of consistent adherence to principles:
"Through them, one's actions and one's life may have greater coherence, greater organic
unity. That may be valuable in itself." ROBERT NozICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 13
(1993).
243 The argument is developed at length in RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 164-
224 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKN, LAw's EMPIRE]. For Dworkin's previous, briefer
discussion of this idea, see RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
81, 87-88 (1977) [hereinafter DwORKIN, Hard Cases]. Dworkin asserts that the sort of
inconsistency with which he is concerned is inconsistency of "principle," not inconsistency
of "policy." DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra, at 221-23. It is none too clear what Dworkin
means by this distinction: In an earlier essay, he defined a policy as "a goal to be reached,
generally an improvement in some economic, political, or social feature of the community,"
whereas a principle is "a standard... to be observed, not because it will advance ... an
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Assuming Dworkin is correct in inferring a popular preference for a
structurally consistent body of law, as a defining characteristic of our political
community, 244 his analysis fails to consider that structural inconsistencies are
often difficult to spot. It is one thing for a legal system to oscillate between
alternative formulations of the same legal rule (temporal, as opposed to
structural, inconsistency245). If citizens cannot anticipate which principle will
be applied on any given day of the week and hence cannot predict the legal
ramifications of the decisions they make, then they lose their capacity rationally
to plan their affairs. This defect in the system will be readily apparent and
immediately felt.246 But when our game is the checkerboard instead of the see-
saw, that difficulty fails to arise. Here, it requires a roving eye to notice
failures to deal with different-but-analogous problems in a harmonious way.
Many of the inconsistencies examined in this Article have escaped detection up
to now, even by experts in the field.247 The peripheral vision of lay persons is
economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of
justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality." RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of
Rules I, in TAIaNG RIGHTs SERIOUsLY 14, 22-23 (1977); see also DWORKIN, Hard Cases,
supra, at 90-91. Yet in his discussion of legal inconsistency, Dworkin offers as an example
of inconsistency of principle the application of strict products liability to some products but
not to others; some three pages on, he offers as an example of inconsistency of policy the
application of farm subsidies to some crops but not to others, for which discriminations
"there might be sound reasons of policy." DwoRKN, LAW'S EMIRE, supra, at 217-18,
221-22; see also id at 178. From this, I gather that what Dworkin here intends by an
inconsistency of "principle" is simply an inconsistency stemming from an arbitrary
application of alternative policies, that is, a disparity that cannot be justified by some
singular, rational, policy formulation. Dworkin makes clear that he has no quarrel with
discordant rules where the disharmony follows from valid policy considerations. See id. at
179 & n.6.
244 There are of course any number of alternative political conceptions of community,
many of which are not incompatible with checkerboard lawmaking. Dworkin himself details
several of these alternatives. See DWORKN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 243, at 190-215.
2 45 Dworkin prefers a spatial terminology, distinguishing "horizontal consistency"
from "vertical consistency." DWORKMN, LAW'S EMPNIRE, supra note 243, at 227.
246 Judges, at least, have sensed the sensitivity of the public to temporal consistency
with respect to individual legal issues: "There should be some measure of uniformity in
[personal injury] awards so that similar decisions are given in similar cases; otherwise there
will be great dissatisfaction in the community and much criticism of the administration of
justice." Ward v. James, 1 All E.R. 563, 574 (C.A. 1965) (Denning, M.R.). "It is almost
as important that the law should be settled permanently, as that it should be settled
correctly.... Vacillation is a serious evil." Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 724
(1865) (Swayne, J.).
247See, e.g., supra note 91 and accompanying text. But cf. Dworkin:
"[Ciheckerboard statutes are a flagrant and easily avoidable violation of integrity .... "
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doubtless far blurrier; the low salience even of individual legal rules among the
laity has been demonstrated empirically.248
In short, the political repercussions of structural inconsistencies in law are
likely to be few. Among ordinary citizens, checkerboard jurisprudence is too
obscure to raise eyebrows or to diminish in any palpable way our sense of
belonging to a community. 249 Only those possessed of professional legal
training are equipped to discern structural inconsistencies within their subject
matter. If as a result laiwyers feel alienated from the larger political community,
the popular response will probably be, good riddance!
To the extent, then, that disquiet over legal inconsistency is confined to the
legal community, without infecting the larger body politic, the aim to correct it
may degenerate into an aesthetic ideal, an appeal for elegentia juris.250 But
even here, the point is not unequivocal. There are, after all, some aesthetes
who prefer the crazy-quilt to the monotony of consistent patterns. 251
On further reflection, however, one can conjecture other, substantive
arguments to make on behalf of structural consistency. In those instances where
inconsistencies distinguish the rights of different groups within society, political
discontent is likely to well forth. This peculiarly invidious sort of inconsistency
has, of course, been the object of constitutional proscription. 252 At least within
DWORKN, LAWS EMPiRE, supra note 243, at 217.
248 See Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis.
L. RLv. 379, 408-09.24 9 The very fact that structural inconsistencies have been left undisturbed in our law-
often for centuries-without raising so much as a ripple of protest is in itself an empirical
confirmation of this conclusion. Of course, this would not preclude Dworkin from
proposing integrity as a moral ideal in political theory, though it would diminish the
practical or pragmatic significance of any such theory. But, at any rate, Dworkin does not
claim that his theory has abstract merit in political morality. Rather, Dworkin professes to
be developing a descriptive model of prevailing political ideals, premised on our own
conceptions of what defines our community. That is to say, Dworkin is deriving and
articulating ideals that, he asserts, follow from (and "fit") a conception of community that
he takes to be ours. See DWORKI, LAW'S EMPtE, supra note 243, at 216. I have, in the
text above, raised doubts about that fit, at least at a practical level. But even Dworkin's
descriptive identification of the ideal is doubtful. See infra note 252.2 50 Dworkin specifically denies that the concern for legal consistency derives merely
from a "superstition of elegance." DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 243, at 167. On
Dworkin's superstitious predecessors, see supra note 242.
251 "Whe delightful emotion of grandeur, depends little on order and regularity; and
when the emotion is at its height by a survey of the greatest objects, order and regularity are
almost totally disregarded." LORD KAMES, ELEMENTS OF CRrrIcisM (Edinburgh, 2d ed.
1763), quoted in DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 100 (1941).
2 52 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Dworkin points to the Equal Protection Clause as
evidence of a prevailing (though implicit) political commitment to the ideal of structural
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the realm of inheritance law, it has reared its head only rarely.253 In addition,
where structurally inconsistent principles brush up against each other,
difficulties can arise. In the non-Euclidean geometry of our legal sphere,
parallel lines sometimes intersect. Where the boundaries between mutually
inconsistent rules are indistinct, as for instance in the case of the plain meaning
rule and the latent or patent ambiguity rule, the result at the point of
intersection is uncertainty. 25 4 Where the boundaries between mutually
inconsistent rules are clear-cut, as for instance in the case of laws governing the
substantive effect of revocation of codidils and of subsequent wills by act, the
result is a catastrophic discontinuity at the margin.25 5
Yet it is not evident that these juridical sequelae are substantively different
from, or even more pronounced than, those that would continue to pervade a
legal landscape that was developed consistently. To the extent that rules are
indistinct, they create uncertainties singlehandedly. A penumbra shimmers
around many rules of law; oftentimes, there seems to be more penumbra than
law. Likewise, catastrophic discontinuities appear wherever a legal system
decides to draw sharp lines, irrespective of whether they happen to intersect.
consistency in law, a "part of our collective political morality" which, while nowhere
expressed in general terms in our hallowed political texts, nonetheless conforms to "our
instincts." DWORKIN, LAw's EMPmIE, supra note 243, at 182-85, 214-16 (quotations at 182,
184); see also EIsENBERG, supra note 229, at 44 (suggesting that structural consistency
promotes "evenhandedness"). Of course, no one can deny that the Equal Protection Clause
embodies one of our political ideals, but this covers only a small sub-set of structural
inconsistencies. Whether, in fact, everyone would instinctively agree that "[e]ven if I
thought strict liability for accidents wrong in principle, I would prefer that manufacturers of
both washing machines and automobiles be held to that standard than that only one of them
be," is open to question. Id. at 182. Dworkin readily admits that violations of the ideal are
frequent (see id. at 184), a frequency confirmed by the many examples rehearsed in this
Article. Once again, this empirical fact calls into question the prevalence of the ideal.
Indeed, if Dworkin's identification of structural consistency of law as one of our ideals were
accurate, then, given its rampant violation, that ideal would have to be accounted apolitical
fiction. Discussing this phenomenon, see EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 13-
15 (1988). At any rate, throwing a dose of cold water on Dworkin's claim that structural
consistency is the primary tenet underlying Americans' sense of political community, see
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamdc Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. Ray. 1479,
1550-53 (1987).
253 One example has been the treatment of children born out of wedlock under the law
of intestate succession. For a brief historical discussion, see DUKmININR & JOHANSON,
supra note 142, at 106-07.
254 See Mpra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
25 5 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
19961 1141
OHIO STATE L4WJOURNAL
All our actions at the margin are either legal or illegal; they are never a little bit
illegal.25 6
At the end of the day, it seems difficult to surmise that structural
consistency is a value-the absence of melody is not a malady in and of itself.
On the other hand, structural inconsistency can be characterized as a benign
symptom, not harmful per se, but ominous, often reflecting and divulging the
presence of an underlying ailment. For what structural inconsistencies
frequently do signal is public policy misapplied. This I would offer as the weak
form of the argument for why they are important.
To be sure, there may be sound reason back of seemingly inconsistent legal
rules.257 An analogy ought not to be confused with an identity; for an analogy
is not an absolute.25 8 It derives rather from the analytic structure we choose to
project onto the particular rules that are under comparison. The different
problems covered by those rules will be similar in some respects, but never in
all respects. Infinitely variable, our analytic structure rests on assumptions
about which similarities are significant and which distinctions insignificant,
given the nature and scope of the public policies we perceive to apply. Those
assumptions may be sketchy, and a superficial structural analogy drawn
between discordant rules may prove false on closer inspection of the policies
that respectively underlie them.25 9 In other words, the fault may lie not with
25 6 Justice Holmes, as usual, saw the point clearly. See his discussions of catastrophic
discontinuities in law in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1925) (Holmes, L,
dissenting); LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 354
(1913) (Holmes, J., partially concurring); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and
Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. Rv. 443, 456-57 (1899). See also Glanville L. Williams,
Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. REv. 179, 181-89 (1945).
257 As architects are wont to say, "an asymmetry is not necessarily an imbalance."
Criticizing the British Wills Act of 1837, Henry Sugden warned against "unnecessarily
forming a system... whilst the irregularities which time and necessity have introduced
may be the very things which do not require reform or alteration." Sugden, supra note 31,
at 9, 19. Dworkin readily concurs and has no objection to doctrinal asymmetries when they
are justified by public policy. See supra note 243. See also EISENBERG, supra note 229, at
44-45, 93-94 (suggesting that only where doctrinal asymmetries are not justified by policy
considerations should the doctrines be conceived as inconsistent).
258 Or is it? The question of whether there are natural categories, independent of
human conceptual activity, has engaged philosophers of knowledge at least since Aristotle.
For a recent discussion, see HiLARY KORNBLTrH, INDUCTIVE INFERENCE AND ITS NATURAL
GRouND: AN ESSAY IN NATURALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY (1993).
259 The philosopher of knowledge, W.V. Quine, described categorization in general as
a dynamic process:
[O]ne's system of kinds develops and changes and even turns multiple as one
matures .... And at length standards of similarity set in which are geared to theoretical
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the rules but with the structure developed to reveal symmetries and
asymmetries between them. Along the way, we have posited policy distinctions
that could serve to justify at least some of the doctrinal disparities explored in
this Article.260 At the same time, as we have also seen, inconsistencies may
trace to phantom policies, such as historicism261 or frivolous distinctions of
form.262 Where that is true, needless to say, inconsistencies can and should be
rejected as substantively groundless.
On the other hand, discordant legal rules may be informed by alternative,
equally plausible, policy principles. 263 Where that is the case, where
lawmakers face a policy dilemma or antinomy, their decision to opt for
science. This development is a development away from the immediate, subjective,
animal sense of similarity to the remoter objectivity of a similarity determined by
scientific hypothesis and posits and constructs.
W.V. QuiNE, Natural Kinds, in ONToLoGicAL RELATirrY AND OTrHER ESSAYS 114, 134
(1969). On the other hand, it remains possible that even on closer inspection, the presence
or absence of a structural inconsistency would prove ambiguous if a difference of opinion
exists over what public policy underlies a particular rule. See generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).260 See, e.g., supra notes 88-91, 219 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 43-46, 60 and accompanying text. On historical derivation as a
source of legitimation of law, see generally Harold I. Berman, The Origins of Historical
Juisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hate, 103 YALE L.J 1651 (1994). For Justice Holmes's
classic denunciation of historicism, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARv. L. REV. 457, 468-69 (1897).
262 See Supra notes 123-26, 136, 160-65 and accompanying text. In some instances,
inconsistencies that in one era made sense have grown frivolous with the passage of time
and hence should be looked upon, more precisely, as anachronisms: the classic example
being the hoary distinctions between realty and personalty that persist within the property
laws of many states. See, e.g., supra notes 57, 60; HIrsch, Spendthrift Tnsts, supra note
63, at 3 n.8. See also EtsBnERG, supra note 229, at 45-46, 124-26.
263 It is this sort of inconsistency to which Dworkin's argument is addressed. The
classic policy conflict within inheritance law lies between the principle of freedom of
testation on the one hand and the principle of protection of dependents on the other,
although this conflict has been resolved by and large through compromise at the relevant
points where the tension arises, rather than through alternating implementations. On this
problem, see SnMEs, supra note 235, at 1-3 1; Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testanentary
Freedom, 38 AIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996); see also DWORKN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 243,
at 435 n.7 (noting the possibility of avoiding inconsistency through compromise). Among
the inconsistencies explored in this Article, the one between executed wills (providing
certainty of intent) and holographic wills (providing ease of testation) presents the clearest
unresolved policy conflict, which lawmakers could again (if they were so minded) settle
through compromise. See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
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consistency versus the checkerboard may, as I have suggested, simply come
down to a question of aesthetics (Dworkin's axiom notwithstanding). In such
instances, pointing out the inconsistency will often have no political
implications beyond highlighting the policy dispute in a particularly vivid
way.2 64
Yet there remains a third possibility: namely, that a single, coherent policy
dictating one rule is not reflected in another rule to which we can draw an
analogy, simply because it has been overlooked. For when rules pass as ships
in the night and are rarely compared, it is well-nigh inevitable that policies seen
to be germane here will, on occasion, slip by us over there.2 65 The discovery
of a structural inconsistency suggests this possibility.266 Its identification can
aid lawmakers in applying the appropriate policy to all legal problems to which
it relates. 267 Accordingly, if structural consistency is not something devoutly to
264 On the other hand, recognition of such an inconsistency could have constitutional
implications, to the extent that discriminate application of alternative policies to different
groups is deemed eo ipso to be politically illegitimate. See supra note 252 and
accompanying text.
265 Not always, of course. The policies themselves are free-floating and can be pointed
out by commentators or lawmakers without focusing on, or even noticing, their embodiment
within other rules. Some of the criticisms offered in this Article from a comparative
perspective have already been made by other commentators, without comparison, at the
level of pure policy. See, e.g., supra notes 165, 224 and accompanying text.
266 Concern for structural consistency has often led thinkers in a conservative
direction. They have hesitated to innovate with respect to established rules for fear of
creating inconsistencies and conflicts with respect to other, analogous rules that they have
no immediate authority to change. For a modem discussion, see RAZ, supra note 242, at
200-01; see also DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE, supra note 243, at 218 (remarking the same
dilemma in the context of legislation); for references specifically concerning inheritance
law, see ARMSTRONG, supra note 36, at 99; Hirsch & Wang, supra note 63, at 55-56. Such
views are premised on the assumption that lawmakers have theretofore been mindful of
consistency which, as this Article has endeavored to show, is a doubtful proposition! If, by
contrast, we assume that lawmakers have not been so mindful, then concern for structural
consistency leads rather in an activist direction. Dworkin recognizes this point at the
broader level of antinomies of principle, which are the focus of his-interest. See DwoRKIN,
LAWS EMPIRE, supra note 243, at 219-21.
267 As observed supra note 265, comparative analysis is not essential for this purpose,
so long as lawmakers take pains to inquire into relevant policies, which can always be
explored intrinsically. Still, comparative analysis is quite helpful for this purpose, given that
related rules may already reflect, and their formulation may already have been the occasion
for articulating, those relevant policies. Comparative analysis thus saves lawmakers from
the task of rediscovering policies already developed and followed in other arenas. That this
task may not be accomplished otherwise is, I believe, evidenced in the many inconsistencies
identified in this Article that have never been satisfactorily justified.
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be wished, it is at least something closely to be watched.
One of the lessons of this Article is the failure of judicial and legislative
vigilance in this regard. Lawmakers simply have not spied many of the
inconsistencies that have sprung up over the years and so have never
deliberated over whether they are justified as a matter of social utility. This
inobservance is an unfortunate, but predictable, byproduct of our legal culture.
Judges and legislators alike face issues narrowly, one at a time, case by case.
Structurally comparative analysis has been the exception, 268 and so it has
become possible, or even probable, for individual doctrines to develop, as it
were, in splendid isolation.269 This tropism for legal cabining must follow in
26 8 This is not, of course, to say that it never occurs. Analytical spores do on occasion
drift from one legal category into another. Recognizing the usefulness of analogies, see for
example RESTATEMEN (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 61, § 90 cmt. a; FRANK M.
COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 105 (1980). For an early example, see Helmholz, supra
note 43, at 101-02 (noting an analogy of contract formalities to will formalities, made by
attorneys in the sixteenth century). For a recent example, see In re Estate of Palizzi, 835
P.2d 563, 564 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (applying to wills a rule of construction previously
limited to real property deeds), rev'd on other grounds, 854 P.2d 1256, 1260-61 (Colo.
1993). For some other examples, see Hirsch, Insolvent Heir, supra note 63, at 605-06. For
recent theoretical discussions of analogical reasoning in law, see generally EISENBERG,
supra note 229, at 83-96; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 86-98
(1990); RAZ, supra note 242, at 201-06; Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics,
Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argwnent by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REv. 923
(1996); James R. Murray, The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning, 29 UCLA L. REV. 833
(1982); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993).
Attorneys arguing individual cases obviously have an incentive to offer substantive analogies
in order to sway the court; in similar fashion, the early English attorneys prodded the
procedure-driven writ system by offering, in effect, procedural analogies, seeking to
gerrymander the boundaries of the ancient forms of action. The latter story is told in
Mum, supra note 197.
269 The phenomenon has been recognized, for example, within the field of bankruptcy
law: "mhe problem is the way in which bankruptcy law is perceived as an area separate
from the rest of the legal world. In many respects the new bankruptcy [code] inadequately
reflects bankruptcy law's existence as part of a legal structure that includes many
other... laws .... " Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L.
REV. 953, 953 (1981); similarly, see THOMAs H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITs OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW 279 (1986); William F. Adler, Some Effects of Chandler Bankruptcy Act
on Other Branches of the Law, 15 U. CIN. L. RaV. 429, 429 (1941). And again, in
addressing analogous cases separately categorized under tort and property, "what is initially
remarkable ... is that neither Mr. Justice Chouinard in Lapierre nor Mr. Justice Estey in
Tener had an inkling that the cases raised much the same issues and problems. Neither
judgment refers to the other. Neither judgment alludes to the need for a common underlying
justification ... ." Cohen & Hutchinson, supra note 239, at 33. And again, an aspect of
copyright law antithetical to inheritance theory "was created inadvertently, grew
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part from deep-seated notions about what it means to judge and to make law.
Constructing compartments is an inherent aspect of the process, as we have
come to know it. But the tendency to divide and then to subdivide legal
doctrines, with attention successively riveted on each individually, also stems
almost certainly from the daunting complexity of American law. One of the
more subtle consequences of legal complexification has been its tendency to
breed compartmentalization, if only to offer a measure of relief to lawmakers
and legal scholars with human capacities for absorbing knowledge.270 The
more intricate law becomes, the greater the inducement to home in on the trees,
and eventually the leaves, to the exclusion of the forest.2 71 Such analytical self-
confinement is, of course, an old story in the law272-but so are complaints
haphazardly, ... and throughout its life remained unknown, as it still is today, ... to
virtually all the [estates] attorneys who must know of it if they are to plan creative persons'
estates properly." Nevins, supra note 233, at 114 (see also id. at 77-78). Noting the
phenomenon of ad hoc development as a general aspect of the common law, see DANIEL 1.
BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 41 (1965), and as a general aspect
of legislation, see Eskridge, supra note 252, at 1551-52; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public
Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1078-79 (1989).
270 Some of the other costs and benefits of legal complexity are explored in RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RuLES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 21-49 (1995); Louis Kaplow, A Model
of the Optimal Conplexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995); Lynn M.
LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1498, 1549-51 (1996); Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw.
U. L. REV. 767 (1977); Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990
Wis. L. REV. 1267; Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the lusions of Tax
Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 319 (1994); Peter H. Schuck, Legal
Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DuKELJ. 1 (1992).
271 Or is it (also) the other way around? For the more we narrow our gaze, the greater
the clarity of microscopic intricacies of public policy-and hence the impetus to offer a
correspondingly intricate legal response. As Grant Gilmore averred, "[t]he path of the law
leads not to the revelation of truth but to the progressive discovery of infinite complexity."
Grant Gilmore, For Arthur Lef 91 YALE L.J. 217, 218 (1981); see also McCaffery, spra
note 270, at 1275-79 (discussing vicious cycles of complexification within one legal
category). Raiding the lexicon of mathematical geometry, one observer refers to this
phenomenon as the "fractal" nature of legal analysis. See Stephen B. Land, Strange Loops
and Tangled Hierarchies, 49 TAX L. REV. 53, 123 (1993). For a similar vision of
investigations into natural science, see KARL R. POPPER, The Growth of Scien'fic
Knowledge (1960), in POPPER SELECTIONS 171, 179-80 (David Miller ed., 1985).
272 Professor Milsom recounts the development of the writ system in Great Britain:
"Upon the infinite details ... [the sejeants-at-law] concentrated their great abilities; and
they never looked up to consider as a whole the substantive system they did not know they
were making." MILSOM, supra note 197, at 29-30, 32 (quotation at 32). Not only do legal
actors tend to confine themselves to a single category of analysis when dealing with a
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about the sprawling lushness of our legal jungle.273 To some extent, notions of
particular problem; they also tend to confine themselves over time to the sane category of
analysis, the phenomenon of specialization. Courts with specialized (though sometimes
overlapping) jurisdictions existed in England from medieval times. See 1 WILLIAM
HOLDsWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 526-632 passin (7th ed. 1956). These too have
been a feature of the American judicial landscape nearly from the beginning. See
LAWRENCE M. FRIDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERCAN LAw 141-43 (2d ed. 1985); Mark
DeWolfe Howe, The Sources and Nature of Law in Colonial Massachusetts, in LAw AND
AUTHORrIy IN COLONIAL AMERICA 1, 6-7 (George Athan Billias ed., 1965). For recent
discussions, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV.
377; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in
Resolving Badness Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1 (1995) (and commentaries following).
The specialized practice of law was already underway in America in the eighteenth century
and was a recognized trend in the nineteenth century. See FRIEDMAN, supra, at 310-11;
MORTON I. HORW1TZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 140-41
(1977); PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 142-43 (1965). It has been
fbrmalized today with the practice of board certification by state bar associations in legal
sub-specialties, such as estate planning. Specialized legal treatises first began to appear in
England late in the fifteenth century (and have lately been joined in America by the
specialized law reviews). See generally Mike Antoline, The New Law Reviews: A Bwst of
Specialty Alternatives, STUDENT LAW., May 1989, at 26; John H. Langbein, Otancellor
Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 547, 585-93 (1993); A.W.B.
Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Prnciples and the Fonns of Legal
Literature, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 632 (1981); D.W.M. Waters, The Role of the Trust Treatise
in the 1990s, 59 Mo. L. REV. 121 (1994).
273 For modem assessments, see supra note 270. For popular perceptions, see Jerrold
K. Footlick, Too Much Law?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977, at 42. Likewise, the revisers of
the Uniform Probate Code have added to its complexity, despite the original drafters' call to
simplify inheritance law. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Criticizing the revised
Code's complexity, see Ascher, supra note 224. In fact, complaints about the complexity of
law may well be as old as law itself. Certainly, they pealed through the literature of the late
nineteenth century, as when one anonymous critic wondered:
[What are we to do with [the law's] vastness? Who can master and understand it, and
what is the use of law if common minds cannot find it out by study? Law becomes a
delusion and a snare if to know what it authorizes ... he has got to study a couple of
thousand volumes.
Codes, 9 ALB. L. REV. 33, 33 (1874). Yet, the same lament could also be heard early in
that century, as when Justice Story warned that:
The mass of the law is, to be sure, accumulating with an almost incredible
rapidity, and with this accumulation, the labor of students as well as professors, is
seriously augmenting.... [Ihe fearful calamity, which threatens us, [s] of being
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lawmaking as the formulation of conceptual compartments (now as then)
simply make virtue of epistemological necessity.274
buried alive, not in the catacombs, but in the labyrinths of the law.
Joseph Story, An Address Delivered Before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, 1 AM. JURIST 1,
31 (1829). For other early criticisms, see CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN
CODn cATION MoVE MEr: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REvRIM 8, 12-18, 36-39,
51, 55-59, 84, 127, 159-60 (1981); DAVID D. FIELD, The Codes of New York and
Codificat'on in General (Feb. 6, 1879), in 1 SPEEcHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS
PAPERS Op DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 374, 377-78 (A.P. Sprague ed., New York, D. Appleton
& Co. 1884) [hereinafter FIELD PAPERS]; 3 KENT, supra note 172, at 88 n.b; GORDON S.
WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 323 (1992) (quoting Henry
Chipman, 1806); Letter from James Kent to Simeon Baldwin (Jan. 18, 1795), quoted in
Joseph Dorfman, OCancellor Kent and the Developing American Economy, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 1290, 1314-15 (1961); and on a paranoid note, see THE KEY OF LIBERTY: THE IFE
AND DEMOCRATIC WRITINGS oFWILLIAM MANNING, "A LABORER," 1747-1814, at 132-33,
140-41, 146, 180 (Michael Merrill & Sean Wilentz eds., 1993) (ms. 1798-99) (suggesting
that lawyers had conspired to complexify law in their own mercenary interest). For British
references to legal complexity in the nineteenth century, see 2 AUSTIN, supra note 28, at
1092; and in the eighteenth century, see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *10-11; 2 id. at
*172; 3 id. at *265-68, *325-28 (also adverting to the complexity of the continental civil
law); 4 id. at *417-18 (blaming the Normans), *443; and in the seventeenth century, see
DONALD VEALL, THE POPULAR MOvEmENT FOR LAW REFORM, 1640-1660, at 69-70, 97
passim (1970) (quoting Francis Bacon and John Warr). But see Holmes, supra note 261, at
458, averring that:
It is a great mistake to be frightened by the ever increasing number of reports. The
reports ... in the course of a generation take up pretty much the whole body of the
law, and restate it from the present point of view. We could reconstruct the corpus from
them if all that went before were burned.
274 Generally on the psychology and epistemology of categorization, see W.K. ESTES,
CLASSIFICATION AND COGNrrION (1994). For an early discussion, see IMMANUEL KANT,
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 100-06 (.M.D. Meildejohn trans., Prometheus Books 1990)
(1781). Some researchers assert that the cognitive tendency to categorize is innate:
[O]rganisms... not only appear to have perceptual categories, but ... [may] also
display a sophisticated system of subcategories .... It is most likely that at least the
subcategory system, if not the categories as well, are acquired through experience and
not hard-wired. Both categorizing and subcategorizing are adaptive to highly social,
actively communicating animals, human and nonhuman.
Charles T. Snowdon, A Naturalistic VIew of Categorical Perception, in CATEGORICAL
PERCEPTION 332, 352 (Stevan Hamad ed., 1987).
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Indeed, this phenomenon, together with its systemic radiations, has come
to be an accepted aspect of human cognition in general. Whenever we face
highly complex decisions (of which lawmaking is but one of a myriad of
examples), human persons often resort to heuristic devises serving to simplify
the analytical challenge that those decisions pose. The choices that follow from
these simplified processes of reasoning are rarely optimal, but they are usually
good enough, enabling us to get by. Though not always rational, then, in the
sense of being perfectly thought out, these decisions reflect an efficient use of
our scarce cognitive resources, and so represent exercises in "bounded
rationality." 275
Of the many analytical short-cuts to which human persons have recourse,
one is simply the tendency to contemplate problems locally, without
comprehensive enquiry into their global interconnections. This sort of
reductionism renders the problem at hand far more tractable, often without
substantially degrading the decision's quality. But, as cognitive theorists
predict, "particular decision domains will evoke particular values, and great
inconsistencies in choice may result from fluctuating attention."276 It is
275 The concept has been developed over the course of a career in the work of Nobel
laureate Herbert Simon (who also coined the term). See his pioneering essay, Herbert A.
Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955), reprinted in 2
HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALrY 239 (1982) [hereinafter SIMON,
MODELS]. For a recapitulation, see HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFEAmS (1983)
[hereinafter SIMON, REASON]. Discussing heuristic processes generally, see JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURIsTiCs AND BIASEs (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). Of
course, Simon's model diverges from the assumption of perfect rationality still employed
and defended by mainstream economists, whose works have also been laureated. See Gary
S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. POL. ECON.
385, 402 (1993).
276 SIMON, REASON, supra note 275, at 17-23 (quotation at 18) (emphasis added); see
also Herbert A. Simon, The Bottleneck of Attention: Connecting Thought with Motivation,
in 41 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION: INTEGRATIvE Vmws OF MOTrvATION, COGNrrION, AND
EMOTION 1, 4-8 (William D. Spaulding ed., 1994) (discussing the efficiency of serial, as
opposed to parallel, problem solving). This tendency toward localized analysis may be
related to the "anchoring" heuristic, whereby persons asked to estimate probabilities tend,
in somewhat similar fashion, to focus on an initial factor in making the calculation and fail
to adjust sufficiently to take account of other ones. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1128-30 (1974),
reprinted in JUDGMENTr UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 275, at 3.
Another, related method of analytical simplification often employed by decision makers
is what Professor Simon (dipping back to the old Scotch lexicon) dubs saticing: "using
experience to construct an expectation of how good a solution we might reasonably achieve,
and halting search as soon as a solution is reached that meets the expectation." Herbert A.
Simon, Invariants of Hwnan Behavior, 41 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 1, 9 (1990). As Professor
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precisely this phenomenon of localized analysis, with attendant structural
inconsistency, that inheritance law so manifestly evidences. 27 7 Legal scholars
of late have taken notice of the intellectual frailties of human actors and have
applied the insights of cognitive science to substantive questions of legal
policy. 278 The time has come to recognize the jurisprudential significance of
our cognitive limitations as well: Bounded rationality profoundly affects the
Simon observes,
[plicking the first satisfactory alternative solves the problem of making a choice
whenever... an enormous, or even potentially infinite, number of alternatives are to
be compared .... Satisficing also solves the common problem of making choices when
alternatives are incommensurable, either because (a) they have numerous dimensions of
value that cannot be compared, (b) they have uncertain outcomes that may be more or
less favorable or unfavorable, or (c) they affect the values of more than one person.
Id. at 9-10. Plainly, all of these factors are present in the context of lawmaking, and so we
may anticipate that lawmakers will satisfice when they craft legal rules. That satisficing can
also result in inconsistency of choice is obvious. See Simon, supra note 275, at 110-11
(noting that when decision makers satisfice, the sequence of their search for alternatives,
and hence their ultimate choice, may be impossible to anticipate).
277 Localized analysis is not the only reflection of bounded rationality evident in the
process of lawmaking. Another heuristic specific to courts is the effort-reducing doctrine of
precedent. See infra note 303. Still another heuristic-the ne plus ultra of heuristics, in
fact-often employed by courts is encouragement of the litigants to shift to alternative
dispute resolution, to settle, or (in criminal cases) to plea bargain, along with the simple
refusal to try cases, either in whole (denial of review, etc.) or in part (resolving cases
without reaching all of the issues presented, etc.). Courts thereby relieve the cognitive strain
of complex decision-making by relieving themselves of responsibility for making any
decision at all! History reveals a long tradition of such expedients in the common law. For
some early variants, see J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCrION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 4-6
(2d ed. 1979) (discussing early encouragement of settlement and judicial decision through
supernatural oracles). Perhaps we should dub this the abstention heuristic. It is employed
often enough in lay decision-making as well ("Honey, you decide!"). Recognizing the
phenomenon, but tracing it to a different psychological source, see Richard H. Thaler,
Toward a Positive Theory of Conswner Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 39, 51-54
(1980), reprinted in RIcHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIoNAL ECONOMCS 3 (1991).
Dworkin acknowledges the cognitive limitations of judges implicitly-or rather
eponymously-by calling his ideal judge "Hercules." See DwoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra
note 243, at 264-66; DwoRIGN, Hard Cases, supra note 243, at 105, 130.
278 Myself among them. See Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts, supra note 63. For another
recent contribution to this growing literature, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Liits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211 (1995); see also LoPucki,
supra note 270 (addressing the dichotomy between law-in-books and law-in-action from the
perspective of cognitive theory).
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process of lawmaking itself.279
One might therefore be tempted, on reflection, to take a philosophical
attitude toward all of this. Call it a fact of legal life, and then call it a day. If
lawmakers are subject to natural constraints, a microscopic approach may, once
again, bring efficiently to bear their modest intellectual powers. In this sense,
structurally inconsistent law would still be teleologically sound, allowing
governors-and the governed-if not to make strides, then at least to make do.
But in truth, our predicament need not be cast in such fatalistic terms. Over
the ages, surely, some jurists have managed to take a large view of their
27 9 The fallibility of human reason is in fact an ancient theme in the philosophy of the
psyche. See Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts, supra note 63, at 18-19. That this fallibility could
tarnish the process of lawmaking was also recognized early. For the seventeenth-century
Puritans, it became an argument for preferring the laws of God over human legal
innovations. As the Reverend John Cotton put it, "[t]he more any Law smells of man the
more unprofitable." GEORGE LEE HAsKINs, LAw AND AurHORrrY IN EARLY
MASSACHUSETTS 141-62 (1968) (quotation at 160). For some eighteenth-century
Englishmen, the fallibility of reason became instead an argument for preferring the common
law over statutes. Though both were the products of men, still the common law was derived
from natural law and had been gradually cleansed of its human errors by the scourings of
judicial reconsideration over the course of the ages. See BOORSTIN, supra note 251, at 25-
30; DAviD IEmERMAN, THE PRovINcE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRrTAIN 43-47, 56-67 (1989). In the nineteenth century, Jeremy
Bentham remarked the "indolence or shortsightedness of the Legislator" whose rule was
"[n]ever to look further than your nose" as a ground for placing lawmaking in the hands of
an ingenious, far-sighted codifier. See LIEBERMAN, supra, at 245, 252 (quoting Bentham).
Blessed in equal measure with far-sight and insight, Justice Holmes came close to
anticipating the concept of bounded rationality when he noted that lawmakers tend to imitate
their predecessors:
Most of the things we do, we do for no better reason than that our fathers have done
them ... and the same is true of a larger part than we suspect of what we think. The
reason is a good one, because our short life gives us no time for a better, but it is not
the best.
Holmes, supra note 261, at 468. And in the twentieth century, the American Legal Realists
became interested in psychology and human fallibility as affecting the decision-making
processes ofjudges. In this regard, see JEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 100-
17 (1930) (observing that "judges are not a distinct race and ... their judging processes
must be substantially of like kind with those of other men... "). Charles Lindblom has
applied insights on the limits of human intellectual capabilities more generally to the
behavior of public administrators and policy analysts. See DAvID BRAYBROOKE & CHARLEs
E. IUNDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DEcISION (1963); Charles E. Lindblom, Policy Analysis, 48
AM. ECON. REV. 298 (1958); Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through,"
19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959) [hereinater Lindblom, Muddling Through].
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discipline. Roman law had its Gaius, English law its Bracton and its
Blackstone, American law its Chancellor Kent. Having methodically trudged
across the law's many vineyards, these thinkers could invest their scholarship
with a breadth of vision born of the long march.280 Their insight-and their
endurance-was impressive, but not preternatural. 28' And even if the steady
complication of rulemaking has rendered it all but impossible for today's jurists
to follow in their footsteps, traversing the whole of modem law, such a feat is
rather more than our situation demands. 282 Lawmakers need not be one-man
280 Blackstone, for one, perceived structural interconnections between different
segments of the law with notable acuity. He expressed repeated concern for the "symmetry"
or "uniformity" of the law and for the "connexions" within it. E.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 26, at *10, *35; 2 id. at *128, *376; 3 id at *267, *269, *271; 4 id at *443; Perrin
v. Blake (Ex. Ch. 1772) (Blackstone, I.), reprinted in HARGRAVE, supra note 198, at 487,
498; see also BooRsTIN, supra note 251, at 85-105 (on Blackstone's aesthetics). On
Chancellor Kent's perspicacity, see infra notes 287, 289; see generally David W. Raack,
"To Preserve the Best Fruits": The Legal 7hought of Chancellor James Kent, 33 AM. I.
LEGAL HiST. 320 (1989); Carl F. Stychin, 7he Commentaries of ChancellorJwnes Kent and
the Development of an American Common Law, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 440 (1993). Justice
Holmes, author of another classic treatise on the sum and substance of the common law,
had likewise "tried to see the law as an organic whole." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Address
(Dec. 3, 1902) in 3 THE COLLECrE WORKS OF JuSTICE HOLMES 535, 536 (Sheldon M.
Novick ed., 1995); cf. HOLMES, supra note 242, at 1, 36. Still another (often forgotten)
figure on the stage of early American law developed a similar global vision upon
assembling the first systematic course of legal studies in the United States. David Hoffman
urged his students that "the Law ... would assume no small degree of interest ... were
[they] initiated, so to speak, in its geography; were [they] instructed in the nice connexions
and dependencies which unite its many minute divisions, and conduct [them] naturally and
easily from one topic to another...." HOFFMAN, supra note 242, xviii. Hoffman added, in
a passage that will be sadly unusual to the student reader of today, that "[tlhese minute
connexions, this natural order and arrangement, it was the aim of the author.., to exhibit
in the following pages." Id.
281 Recent cognitive research suggests that, when they put their minds to it, human
persons can set aside reductionistic methods of analysis and tackle problems thoroughly.
They then engage in systematic processing, in contradistinction to heuitic processing. In
order to do so, however, persons must be suitably motivated and have the luxury of ample
time. Systematic processing is most likely to ensue within highly competitive markets,
where any diminishment of rationality is sharply punished. See Carol T. Kulik & Blissa L.
Perry, Heuristic Processing in Organizational Judgments, in APPLICATIONS OF HEURISTICS
AND BIASES TO SOCIAL ISSuES 185 (Linda Heath et al. eds., 1994); Robert Cooter, Law and
Unified Social Theory, 22 J.L. & S6C'Y 50, 55 (1995) (using different terminology).
Lawmaking would not appear to present such pressures; still, Blackstone and his fellow
travellers do seem to have been systematic processors, not heuristic processors.
2 82 Blackstone thought otherwise: "[Without contemplating the whole fabric together,
it is impossible to form any clear idea of the meaning and connection of those disjointed
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bands, with a single intellect shouldering all of the responsibility. By
collaborating, jurists can extend the bounds of individual rationality.283 And as
a practical matter, even a team effort need not strive to turn every stone along
the law's path. If our aim is simply to unearth oversights of policy, most of
these can be brought to light by throwing individual doctrines into "regional,"
as opposed to microscopic, relief. The more lawmakers widen the radius of
their search, the less likely they are to stumble upon congruent policies. 284
Barring, then, the comprehensive tour d'horizon, now understandably an
enterprise too heroic to contemplate, 285 jurists can cope by cutting swaths
parts, which ... form... the modem law... ." 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *196.
But cf. Langbein, supra note 272, at 593 (asserting that the comprehensive text, when
produced once, "[does] not bear repeating.... Breadth is the enemy of depth, and when
breadth is no longer needed, depth will prevail."). My own plea, as discussed hereafter, is
for policy analysis conducted at a level somewhere in between these extremes.
283 "[lIt is now clear that the elaborate organizations that human beings have
constructed in the modem world to carry out the work of ... government can only be
understood as machinery for coping with the limits of man's abilities to comprehend and
compute in the face of complexity ...." Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in
Business Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 493, 501 (1979), reprinted in 2 SIMoN,
MODELS, supra note 275, at 474; SIMON, REASON, supra note 275, at 87-88. On the other
hand, even group-thought often displays bounded rationality writ large. See SIMON,
REASON, supra note 275, at 79-87. One difficulty is the incentive individual members of a
group have to free-ride off the cognitive efforts of their fellows, a phenomenon known in
the psychological literature as social loafing, which, inter alia, "might prevent optimal
coordination of team members' efforts." Gary I. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: Political
Leadership in Hierarchies, in THE LIMIrs OF RATIONALTrY 324, 327-28 (Karen Schweers
Cook & Margaret Levi eds., 1990).
The modem technology of artificial intelligence may also provide means of
transcending human limitations on powers of cognition. See SIMON, REASON, supra note
275, at 91-92. But cf. Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Fonn
Molds Substance, 75 CAL. L. REv. 15, 26-27 (1987) (suggesting that the new tools of
computer research are pushing lawfarther in the direction of atomization).
284 In actual fact, the environment in which we live, in which all creatures live, is an
environment that is nearly factorable into separate problems .... We live in what
might be called a nearly empty world .... Perhaps there is actually a very dense
network of interconnections in the world, but in most of the situations we face we can
detect only a modest number of variables or considerations that dominate.
SIMON, REASON, supra note 275, at 19-20. For a more formal discussion, see Herbert A.
Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REv. 129
(1956), reprinted in SIMON, MODELS, supra note 275, at 259.
2 85 As Professor Friedman remarks, no modem writer has "dared" to restate the
whole of American law. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 272, at 624. Arthur Leff was making a
stab at it (albeit along a zigzag path) but died before he could complete his summa, the Leff
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through the jungle. All that is required is that they plot their course with some
strategic sense of direction. 286 To the extent lawmakers are failing to undertake
even this much, we may justly scold them for unwarranted timidity.
From an institutional perspective, what needs to be done? One useful tactic
would be for lawmakers to restrain so much as possible the proliferation of
categories and doctrines within the law, say, by fusing them together in codes
and restatements. Were symmetrical categories and doctrines joined, courts
would have no trouble spotting their intra-connection; it is only when the
Siamese-doctrines are severed that they may wander off in different directions.
Specific suggestions along these lines have been offered by various scholars, in
fact for quite some time,287 and it was this insight that inspired the drafters of
D'ctionary of Law. Even so, his aim in that project was more modest: to "know all of law-
one micron deep." Susan Z. Leff, Some Notes About Art's Dictionary, 94 YALE L.L 1850,
1850 (1985). See also 2 AUSTIN, supra note 28, at 1024 (noting the infeasibility of
mastering all of English law even in the nineteenth century).
286 Under the constraints of bounded rationality, "[s]earch is partly random, but in
effective problem-solving it is not blind. The design of the search process is itself often an
object of rational decision." JAMEs G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANtzATIONS 140
(1958). With respect to inheritance law, the adjoining fields of property and contract offer
the richest quarries for structural analogies and hence ought to be the first ones mined by
the policy analyst.
287 Grant Gilmore, for example, suggested uniting quasi-contract with promissory
estoppel-and more generally contract with tort-as a means of reconciling doctrinal
disparities. But, he added glumly, "the legal mind has always preferred multiplication to
division." GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACr 88-90 (1974). As early as the
1820s, Chancellor Kent espoused the condensation of future interests:
It appears to be wise to abolish the technical distinctions between contingent
remainders, springing or secondary uses, and executory devises, for they serve greatly
to perplex and obscure the subject. It contributes to the simplicity, and uniformity, and
certainty of the law, to bring those various executory interests nearer together, and
resolve them in a few plain principles.
4 KENT, supra note 172, at 266 n.c; for some subsequent echoes, see 1.1. Dukeminier, Jr.,
Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests: A Requiem for the Distinction, 43 MINN. L.
REv. 13 (1958) (see also id. at 52-55 for a discussion of other jurisprudential costs and
benefits of simplification); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Refomudating the Structure of Estates:
A Proposal for Legislative Action, 85 HARV. L. REV. 729 (1972). A bit later in the
nineteenth century, the Boston attorney Francis Hilliard began what proved a successful bid
to bind several writs into the single category of tort by producing the first treatise devoted to
the subject. Urged Hilliard,
I have... evolved a series of principles, far less fragmentary and disconnected, than
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Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code to merge the sundry security
interests of old into a single new security device.288 Such is a useful way
Qiterally) to consolidate the victory, once an apt analogy has been descried.
Still, it is left to lawmakers initially to ferret out the analogies, to identify those
categories and doctrines that have become needlessly balkanized; obviously, it
would not do to collapse them pell-mell, for many of them draw efficacious
distinctions of which categorical amalgamation might lead us to lose sight.289
they have always appeared to me when stated in connection with mere forms of
action.... From the very nature of these topics it may be inferred, and upon
examination will be found, that they involve principles of great comprehensiveness
... not requiring to be disconnectedly set forth .... I have myself been surprised to
find, for example, how many general principles are common to the great trio of
remedies, trespass, case, and trover....
1 FRANCIS IILLARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS at vii-viii (Boston, Little,
Brown 1859). On the crystallization of tort into a legal category, see also G. Edward White,
The Intellectual Ofigins of Torts in America, 86 YALE L.J. 671 (1977). For still another
early effort to unify a category out of previously separate strands as "a gain to clear
thought," see JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAiNTs ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY § 7 (1st
ed. Boston, Soule & Bugbee 1883); see also GRAY, supra note 1, § 782 (generally
advocating legal simplification).
2 88 See 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECuRrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 9.1-.2
(1965); Gilmore, Confessions, supra note 237, at 620. Within the field of inheritance law,
the jumble of existing will substitutes is ripe for such a merger. See supra note 39.
289 This is the opposite side of the coin, well illustrated by the so-called fallacy of the
transplanted category. See supra note 3, and accompanying text. Chancellor Kent, who
favored compression of future interests (see supra note 287), was more wary of
compressing the whole of real property law, which he felt needed to preserve many of its
refinements. See 4 KENT, supra note 172, at 345-47. More recently, noting the danger of
reducing fiduciary law into a single category, see Frankel, supra note 3, at 796-97 ("a
general theory might offer a temptation to force all fiduciaries into a theoretical straitacket,
thus sacrificing the flexibility of a more particularized approach"). Yet, the true categorical
dilemma arises when we identify legal doctrines that raise related, but not identical, policy
considerations. Here, it would seem, collecting the doctrines under a single, general
heading is at once salvation and curse: on the one hand, helping to call attention to policy
similarities, and on the other tending to distract attention from policy differences. The
decision to widen or restrict the scope of the "fiduciary" category may well raise such a
tension. But cf Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed Metaphor,
Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897 (advocating
expansion of this category). More generally on the costs and benefits of legal categorization,
see DWORKIN, LAWs EMPIRE, supra note 243, at 250-54; Cohen & Hutchinson, supra note
239, at 20-29, 53-54; Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 661 (1989); Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 131-37
(1970); Roscoe Pound, assification of Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 933, 944 (1924). For
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As always, a careful consideration of substance should dictate form, for form,
alas, is not without influence of its own.
Codification (whatever its other legion of virtues and vices, which has been
much debated) in itself presents a golden opportunity for structural
coordination, at least within its substantive dimensions. 290 Because a code is
assembled in one fell swoop, rather than bit by bit, its drafters stand in a
position to look down upon their work as a structural whole, to apply policies
where broadly (or narrowly) applicable, and to do so systematically. Judges,
who sit rather than stand, obviously occupy a different position. The chance
thus presented to harmonize law was one of the virtues of codification extolled
by its nineteenth-century advocates. 291
further discussions of my own, see Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankrutcy, supra note 63, at
247-48; Hirsch, Insolvent Heir, supra note 63, at 652-54. For discussions of the
psychology and epistemology of categorization, see supra note 274.
29 0 Of course, a comprehensive code, in the manner of the civil law, knows no
bounds; the broader the coverage, the greater the opportunity for coordination. See also
infra note 291.
291 E.g., Jeremy Bentham:
Law, blundered out by a set of men, who,--their course of operation not being at their
own command, but at the command of the plaintiffs in the several causes,-were
... completely destitute of the power... to operate in pursuit of ... any
comprehensive and consistent plan, good or bad,.. . and which accordingly never has
been, nor... ever can be, the result of antecedent reflection, grounded on a general
view of the nature of each case.... or the analogous cases connected with it: nor, in a
word, anything better than a shapeless heap of odds and ends ....
Letter from Jeremy Bentham to President James Madison (Oct., 1811), in 4 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 453, 459 (John Bowring ed., photo. reprint 1962) (1843) [hereinafter
WORKS]. A code, by contrast, offered the advantages of "conritency in design, and
unifonnity of expression." Letter from Jeremy Bentham to the Citizens of the several
American United States (July, 1817), in 4 id. at 478, 494. Likewise, John Austin: "And
which, I would ask, is the most likely to be bulky and inconsistent: A system of rules
formed together, and made on a comprehensive survey of the whole field of law? or a
congeries of decisions made one at a time, and in the hurry of judicial business?" The
drafters of a code can "construct every rule as that it may harmonise with the rest." 2
AUSTIN, supra note 28, at 660, 665-66, 672 (quotations at 665-66); by the same token,
pointedly, Austin objected to "bit-by-bit" codification as leading to disharmony between the
bits. "It seems to me that codification carried on in this manner (and which, I know not
why, has gotten to itself the honourable name of practical), is far more rash than any
conceivable scheme of all-comprehensive codification... ." Id. at 1094-95; see also infra
note 298. American advocates of codification parroted these themes. E.g., DAVID D. FIELD,
Codificaion of the Law (Nov. 28, 1870), in 1 FIELD PAPERS, supra note 273, at 349, 350-
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Yet here too, wrenches can find their way into the creative machinery. One
difficulty is the political constraints under which drafters of a code typically
operate. Codes are not enacted ab nihilo. New laws inevitably supersede old
ones, and in a democracy changes of rules and policies tend to unfold
incrementally; radical deviation from past practices is rarely palatable
politically. Continuity matters, and the preservation of inconsistencies of policy
is a price society willingly pays for that end. The drafter who would presume
systematically to harmonize the substance of a code risks losing political
support simply by virtue of the magnitude, quite apart from the merits, of the
legal changes such a code would comprehend.292 The drafters of the Uniform
Probate Code appear to have been sensitive to this reality.293
Along with the political dislocation that it entails, legal reform can also
exact significant economic costs. The very fact that a rule exists, even if it is
structurally inconsistent with another rule, or for that matter is intrinsically sub-
optimal, in itself can justify its perpetuation when persons have already acted
on the assumption that the rule is in force. In other words, legal mandates can
engender path dependence (to borrow a concept from stochastic theory): rules
can be self-reinforcing, to the extent that they occasion expensive social
reliance. 294 In the context of inheritance, for instance, such costs can be
53 ("Our law is in a state of chaos."); DAVO D. FfiLD, Reasons for the Adoption of the
Codes (Feb. 19, 1873), in 1 FMLD PAPERS, supra note 273, at 361, 363-64, 372.
292 Professor Lindblom noted the phenomenon in connection with policy analysis in
general:
It is a matter of common observation that in Western democracies public administrators
and policy analysts in general do largely limit their analyses to incremental or marginal
differences in policies that are chosen to differ only incrementally. They do not do so,
however, solely because they desperately need some way to simplify their problems;
they also do so in order to be relevant. Democracies change their policies almost
entirely through incremental adjustments. Policy does not move in leaps and bounds.
Lindblom, Mudding Through, supra note 279, at 84-85; see also BRAYBROOKE &
LNDBLOM, supra note 279, at 73. For an early discussion, see THE FEDERALIST, supra note
185, no. 44, at 282-83 (James Madison). Noting political resistance to reform in the area of
inheritance law, see Gaubatz, supra note 4, at 515-16, 541.
293 See supra note 129; see also, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-503
cmt. (taking pains to assert legislative precedents for the "dispensing power," discussed
supra note 33 and accompanying text).
294 On the phenomenon of path dependence (which can arise in inorganic-chemical,
biological, and economic systems), see generally W. BRiAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS
AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994). Discussing path dependence in connection
with legal systems, see Mark J. Roe, Chwos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996) (looking to the law of corporate governance for illustrations). I
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substantial. A departure from prevailing rules could necessitate the review and
revision of every preexisting will executed in their light. In such a case, the
game of reform may not be worth the candle.295 On reflection, the would-be
systematizer of legal rules may be better advised to leave well enough alone.
The task of legal harmonization also faces obstacles posed by social
dynamics. Assembling a code takes longer than drafting individual statutes. Yet
society evolves at its own relentless pace, refusing to wait for lawmakers to
catch up. By the time the laborious exercise of drafting a code is done, it may
already be nearing obsolescence.296 In short order, then, the typical code will
need to be decorated with amendments. But these often have to be added
piecemeal, on the spur of the moment, if further obsolescence is to be avoided.
Once again, the door will be open to thoughtless inconsistency.2 97 Codifiers
would add that path dependence is not a necessary attribute of a legal system, for one can
imagine a regime of dispute resolution in which all issues are continuously judged de novo.
But a system giving its citizens the opportunity for social reliance-that is to say, a system
that allows them to depend upon a path-operates to their great benefit, for then and only
then can they set about rationally planning their affairs. That, of course, is one of the
traditional justifications for the principle of precedent, whereby rules are blazed across the
legal landscape. See supra note 246 and infra note 303. Hence, although path dependence
has its costs, these plainly are incomparable to the alternative costs of pathlessness.
295 See Delaware Trust Co. v. Delaware Trust Co., 95 A.2d 569, 575-76 (Del. Ch.
1953) (declining to correct a misapplication of the rule against perpetuities in a prior
decision "because of the apparent reliance placed upon it by the Bar over a great many
years in drawing wills"); Wasserman v. Cohen, 606 N.E.2d 901, 903 (Mass. 1993) ("When
we consider the myriad of instruments drafted in reliance on [the identity theory of
ademption], we conclude that stability in the field of trusts and estates requires that we
continue the doctrine."); see also supra note 88. Professor Ascher has criticized changes
contained within the revised Uniform Probate Code on this basis. See Ascher, supra note
224, at 642-43, 648, 651-54, 657; see also Gaubatz, supra note 4, at 515-16. Down in the
trenches, estate planners are cognizant of the problem. See Timothy V. Barnhart, Updating
Estate Plans: A Structured Review, 10 PROB. & PROP., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 15.
296 In the opinion of one of its authors, the Uniform Commercial Code was "out of
date by the time it [was] enacted." Gilmore, Confessions, supra note 237, at 627. The
problem is most acute in connection with rules whose applications are affected by or
responsive to technology, which often evolves rapidly. For a brief discussion, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 993-94 (1995). By contrast,
inheritance law has responded principally to changes in family patterns (see UNIF. PROBATE
CODE, supra note 5, art. 2, prefatory note), which tend to move at more of a snail's pace;
in this context, as a result, the problem appears less salient.
297 Such piecemeal revision has led to inconsistencies within the federal Bankruptcy
Code. See Linda J. Rusch, Unintended Consequences of Unthinking Tinkering: The 1994
Amendments and the Chapter 11 Process, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J 349 (1995). Likewise within
the Uniform Commercial Code, compare U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1994) with U.C.C. § 9-312(4)
1158 [Vol. 57:1057
INHERITANCE AND INCONSISTENCY
who took a continuously systematic approach to legal change would be hard
pressed to keep in step with the ever-changing times.
Then there is the problem of coordinating the efforts of the code-drafting
body itself. Certainly, it did not help that the Uniform Commercial Code was
split into separate articles, each under the charge of a separate reporter.298 But
aggregation of organizational responsibility is not enough: the Uniform Probate
Code, still littered with inconsistencies, 299 was largely spared from the plight
of administrative fracturing3°° (though perhaps was tugged at by the centrifugal
forces of a procession of review panels30 1). Aggregation of responsibility could
(1994). These two sections were symmetrical under the original, 1952 Official Draft of the
U.C.C. Since then, however, § 9-312 has been amended twice. The history is noted briefly
in JAmEs J. WrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIIoRM COMMEmCLL CODE § 24-5, at 1148-
49 (3d ed. 1988).
298 Grant Gilmore allowed that "[one of the sad truths about the Code is that its
several articles were never coordinated as they should have been. The lack of coordination
between article 2 on sales and article 9 on secured transactions is glaringly evident."
Gilmore, Confessions, supra note 237, at 628. Jeremy Bentham anticipated such difficulties.
See infra note 302.
299 Substantive asymmetries within the Uniform Probate Code have been noted at
various points in this Article. See supra notes 42, 59, 76, 91, 115-17, 139-42, 209, 227,
233 and accompanying text.
300 The original version of the Uniform Probate Code was produced by a single
drafting committee. The task of revising the Code in 1990 was allotted to two committees,
one responsible for the substantive Article 2 and the other for Article 6 (dealing with
nonprobate transfers), although membership of the two committees overlapped. See UNiF.
PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, at 39-41, 458-59 (listing the committees' respective
memberships). Though the division of responsibility for drafting the Uniform Probate Code
has not played havoc with consistency in anything like the manner of the Uniform
Commercial Code, instances of inconsistency stemming from that division can nonetheless
be identified. For example, most "time ambiguities," discussed supra Part nll.C., are
covered by Article I of the Code. When it was reformulated in 1990, Article I was altered
to permit recourse to extrinsic evidence to clarify all time ambiguities falling within its
ambit. See UNw. PROBATE CODE, supra note 5, § 2-601. Yet one time ambiguity-the
problem of abatement-has from the start been arbitrarily classed in the procedural Article
nM of the Code, which was not revised in 1990. Therefore, inconsistently, extrinsic evidence
remains inadmissible to clarify the testator's intentions concerning how to abate her estate
under the revised Code. See id. § 3-902 & cmt. (not explicitly barring extrinsic evidence,
but mandating that intent to deviate from the statutory scheme of abatement must be either
"express or implied" by the terms of the estate plan).
301 For an early recognition of this danger, see Sugden, supra note 31, at 5-6. But see
Averill, supra note 117, at 904-06 (urging additional review cycles, on the "theory... that
the more persons to review a draft, the better the finished product will be"); John H.
Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Refonning the Law of Gratuitous Transfers: The New
Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REv. 871, 877 (1992) (suggesting that the Uniform
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even backfire if carried too far; too fw cooks can also ruin the broth when the
recipe is long and complicated. As we have noted, collaborative labor may be
all but essential; a solitary drafter, groaning under the production of a full-
fledged code, would soon fall back on less thoughtful, more mechanical or
derivative, drafting procedures. 30 2 Courts, of course, have often succumbed to
Probate Code benefitted from numerous cycles of review). At the same time, Langbein and
Waggoner add, "when helping hands materialize and the proposed uniform acts come under
deliberation in state bar association committees and in committees of the state legislature,
there is sometimes a disposition to tinker in ways that are ill considered." Langbein &
Waggoner, supra, at 878; anticipating this problem, see DAVID D. FIELD, Co&fication of
the Law, in 1 FIELD PAPERS, supra note 273, at 363-64. Alas, cannot the same difficulty
arise within the initial review-cycle process? I have recounted one illustration of the
potential pitfalls of the review process for codes (m this instance, the federal Bankruptcy
Code) in Ifirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy, supra note 63, at 242 & n.226. For another,
see Leff, supra note 175. For discussions of the problem as it pertains to the maintenance of
geographical uniformity, see Grant Gilmore, Comnercial Law in the United States: Its
Codification and Other Misadventures, in ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE COuMmRCIAL LAW
449, 461-62 (Jacob S. Ziegel & William F. Foster eds., 1969); Langbein & Waggoner,
supra, at 878-79.302 The issue has been a point of debate among codification advocates. Jeremy
Bentham recommended lodging the drafting process in a single pair of hands, inter alia, for
purposes of ensuring harmony:
[Tiwo, or any greater number of workmen, all equal in good intention and skill ....
but taking each one of them a different part of the work, will not render it so well
adapted to that same end as any one of them would .... Want of consistency in the
worknansho, is the cause of the inferiority in this case.
Jeremy Bentham, Codification Proposal, Addressed By Jeremy Bentham to All Nations
Professing Liberal Opinions (1822), in 4 WoRKS, supra note 291, at 535, 555, 558-59 (see
generally 554-59) (quotation at 555). (Ever the enthusiast, Bentham proposed to take on this
task himself: in a series of formal proposals, he offered, gratis, to produce a comprehensive
code of laws for the federal government of the United States or any individual states that
would engage him. Several governors expressed interest, but the War of 1812 and other
circumstances conspired against him, and the lex Bentham never reached our shores. The
relevant correspondence appears in 4 id. at 451-533, and the story is further elaborated in
CooK, supra note 273, at 97-104.) By contrast, John Austin, recognizing the practical
difficulties, urged the modern committee approach: "the code cannot possibly be made by
one mind;... [but] if produced by a number of persons working in concert .... [s]uch a
set of persons would be in a much more favourable position for producing a homogeneous
and consecutive whole than persons working in a disjointed and unconnected manner." 2
AuSTIN, supra note 28, at 677, 1024, 1093-94 (quotation at 677). But at the extreme,
Blackstone recognized that a full-fledged legislature, crowded with "discordant opinions,"
was unequal to the task of developing "a uniform[] plan ofjustice." 3 BLACKSTONE, supra
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analogous burdens of case-load, and their resort to analytical short-cuts is a part
of our problem. 303 Rigor juris and rigor wquitas are old adversaries; rigor
redactor would be one too many.
All of these impediments to structural consistency, even within a code, are
real enough. But they do not alone suffice to explain the level of disharmony
found within the modern codes. What appears to be missing from many of
today's code-drafting processes, however organized, is a fundamental and
deliberate alertness to the problem at hand.3°4 Such a want of consciousness-
not to say conscientiousness-is one of the Uniform Probate Code's signal
characteristics, despite its many substantive achievements. Commentary
accompanying the Code offers scant evidence that its various sections were
ever subjected to any sort of methodical, comparative analysis.3 05 With this end
note 26, at *267.
303 That the press of judicial business can turn legists into legalists is well enough
known. Formalistic reliance on precedent is itself ajudicial heuristic employed to streamline
the adjudicative process (though, of course, it serves other social and moral functions as
well). For some recent critiques, see Lea Brilmayer, Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S.
CAL. L. RLv. 363 (1986); John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CAL. L. RLv. 59 (1987);
Hirsch, Insolvent Heir, supra note 63, at 252-53; Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN.
L. REv. 571 (1987) (see especially 599-601); and early on, see BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRoCESS 142-67 (1921) (see especially 144-50); Holmes,
supra note 280, at 536; see also supra note 246 and accompanying text.
Though adherence to precedent is hardly incompatible with the search for structural
consistency-for a formalistic court may cite to analogous precedents-the search for apt
analogies requires at least implicit consideration of policy symmetries and therefore suffers
from the same drawback (i.e., consumption of precious time) that hampers policy analysis
generally. Hence, it appears likely that a court bent on conserving adjudicative energy will
be driven at once in the direction of formalism and in the direction of analytical narrowness.
3)4 This was not always so. John Austin thus spoke in praise of the ancient juris-
consults: "Each of these writers was master of the Roman law in its full extent; each had the
whole of its principles constantly present to his mind ... ." 2 AuSTIN, supra note 28, at
677.
305 See, e.g., supra note 59 (noting the drafters' failure to relate the standard of
evidence applicable to proving a holograph to the one applicable to proving a mis-executed
will); supra note 76, 146 and accompanying text (noting the drafters' failure to relate the
formalities required for contracts to make wills to conditional bequests and to the doctrine of
incorporation by reference); supra note 91 and accompanying text (noting the drafters'
failure to relate the doctrine of acts of independent significance to revocation by act); supra
note 139 and accompanying text (noting the drafters' failure to relate the evidentiary
exercise of establishing a holograph and incorporation by reference); supra note 209
(pointing out inconsistencies in the rules construing wills executed prior to various types of
changes in family circumstances that the drafters never compared in the accompanying
comments or in their scholarly commentary); supra notes 227, 231 (pointing out
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in view, I would urge the drafters of future codes to resolve hereafter to attach
a "relation to other rules" comment306 to each and every section of their
handiwork. That would at least set lawmakers to thinking and reading across
the lines.
V. CONCLUSION
Aristophanes was only half-right. Zeus remains enthroned, but He needs to
pay closer attention.
inconsistencies between the rules of lapse and ademption, and between the standards of
evidence applicable to extrinsic proof of intent to make a will and intent to deviate from
rules of construction concerning its substantive contents, that the drafters never compared in
the accompanying comments); supra note 233 (referring to other random inconsistencies).
But see supra note 39, for one conspicuous instance in which the Uniform Probate Code has
contributed to the intrinsic harmony of inheritance law. In a related vein, the Code also
manifests asymmetries of drafting style and format that have aroused criticism.
"Unfortunately, this type of inconsistent [format] structure detracts from the argument that
the 1990 UPC is a carefully crafted and integrated whole. Such inconsistencies might give
the impression that the Code is merely a crazy-quilt of provisions from various jurisdictions
and drafters." Averill, supra note 117, at 906-10 (quotation at 907).
306 1 borrow the term from RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) oF CONTRACrS, supra note 61,
§ 90 cmt. a.
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